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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis provides comparative evidence on corporate social 
responsibility disclosure (CSRD) practices by many of the world’s largest 
companies. Specifically, it investigates the relationship between company 
characteristics, institutional factors, the presence of a voluntary assurance 
statement, and internal contextual aspects with the extent of CSRD in 
sustainability reports. The thesis approach is based on legitimacy theory 
tenets to better explain the motivations of these prominent companies to 
communicate CSRD.  
 
The data collection focuses on the 2009 sustainability reports sourced 
from 460 highly visible public companies from 44 separate countries. Key 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) items are used as the benchmark 
disclosure checklist. The empirical results indicate that the average level 
of overall CSRD is 56.8 percent. Labour practices is the most disclosed 
theme by companies (66.4 percent) followed by economic (60.2 percent), 
society (57.0 percent), environmental (56.7 percent), human rights      
(49.0 percent), and product responsibility themes (46.0 percent). 
 
Statistical analysis indicates that high-profile industries, the presence of a 
voluntary assurance statement and a corporate social responsibility 
committee positively influence the extent of corporate social responsibility 
disclosures. Interestingly, companies operating in emerging markets 
disclose more sustainability information than communitarian or Anglo-
American jurisdictions. Consistent with legitimacy theory, these results 
suggest that companies which are more likely impacted by their 
community demonstrate higher accountability and transparency by 
increasing CSRD communication to better address stakeholders’ 
expectations. 
 
Overall, the empirical results have theoretical and practical implications for 
key stakeholders to improve drivers of CSRD. First, this thesis provides 
evidence that legitimacy theory can help explain the extent of corporate 
social responsibility disclosures. Second, this thesis adds new insights on 
the positive role of the voluntary assurance statements and corporate 
social responsibility committees in motivating companies to provide more 
extensive and higher credible sustainability reports.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
1.0 Introduction 
This thesis investigates the extent1 of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure (CSRD)2 of 460 highly visible public companies from 44 
countries in their sustainability reports for the 2009 financial year. Using 
legitimacy theory, the thesis empirically examines the interaction of 
company characteristics, the presence of a voluntary assurance 
statement, institutional factors, and internal context variables, to explain 
variations in the extent of CSRD across jurisdictional business systems. 
Considering the interaction of these variables may help to assist in 
explaining why companies provide such extra voluntary communication. 
An index composed of 79 individual indicators from the Global Reporting 
Initiative (2006) is used to calculate the level of CSRD. Further, the 
findings of this thesis enable a better understanding of the factors that 
explain CSRD communication. For instance, this thesis provides insights 
into how the presence of a voluntary assurance statement and a corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) committee motivate companies to provide more 
credible sustainability reports. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. It begins by giving the background to 
the research, the research’s questions and objectives,  its significance, 
                                               
1
The term ‘extent’ and is used interchangeably with ‘level’. 
2
Corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) is used synonymously with other 
terms such as sustainability reporting, citizenship reporting, social reporting, and triple 
bottom line (TBL) reporting.CSRD can be defined as “the provision of financial and non-
financial information relating to an organisation’s interaction with its physical and social 
environment as stated in the annual report or separate social reports” (Hackston and 
Milne 1996, 78). This definition covers six themes: economic, environmental, labour 
practices, human rights, society, and product responsibility (GRI 2006).The term CSRD is 
used throughout the thesis to describe the company’s communication of their economic, 
social, and environmental activities and impacts of company. 
 
2 
 
assumptions and limitations, and an outline of the thesis. Section 1.1 
outlines the issues relating to the development of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure (CSRD) studies. Section 1.2 provides the 
research questions and thesis’s objectives. An explanation of the 
importance of the thesis is presented in Section 1.3, while Section 1.4 
introduces the assumptions and limitations of this study. Section 1.5 gives 
an outline of the thesis, which is followed by a summary of this chapter. 
 
1.1 Background 
Recent rapid global transformation has seen an increased demand placed 
on corporations not only to perform financially but also to be good 
corporate citizens3. One of the most important aspects of this 
transformation is the growing importance of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) activities (KPMG 2008). The increasing demand on companies to 
be more responsible is evidenced by the increased corporate social 
responsibility disclosures in many firms around the world (Bebbington, 
Larrinaga and Moneva 2008). CSRD typically comprises information about 
corporation’s activities with regard to social and environmental issues such 
as enviromental protection, labour practices, human rights, community 
involvement, and product responsibility (Gray et al. 2001). It also can be 
seen as a mechanism that corporations utilise in order to provide 
information to stakeholder groups and to demonstrate the extent to which 
corporate activities are consistent with the relevant public (Gray, Owen 
and Maunders 1987). The KPMG International Survey provides data that 
corporate social responsibility disclosure has gone mainstream, with 
nearly 80 percent of the largest 250 companies from 22 countries issuing 
stand-alone reports, up from about 50 percent in 2005 (KPMG 2008). 
 
                                               
3
Corporate citizenship can be defined as “the ways in which companies enact the 
strategies and operating practices that affect stakeholders and the natural environment, 
combined with the rights, duties and responsibilities that companies have to the societies 
in which they operate” (Waddock 2006, 22). 
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Past studies document that the extent of CSRD is closely associated with 
firm characteristics, as well as general contextual and internal factors 
(Gray, Kouhy and Lavers 1995; Adams 2002). However, beyond these 
factors, knowledge about the process that underlie the development of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure is still limited, as the extent and 
type of CSRD practices differ from country to country (Gao, Heravi and 
Xiao 2005; Chapple and Moon 2005; Aerts, Cormier and Magnan 2006; 
Baughn, Bodie and McIntosh 2007). Furthermore, most prior studies have 
been conducted  in a single country setting. However, CSRD studies with 
data from a single country only face potential difficulties in linking their 
empirical results to the political, economic or cultural characteristics of 
broader jurisdictional units (Williams 1999). By contrast, the international 
comparisons made in this thesis offer deeper insights.  
 
This thesis attempts to overcome the single-country limitations of previous 
research by comparing corporate social responsibility disclosure across 
jurisdictions. In particular, this thesis explores the extent of CSRD 
practices in emerging market countries, which have not received adequate 
attention in previous corporate social responsibility disclosure literature. 
More broadly, this thesis intends to look at the extent of global CSRD 
practices using a rich data set in 44 countries. 
 
There has been international research examining institutional factors that 
may influence corporate social responsibility disclosure (see for example 
Williams 1999; Buhr and Freedman 2001; Newson and Deegan 2002; 
Holland and Foo 2003; Chapple and Moon 2005; Van der Laan Smith, 
Adhikari and Tondkar 2005; Xiao et al. 2005; Baughn, Bodie and McIntosh 
2007; Orij 2010). These studies note that country/region, culture, the stage 
of nation’s social and economic development and its legal and regulatory 
context are important determinants of the level and type of CSRD. 
However, these studies look at the influence of only institutional or 
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contextual factors on CSRD. They tend to ignore the impact of internal 
factors that influence the extent of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure. As argued by Adams (2002) the internal processes of 
reporting, such as those used to make CSRDs, may be influenced by the 
existence of internal entities such as a CSR committee.  
 
This thesis extends past research by investigating the role of the corporate 
social responsibility committee. Specific internal organisational systems 
are vital to enable companies to adequately monitor changing societal 
expectations and to mitigate the risk associated with these (Rankin, 
Windsor and Wahyuni 2011). The presence of a CSR committee can be 
seen as a mechanism of legitimacy and reputation, as its role is to ensure 
that the company is managed in a socially responsible way and the 
stakeholder’s expectations are addressed (Michelon and Parbonetti 2012). 
Hence, the presence of a CSR committee may potentially demonstrate a 
greater willingness and committment to consider wider corporate social 
responsibility issues within the decision-making framework of the company 
(Kent and Monem 2008). 
 
The emergence of and increase in corporate social responsibility 
disclosure reflects the increasing demand for corporate transparency. To 
enhance the level of CSRD, various stakeholder groups are also 
demanding a voluntary assurance statement in companies’ sustainability 
reports (Moroney, Windsor and Aw 2011). This thesis also examines the 
potentially related role of voluntary assurance statements in enhancing the 
level of CSRD. Past studies in the corporate social responsibility 
disclosure literature have not given sufficient attention to the significance 
of the presence of a voluntary assurance statement. In summary, this 
thesis adds the literature by providing a clear theoretical framework for 
understanding the determinants of CSRD. 
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To date, while there is no universal framework, a number of reporting 
frameworks have been developed to integrate CSR performance into a 
composite unified account. Despite the fact that these internationally 
recognized reporting frameworks differ in content and in the industry and 
region in which they are used, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is one 
of the most important drivers of the quality of sustainability reports (Li et al. 
2011). This thesis utilises the GRI Guidelines (2006) as the benchmark for 
disclosure checklist items.  
 
The GRI is a comprehensive measurement that investigates all aspects of 
corporate social responsibility (GRI 2006; Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni 
2011). Godfrey and Hatch (2007) suggest that it is important for 
researchers to consider all aspects of CSR, such as economic, 
environmental, and social aspects  The GRI (2006) Guidelines consist of 
six themes. These are economic, environmental, labour practices, human 
rights, society, and product responsibility. All of these themes are 
considered relevant for this thesis as they enable a more detailed analysis 
of economic, social and environmental indicators. 
 
1.2 Research Questions and Thesis Objectives 
In order to improve the quality and quantity of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure, it is important to study not only the current extent 
and quality of CSRD practices, but also to investigate the factors 
influencing CSRD (Adams, Hill and Roberts 1998). Therefore, the key 
research questions of this thesis are:  
(1) What is the extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) 
across the sample?  
(2) What company characteristics, the presence of a voluntary assurance 
statement, institutional and internal factors, explain corporate social 
responsibility disclosure (CSRD) communication?  
 
6 
 
To answer these questions, this thesis pursues two objectives. The first is 
to provide comparative evidence about corporate social responsibility 
disclosure practices using data from a large number of companies from 
around the world; that is, to determine the extent to which corporate social 
responsibility disclosure varies across jurisdictions. The second is to 
analyse how company characteristics, the presence of voluntary 
assurance statements, institutional and internal factors account for 
corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
 
1.3 Significance of the Thesis 
This thesis makes several major contributions. First, previous studies of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure practices have almost solely 
focused on annual reports. Few cross-country studies have been 
conducted using sustainability reports. Past studies generally assume that 
annual reports contain a limited number of key social and environmental 
information. The KPMG survey in 2008 finds that some companies still 
integrate financial information with corporate social responsibility 
information in the one annual report. However, the annual reports a limited 
number and narrow range of CSR indicators and information (Frost et al. 
2005).  
 
Some past studies have shown that companies now rely more heavily on 
alternative media to communicate CSR information, such as discrete 
reports or the internet (Frost et al. 2005; Ho and Taylor 2007; Joshi and 
Gao 2009). Such studies’ findings raise questions about the importance of 
the annual report as the main channel for conveying CSR information. The 
findings of Frost et al. (2005) posit that annual reports provide less insight 
into corporate social responsibility than stand-alone sustainability reports. 
Accordingly, this thesis focuses solely on sustainability reports as a better 
media source for capturing and analysing CSR information. This research 
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focus enables companies’ corporate social responsibility disclosure details 
in sustainability reports to be more fully comprehended. 
 
Second, this thesis explores the role of voluntary assurance statements 
increasing the level and credibility of disclosed information (Simnett, 
Vanstraelen and Chua 2009; Moroney, Windsor and Aw 2011). A great 
number of companies rely on assurance statements to improve the 
credibility and transparency of their CSR information. Over 60 percent of 
sustainability reports issued by companies in France, Spain, Korea, and 
Italy include such assurance statements (KPMG 2008). This raises 
questions about what drives companies to seek voluntary assurance 
statements on sustainability reports and, further, the extent to which the 
presence of a voluntary assurance statement changes the level of 
voluntary disclosure, such as CSRD. Despite more demand for assurance 
statements, research on the effect of such statements on corporate social 
responsibility disclosure is rare (Moroney, Windsor and Aw 2011). The 
empirical findings of this thesis will improve understanding of how the use 
assurance statements affects CSRD. 
 
Third, this thesis looks at companies throughout the globe using a rich 
data set in 44 countries rather than merely looking at the corporate social 
responsibility disclosure in a single country, as has been the case in most 
past disclosure studies. However, it is difficult to determine the extent of 
regional or global CSRD with data from only a single country, because 
political, economic and national institutions or cultural characteristics of  
broader jurisdictional units differ (Adams, Hill and Roberts 1998; Williams 
1999). Further, a multi-country sample allows for the introduction of 
country and/or jurisdictional specific effects as a significant institutional 
dimension (Aerts, Cormier and Magnan 2006, 302). Differences in the type 
of corporate governance systems (see for example Van der Laan Smith, 
Adhikari and Tondkar 2005), the type of business systems (see for 
8 
 
example Buhr and Freedman 2001; Chapple and Moon 2005), the type of 
legal system and the level of its enforcement (see for example Williams 
1999; Buhr and Freedman 2001; Holland and Foo 2003), level of 
economic development (see for example Buhr and Friedman 2001; Xiao et 
al. 2005), and culture (Orij 2010) are the main sources of variations among 
jurisdictions. These element have potentially important ramifications on 
corporate social responsibility disclosure and overall corporate 
communication (Aerts, Cormier and Magnan 2006). 
 
Fourth, this thesis analyses all types of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure rather than just a single social or environmental disclosure 
theme. Prior studies are often limited to very specific environmental or 
social aspects, and overlook elements of corporate social responsibility. 
This thesis utilises a more comprehensive measurement construct to 
better investigate corporate communication. By assesing all the types of 
CSRD, this thesis examines a broader set of values, issues, and 
processes that companies must address; it does this in order to more fully 
highlight their societal interactions (Ho and Taylor 2007). 
 
Finally, this thesis contributes to future research and development in 
CSRD by testing legitimacy theory. Legitimacy theory seeks to understand 
what factors may cause variability in corporate social responsibility 
disclosures and to what extent the variables of interest within an 
organisation may influence organisational actions in seeking legitimacy 
(Haniffa and Cooke 2005). Deegan (2002) and Islam and Deegan (2008) 
argue that legitimacy theory is  widely used to explain CSRD. They posit 
that corporate social responsibility disclosure in annual reports is best 
explained as a tool for maintaining legitimacy.  
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1.4 Assumptions and Limitations 
This thesis has assumptions and limitations that are consistent with past 
empirical studies. First, there are so many variables that could be 
examined as proxies of firms’ characteristics, institutional, and internal 
factors that may influence corporate social responsibility disclosure 
practices, that it is not at all possible to analyse all possible variants. 
Second, this thesis solely focuses on stand-alone sustainability reports. In 
doing so, it is assumed these documents provide economic, 
environmental, and social information. Third, it is assumed that the GRI4 
indicators comprehensively cover all major aspects of corporate social 
responsibility. Fourth, this thesis assumes that the 79 indicators used as 
checklist benchmarks in the GRI (2006) are voluntary in each jurisdiction. 
Fifth, this thesis focuses on one period only (2009) and an English version 
of sustainability reports, which limits the generalisability for other time 
periods and the representation of countries in this thesis. Finally, since the 
disclosure index is developed based on the information disclosed in the 
stand-alone reports, it may reduce the number of companies that could be 
in the sample. This is a limitation in that it is likely that bigger firms will 
have stand-alone sustainability reports, therefore the sample may be 
biased towards larger firms.  
 
This thesis employs a disclosure index to measure the extent of corporate 
social responsibility disclosures. It is assumed that each disclosure item is 
deemed equally important and therefore each item is awarded the same 
score when it is disclosed (Cooke 1991; Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995). 
Whilst, this could be questioned, any other form of weighting is fraught 
with problems of subjectivity. Moreover, the scoring approach gives a ‘1’ if 
an item is disclosed and ‘0’ if not disclosed, subject to the applicability of 
the item. This technique arguably loses the subtleties of different levels of 
                                               
4
 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Framework (2006) is intended to serve as a 
generally accepted framework for reporting on an organisation’s economic, 
environmental, and social performance (GRI 2006, 3). 
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disclosure of any item (Ho 2009, 205), but is justified and employed 
because it reduces subjectivity. 
 
These assumptions and limitations are common to most quantitative 
accounting disclosure studies. Despite them, it is argued that deep 
insights will be generated from this research thesis.  
 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises seven chapters and is organised as follows: 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction of the background to the research 
questions and objectives of the thesis, the significance of the thesis, its 
assumptions and limitations, and an outline of thesis. Chapter 2 presents 
the literature review of global corporate social responsibility disclosure 
(CSRD), various theoretical frameworks and the hypotheses development.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the research approach and the specific research 
methods of data collection, sample and sampling, measuring variables, 
model specification, and statistical testing. Chapter 4 reports the 
descriptive statistics and univariate analysis. Chapter 5 presents the 
multivariate analysis of the findings of the relationships between CSRD 
and the predictor variables, and the results of the hypotheses’ testing and 
sensitivity analysis. Chapter 6 discusses the implications of the thesis’s 
findings. Finally, Chapter 7 summaries the conclusions and suggests 
directions for future research. 
 
1.6 Summary 
This chapter provides an overview of the thesis. The research questions 
and objectives of this thesis are outlined, and its significance, assumptions 
and limititations are noted. The chapter ends with an outline of thesis to 
provide a more succint overview of its organisation. The following chapter 
presents the literature review and hypotheses development. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature in order to understand the 
research that has been conducted on corporate social responsibility 
disclosure (CSRD). Section 2.1 provides an overview of CSRD. Section 
2.2 focuses on prior theoretical perspectives and determinants that have 
been used in CSRD studies. Section 2.3 reviews past studies of the 
motivations of companies to provide CSRD information. Section 2.4 
presents the concepts and definitions of legitimacy. This is followed by 
Section 2.5,an outline the formulation of the hypotheses to test the 
relationship between CSRD and predictor variables. Finally, Section 2.6 
provides a summary of this chapter. 
 
2.1 Overview of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is defined as a concept, programs, 
policies, and practice that has been applied and adapted to a wide variety 
of business contexts, and the economic, political, cultural and social 
relationshipsthey have to the societies in which they operate (Baughn, 
Bodie and McIntosh 2007; Fukukawa 2010). Waddock (2006) defines 
CSR as the ways in which companies enact the strategies and operating 
practices that affect stakeholders and the natural environment, combined 
with the rights, duties and responsibilities that companies have to societies 
in which they operate.  
 
Corporate social responsibility arises out of the relatively simple idea that 
corporations have obligations to society that extend beyond mere profit-
making activities (Godfrey and Hatch 2007). CSR is driven by the need for 
social and environmental concerns to be included in businesses’ decisions 
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and operations, and for the increased interaction of business with 
stakeholders (Van Marrewijk 2003). It relates to complex issues such as 
pollution, waste, resource depletion, and workers’ treatment, the power of 
large corporations, local communities, product quality and safety (Gray, 
Owen and Maunders 1987; Branco Rodrigues 2006; Ho and Taylor 2007).  
 
Many companies have sought to meet the growing demands for corporate 
social responsibility by producing corporate social and environmental 
reports. Corporate communication in the form of annual reports, stand-
alone reports or websites is essential for stakeholders understanding 
companies and for companies to manage their external relationships 
(Joshi and Gao 2009). Communicating its CSR activities and performance 
effectively to its key stakeholders, such as customers, employees, 
investors, suppliers, and community groups, helps a company to build 
trust and credibility among these groups that matter most to them (KPMG 
2008). Unerman (2008) adds that corporate social responsibility disclosure 
is a potentially powerful medium which corporations can use to try to 
influence the perceptions of stakeholders, thereby contributing toward 
maximizing the earning potential of their reputation. 
 
There is growing evidence that companies are publicing their corporate 
social responsibility credentials by providing more CSR information 
(Adams and Zutzhi 2004; Adams and Frost 2007; Cooper and Owen 
2007). An increase in the amount of corporate communication on 
corporate social responsibility disclosure as well as the breadth of material 
covered may be in response to greater public demands for a more socially 
responsible approach by corporations (Frost et al. 2005).  
 
Corporate social responsibility disclosure has been defined by previous 
studies in a variety of ways. Gray et al. (2001, 329) argue that CSRD can 
typically be thought of as comprising information relating to a corporation’s 
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activities, aspirations, and public image with regard to environmental, 
community, employee,  and consumer issues. The term corporate social 
responsibility disclosure (CSRD) is used throughout this thesis to describe 
a company’s economic, social, and environmental impacts. Often-
mentioned definitions for CSRD which combine social and environmental 
aspects are as follows: 
 
Corporate social reporting is the process of communicating the social 
and environmental effects of organisations' economic actions to 
particular interest groups within society and to society at large. As 
such, it involves extending the accountability of organisations 
(particularly companies), beyond the traditional role of providing a 
financial account to the owners of capital, in particular, shareholders. 
Such an extension is predicated upon the assumption that companies 
do have wider responsibilities than simply to make money for their 
shareholders (Gray, Owen and Adams 1996, 3). 
 
Voluntary environmental and social disclosure (VESAD) as 
information voluntarily provided by organisations related to their 
activities, programs and application of resources deemed to affect the 
public. These disclosures extend beyond traditional financial 
accounting, encompassing details related to employees, products and 
consumers, community services and environmental impact, 
prevention and reduction (Williams 1999, 231). 
 
Corporate social disclosure is the provision of financial and non-
financial information relating to a company’s interaction with its 
physical and social environment as stated in corporate annual reports 
or corporate social reports (Hackston and Milne 1996, 78). 
 
Further, the GRI (2006, 3) defines corporate social responsibility 
disclosure as “the practice of measuring, disclosing, and being 
accountable to internal and external stakeholders for organisational 
performance towards the goal of sustainable development”. This thesis 
adopts the definition given by the GRI (2006) because it is broader than 
other definitions and it clearly covers six themes (financial and non-
financial performance), which are economic, environmental, labour 
practice, human rights, society, and product responsibility. Moreover, this 
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definition emphasises qualitative and quantitative measurements and it 
also considers wider stakeholder groups. 
 
As an attempt to codify best practice reporting, several bodies have been 
active in developing corporate social responsibility disclosure guidelines. 
Examples are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; the United 
Nations (UN) Global Compact; the United Nations Principles for 
Responsible Investment (UNPRI); the Coalition for Environmentally 
Responsible Economies (CERES) Principles; the International 
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 26000, and the Social 
Accountability (SA) 8000 standard. At an international level, the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) is arguably the most dominant influencing agent 
(Ballou, Heitger and Landes 2006). The GRI’s sustainability reporting 
guidelines are the most notable guidelines. They are comprehensive, 
respected and accepted as representing current best practice for CSRD 
(Deegan 2006; Christopher and Filipovic 2008).  
 
This thesis uses the Global Reporting Initiative (2006) Guidelines version5 
(G3) for several reasons. First, the guidelines are a globally accepted 
framework (Frost et al. 2005; Cahaya et al. 2011). Second, the GRI (2006) 
framework is considered the most comprehensive reporting guideline and 
has gained widespread credibility through a rigorous, global multi-
stakeholder feedback process (Li et al. 2011). It provides a structure for 
the base content of reporting (Bouten et al. 2011). Finally, the GRI (2006) 
framework informs organisations about how they can disclose their 
sustainability performance. It does this through guidelines, protocols, 
                                               
5
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Guidelines are first published in 1999. The second 
version (G2) is launched in 2002 and the third version (G3) in 2006. The current 
guidelines (G3.1) are published in 2011, and the next version (G4) will be launched in 
2013. As this study uses 2009 sustainability reports, the GRI (2006) Guidelines version 
G3 is the most relevant disclosure benchmark. 
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sector supplements, detailed lists of performance metrics and other 
disclosure indicators (Li et al. 2011).  As noted by GRI (2006), the overall 
goals of the guidelines are to enhance the quality, rigor, and utility of 
CSRD.  
The 2006 guidelines (G3) comprise three main parts, these being: 
1. Reporting principles. The principles are intended to help achieve 
transparency – a value and a goal that underlies all aspects of 
CSRD. There are a number of reporting principles, these being: 
a. Materiality. The information in a report should cover topics and 
indicators that reflect the organisation’s significant economic, 
environmental, and social impacts or that would substantively 
influence the assessments and decisions of stakeholders. 
b. Stakeholder inclusiveness. The reporting organisation should 
identify its stakeholders and explain in the report how it has 
responded to their reasonable expectations and interests. 
c. Sustainability context. The report should present the 
organisation’s performance in the wider context of sustainability. 
d. Completeness. The coverage of the material topics and 
indicators and the definition of the report’s parameters should be 
sufficient to reflect significant economic, environmental, and 
social impacts and enable stakeholders to assess the reporting 
organisation’s performance in the reporting period. 
2. Reporting guidance. The purpose of reporting guidance is to control 
the power to govern the financial and operating policies of an 
enterprise and to participate in the financial and operating policy 
decisions of the entity but not the power to control those policies. 
3. Standard disclosures. The standard disclosures are intended to 
specify the base content that should appear in the sustainability 
report. The disclosures are divided into three sections: 
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a. Strategy and profile. Disclosures that set the overall context for 
understanding organisational performance such as its strategy, 
profile, and governance. 
b. Management approach. Disclosures that cover how an 
organisation addresses a given set of topics in order to provide 
the context for understanding performance in a specific area. 
c. Performance indicators. Indicators that elicit comparable 
information on the economic, environmental, and social 
performance of the organisation (GRI 2006; Deegan 2007). 
 
In relation to the management approach and performance indicators, the 
GRI section on sustainability performance indicators is classified into 
economic, environmental, and social categories. These are considered to 
be three critical categories. Social indicators are further categorised by 
labour practices, human rights, society, and product responsibility (GRI 
2006).  
 
Further, the economic, environmental, and social performance indicators 
can each be broken down into two categories, namely core and additional 
performance indicators (see Chapter 3 for further details). Core 
performance indicators are intended to identify generally applicable 
indicators and are assumed to be material for most organisations. While, 
additional performance indicators represent emerging practice or address 
topics that may be material for some organisations, but are not material for 
others (GRI 2006). 
 
2.2 Prior Theoretical Perspectives and Determinants in CSRD Studies 
Several theories attempt to explain corporate social responsibility 
disclosure practices. Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995) argue that empirical 
investigations of CSRD practices have utilised a very wide variety of 
literature that draws upon many different theoretical perspectives. These 
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theoretical frameworks are agency theory, political economy theory, 
legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory, and institutional theory (Deegan 
2006, 272).  A selection of works that use each of these theories is listed 
in Table 2.1 below. 
 
Some previous studies have used political economy theory (see for 
example Williams 1999; Amran and Devi 2007), legitimacy theory (see for 
example Adams, Hill and Roberts 1998; Cormier and Gordon 2001; Patten 
2002; Newson and Deegan 2002; Ahmad and Sulaiman 2004; Haniffa and 
Cooke 2005; Magness 2006; Van Staden and Hooks 2007; Branco and 
Rodrigues 2008; Aerts and Cormier 2009; Faisal, Tower and Rusmin 
2012a, 2012b), stakeholder theory (see for example Roberts 1992; Van 
der Laan Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar 2005; Eljido-Ten 2007; Cahaya, 
Porter and Brown 2008; Brammer and Pavelin 2008; Gunawan 2010; Orij 
2010; Michelon and Parbonetti 2012), and institutional theory (see for 
example Rahaman, Lawrence and Roper 2004; Aerts, Cormier and 
Magnan 2006; Amran and Haniffa 2011; Cahaya et al. 2011) to explain 
determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosure.  
 
Current studies have also employed multiple other theoretical lenses in 
explaining corporate social responsibility disclosure practices (see for 
example Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni 2011; Coetzee and Van Staden 
2011; Mahadeo, Hanuman and Soobaroyen 2011). Legitimacy theory is 
widely used to explain the motivations and determinants of companies that 
engage in CSRD (see Table 2.2). Consistent with Deegan (2002), Table 
2.1 and Table 2.2 show that corporate social responsibility disclosure is 
most relevant explained as a tool for maintaining legitimacy. This thesis 
thus utilises legitimacy theory as the theoretical framework to explain 
variations incorporate social responsibility disclosure practices. 
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The growing amount of accounting research in the corporate social 
responsibility disclosure area has generally focused on the extent and 
determinants of CSRD in a single country (see for example Trotman and 
Bradley 1981; Teoh and Thong 1984; Cowen, Ferreri and Parker 1987; 
Belkaoui and Karpik 1989; Patten 1991; Ness and Mirza 1991; Roberts 
1992;  Patten 1991; Hackston and Milne 1996; Deegan and Gordon 1996; 
Neu, Warsame and Pedwell 1998; Tsang 1998; Cormier and Gordon 
2001; Patten 2002; Cormier and Magnan 2003; Al-Tuwaijiri, Christensen 
and Hughes 2004; Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Cormier, Magnan and Van 
Velthoven 2005; Gao, Heravi and Xiao 2005; Naser et al. 2006; Nurhayati, 
Brown and Tower 2006; Magness 2006; Branco and Rodrigues 2008, 
2008a; Clarkson et al. 2008, Said, Zainuddin and Haron 2009; Reverte 
2009; Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni 2011; Coetzee and Van Staden 
2011; Mahadeo, Hanuman and Soobaroyen 2011). On the international 
front, research is now examining the institutional factors that influence 
CSRD (see for example Adams, Hill and Roberts 1998; Williams 1999; 
Buhr and Freedman 2001; Newson and Deegan 2002; Holland and Foo 
2003; Welford 2005; Chapple and Moon 2005; Van der Laan Smith, 
Adhikari and Tondkar 2005; Xiao et al. 2005; Baughn, Bodie and McIntosh 
2007; Ho and Taylor 2007; Aerts and Cormier 2009). These studies have 
concluded that country of origin (Newson and Deegan 2002; Van der Laan 
Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar 2005), cultural and institutional factors (Buhr 
and Freedman 2001), the stage of a nation’s social and economic 
development (Chapple and Moon 2005; Xiao et al. 2005), legal and 
regulatory context (Holland and Foo 2003), and jurisdictional business 
systems (Faisal, Tower, and Rusmin 2012a, 2012b) are important 
determinants of the level and type of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure. Baughn, Bodie and McIntosh (2007) argue that the relationship 
between corporate social responsibility disclosure and a country’s 
economic, political, and social contexts reflects the importance of a 
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country having the requisite institutional capacity to promote and support 
corporate social responsibility disclosure practices.  
 
Table 2.1 provides a summary of past studies with regard to the 
determinants of and theories applied to CSRD. This review is intended to 
develop the direction and the key of areas examination of this thesis by 
integrating many prior studies which have examined the effect of specific 
of company characteristics with companies operating in a single and/or 
multiple country from a single or multiple theories. These studies are 
presented in order from the oldest to the most recent. 
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Table 2.1 Prior Theoretical Perspectives and Determinants in CSRD Studies 
Study Sample of Study Theory Determinants of CSRD 
Trotman and Bradley (1981) 207 Australian firms Not specified Size, social pressures, management decision 
Teoh and Thong (1984) 100 Malaysian firms Not specified Size, country of origin, ownership 
Cowen, Ferreri and Parker (1987) 134 US firms Not specified Size, industry 
Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) 23 US firms Not specified Leverage, size, systematic risk, ROA 
Andrew et al. (1989) 119 Malaysian and Singaporean firms Not specified Size 
Patten (1991) 156 Fortune 500 firms Legitimacy Size, industry 
Ness and Mirza (1991) 131 UK firms Agency Industry 
Roberts (1992) 130 Fortune 500 firms Stakeholder Political committee, leverage, public affairs staff, 
philanthropic, ROE, risk, age, industry 
Hackston and Milne (1996) 47 New Zealand firms Not specified Size, industry  
Deegan and Gordon (1996) 197 Australian firms Not specified Size , industry type 
Tsang (1998) 17 Singaporean firms Not specified Industry 
Adams, Hill and Roberts (1998) 150 firms from 6 countries Legitimacy Size, industry, country of domicile 
Williams (1999) 356 firms from 7 countries Political economy Culture, political & civil system, size, industry  
Moneva and Llena (2000) 160 Spanish firms Stakeholder International operations 
Buhr and Freedman (2001) 248 US and Canadian firms Not specified Culture, institutional factors  
Cormier and Gordon (2001) 3 Canadian firms Legitimacy Ownership status, size 
Newson and Deegan (2002) 150 multinational firms Legitimacy Country of origin, industry  
Patten (2002) 122 US firms Legitimacy Media 
Gao, Heravi and Xiao (2005) 33 Hong Kong firms Not specified Size, industry 
Cormier, Magnan and Van Velthoven 
(2005) 
337 German firms Institutional Risk, ownership, fixed assets, size, age 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) 160 Malaysian firms Legitimacy Culture, governance characteristics, size, multiple 
listings, industry, profitability 
 
21 
 
Table 2.1 (continued)    
Study Sample of Study Theory Determinants of CSRD 
Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari and 
Tondkar (2005) 
58 firms from US, Denmark, Norway Stakeholder Country of origin 
Magness (2006) 44 Canadian firms Legitimacy Size, external financing, press releases 
Ho and Taylor (2007) 50 Japanese & US firms Not specified Size, profitability, leverage, industry 
Clarkson et al. (2008) 191 US firms Socio political Economic performance 
Brammer and Pavelin (2008) 450 UK firms Not specified Size, industry 
Branco and Rodrigues (2008) 12 Portuguese firms Legitimacy Size 
Kent and Monem (2008) 22 Australian firms Not specified Media, audit committee, CSR committee 
Joshi and Gao (2009) 49 multinational firms Not specified Size, profitability 
Liu and Anbumozhi 175 Chinese firms Not specified Government power, size 
Aerts and Cormier (2009) 158 firms from US and Canada Legitimacy Industry, leverage, media exposure, environmental 
performance  
Da Silva M and Aibar-Guzman (2009) 109 Portuguese firms Not specified Size, quotation on the stock market 
Reverte (2009) 46 Spanish firms Not specified Size, industry, media 
Orij (2010) 600 firms from 22 countries Stakeholder Culture 
Dilling (2010) 124 firms from 25 countries Not specified Size, governance committee 
Islam and Deegan (2010) 2 multinational firms Legitimacy, media-
agenda 
Media 
Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni (2011) 187 Australian firms Institutional 
governance theory 
Governance, Environmental Management System, 
size, industry  
Coetzee and Van Staden (2011) 19 South African firms Stakeholder, 
Legitimacy, media-
agenda  
Size, risk, social performance, number of fatalities 
Mallin and Michelon (2011) 100 KLD firms Legitimacy CSR committee, CEO duality,  multiple 
directorships 
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As highlighted in Table 2.1, Trotman and Bradley (1981) investigate why 
companies provide corporate social responsibility information and examine 
association between characteristics of companies (size, systematic risk, 
social pressures and management’s decision horizon) and corporate 
social responsibility disclosure. They look at 207 firms listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). Their results demonstrate that 
companies which provide CSR information are on average, larger in size 
and have a higher systematic risk. In addition, their results show that there 
is a positive association between company size, degree of social 
pressures and long-term decisions-making and the amount of CSRD. 
 
Teoh and Thong (1984) examine corporate social responsibility disclosure 
100 Malaysian companies using the questionnaire survey approach. They 
also use personal interviews with senior management to obtain 
information regarding aspects of corporate social performance and 
reporting, namely social awareness and social involvement. They find that 
most of the companies interviewed state that they focus on social 
involvement, specifically relating to employees and product/services. Their 
results show that company size, country of origin, and corporate 
ownership have a significant impact on the extent of CSRD. 
 
Cowen, Ferreri and Parker (1987) test the relationship between corporate 
characteristics (size, and industry type) and the propensity to disclose 
types of CSR information. A sample of 134 US Fortune 500 companies 
operating in ten industries is used. Their results show that corporate size 
has a significant impact upon environment, energy, fair business practice, 
community involvement and other disclosures. Industry category also 
appears to have influenced on energy and community involvement 
communication. 
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Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) investigate the relationship between a firm’s 
social disclosure, social performance and economic performance. Using 
23 of the US’s leading companies, they find that there is a significant and 
positive association between social disclosure and social performance, 
social disclosure and political visibility (i.e. size and systematic risk), and a 
negative association between social disclosure and contracting and 
monitoring costs (measured by leverage). 
 
Andrew et al. (1989) provide evidence about corporate social responsibility 
disclosure practices in Malaysia and Singapore. Using 119 annual reports 
of publicly-listed companies for the year ending 1983, they find that the 
level of CSRD in both countries is 26 percent. Large and medium size 
companies disclosed more social information than small companies. 
Moreover, they note the human resources are the main type of social 
information disclosed by companies. 
 
Patten (1991) studies corporate social responsibility disclosure through the 
lens of legitimacy theory. He examines whether CSRD relates to public 
pressure and firm profitability. the level of CSRD is measured by counting 
the number of pages of disclosure in the annual report for each seven 
themes: the environment, energy, fair business practices, human 
resources, community involvement, products, and other disclosures. The 
public pressure variable is measured by firm size and industry 
classification. 156 US companies listed on the Fortune 500 in 1985 are 
utilised as his sample. The results reveal that size and industry are 
significant predictor variables as determinants of CSRD US company. 
 
Ness and Mirza (1991) utilise agency theory to test the relationship 
between environmental disclosures and type of industry. Focusing on 131 
leading UK companies in 1984, their results indicate that there is a positive 
association between environmental disclosure and type of industry. In 
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addition, they argue that oil companies disclose more environmental 
issues as they are perceived to be damaging the environment, thus their 
managements place a heavier emphasis on environmental disclosure in 
annual reports. 
 
Roberts (1992) empirically tests the determinants of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure. Stakeholder power, strategic posture, and a 
company’s past and current economic performance are used to explain 
the level of correlation between CSRD and economic performance. Three 
stakeholder power variables included are: percentage of ownership in the 
firm held by management and shareholders holding more than 5 percent 
of common stock, amounts contributed by the firm to its corporate political 
action committee, and average debt to equity ratio. Two strategic posture 
variables included are the average number of public affairs staff employed 
by the firm and the sponsorship of a philanthropic foundation by the firm. 
Economic performance is measured by the average annual change in 
return on equity (ROE) and systematic risk. By using a sample from 130 
large Fortune 500 companies, Roberts marshals strong evidence that the 
intensity of stakeholder power, strategic posture, and economic 
performance can predict or explain CSRD.  
 
Hackston and Milne (1996) provide a description of New Zealand 
companies’ corporate social responsibility disclosure practices. They 
examine the determinants of CSRD among these companies (size, 
industry, profitability, and country of ownership). Using the largest 47 
companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange in 1992 as their 
sample. Six types of social disclosure are used to measure the extent of 
CSRD. The six categories are environment, energy, employee health and 
safety, employee other, products, and community involvement. Their 
results show that size, industry, and country of ownership are 
determinants of CSRD.     
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Deegan and Gordon (1996) explore the environmental disclosure 
practices of 197 Australian companies from 1981 to 1991. They find that, 
first, the amount of environmental disclosure in Australia is low, on 
average 186 words. Second, in the period of 1988 to 1991 there is an 
increase in environmental disclosure which they posit is caused by an 
increasing  number of companies. Finally, they find that there are 
statistically significant relationships between the size of company, industry 
type and the level of environmental disclosure. 
 
Tsang (1998) uses a longitudinal study of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure in Singapore, based on 17 companies from three industries, 
namely banking, food and beverages, and hotel. The period covered is 
1986 to 1995. His study uses four specific social responsibility 
themes─namely, the environment, human resources, community 
involvement, and other category. The results show that most information 
disclosed is in the areas of human resources and community. In addition, 
the industry type affects the level of CSRD. For example, the banking 
industry have the highest of proportion of companies disclosing corporate 
social responsibility information followed by food and beverages and then 
hotels.      
 
Adams, Hill and Roberts (1998) identify factors that influence the 
corporate social responsibility disclosure of 150 firms in six European 
countries in 1993. These countries are France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. The content analysis approach is used 
to measure the extent of CSRD. Legitimacy tenets are employed to 
explain the motivation of firms to disclose their corporate social 
responsibility disclosure practices. Their results show that the extent of 
CSRD is positively related to the size of firm and the type of industry. 
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Using samples from seven Asia-Pacific countries, Williams (1999) looks at 
the corporate social responsibility disclosure practices of 356 firms from 
Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, 
and Malaysia for the year 1994. Five themes of CSRD, namely the 
environment, energy, human resources, products and customers, and 
community involvement are analysed by content analysis to measure the 
extent of CSRD in each country. His findings indicate that the extent of 
CSRD is negatively related to culture (uncertainty avoidance and 
masculinity) and political system. His results also show that size and 
industry type affect the extent of CSRD. 
 
Buhr and Freedman (2001) explore the role of culture and institutional 
factors on voluntary environmental disclosure. Using a longitudinal 
approach, they compare the environmental disclosure of 56 Canadian and 
US firms in 1988 and 68 firms (in each country) in 1994. Using content 
analysis methods, they measure the level of environmental disclosure in 
four areas: legal events and/or capital expenditure (costs), emissions, 
management, and miscellaneous. The results show that the extent of 
environmental disclosure of Canadian firms is higher than US firms both in 
the year 1988 and in the year 1994. They argue that the differences in the 
level of disclosure are affected by political system and business climate. 
 
Newson and Deegan (2002) look at corporate social responsibility 
disclosure practices in Australia, Singapore, and South Korea. Specifically, 
they examine whether large multinational corporations adopt similar CSRD 
policies and if not, whether the dissimilarities are affected by country of 
origin and industry of operation. Using 149 large multinational firms, they 
investigate the extent of CSRD in eight themes, namely environmental, 
energy, diversity, fair business practices, human resources, community 
involvement, products, and other. Their results find that the extent of 
CSRD is 19 percent. Human resources have the highest levels of 
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disclosure by companies, followed by community involvement. As for 
disclosure in each country, they find that the level of CSRD of Australian 
firms is the highest, followed by Singapore and South Korea. Australian 
firms provide the highest disclosure for health and safety; while Singapore 
firms have the highest levels of disclosure for training and empowering 
employees. South Korean firms disclose most about protecting the 
environment from their operations and products. The authors conclude 
that country of origin and industry of operation as the main determinants of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
 
Gao, Heravi and Xiao (2005) investigate the determinants of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure in 154 annual reports of 33 Hong Kong 
listed companies from 1993 to 1997.  Their research find that industry and 
firm size have an impact on the level of disclosure. Cormier, Magnan and 
Van Velthoven (2005) identify determinants of corporate environmental 
disclosures. Their sample comprises 304 firm year observations of seventy 
six large German companies from 1992 to 1998. Results show that risk, 
ownership, fix assets age, and firm size determine the level of 
environmental disclosures.                   
 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) explore corporate social responsibility 
disclosure practices in Malaysia for the years 1996 and 2002. They use a 
sample of 160 non-financial companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE) in 1996. Content analysis and a disclosure index 
approach are used to measure the extent of CSRD. Their results indicate 
that there is a significant difference in the extent and variety of CSRD in 
Malaysian non-financial companies’ annual reports. In addition, their 
results show that there is a significant difference in the themes of CSRD 
(the environment, employees, community, and products). Regarding the 
level of CSRD, the results indicate scores of 16.3 percent in 1996 and 
17.1 percent in 2002. The multivariate tests show that culture and 
28 
 
corporate governance significantly impact on the extent of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure. 
 
Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar (2005) investigate the 
differences in corporate social responsibility disclosure between 32 
Norwegian/Danish firms and 26 US firms in the electric power generation 
industry. From a stakeholder perspective, they investigate several factors 
that influence the stakeholder─firm relationship and identify whether 
countries with different emphasis (stakeholder orientation versus 
shareholder orientation) have a different levels and quality of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure in their annual reports. They hypothesize 
that firms in countries with a stakeholder orientation will provide a higher 
level and quality of CSRD than firms in countries with a shareholder 
orientation. Based on the content analysis approach, they measure the 
level of CSRD in annual reports from 1998 and 1999. The analysis centres 
on six themes: community involvement, environmental practices, 
consumer relations, human resources, product safety, and shareholder 
rights. Their results support their hypotheses and they conclude that 
country of origin is an important predictor of such corporate social 
responsibility communication. 
 
Ho and Taylor (2007) investigate the triple-bottom-line (TBL) disclosure of 
US and Japanese firms. They sample 50 of the largest firms in these 
countries for the period of 2003. Twenty disclosure items from three 
themes are considered: economic, environmental, and social. These are 
explored in annual reports, stand-alone reports, and website reports by 
using Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Guidelines (2002) as checklist 
items. They also examine the determinants of TBL disclosure. The results 
indicate that the extent of TBL disclosure (in all three themes) is greater 
for Japanese firms than for US firms. Their results also indicate that the 
level of TBL disclosure is higher for firms that are larger, have lower 
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profitability and liquidity, and are in the manufacturing industry. Overall, 
they conclude that the extent of TBL disclosure is primarily driven by non-
economic factors.  
 
Clarkson et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence of the relationship 
between corporate environmental performance and the level of 
environmental disclosure for 191 US companies in 2003. Their sample 
focuses on five industries, namely pulp and paper, chemicals, oil and gas, 
metals and mining, and utilities. Environmental performance is measured 
by the percentage of total toxic waste and the ratio of total release 
inventory (TRI) to total firm sales. A disclosure index based on 95 items is 
used to measure environmental disclosure. Twenty items relate to soft 
disclosure and 75 items relate to hard disclosure, each of which refers to 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Guidelines (2002) as the benchmark 
of disclosure. The results indicate that a positive relationship between 
environmental performance and the level of environmental disclosure. 
 
Brammer and Pavelin (2008) examine factors influencing the quality of 
corporate environmental disclosure of 450 large UK companies. Their 
findings show that high quality environmental disclosures are primarily 
associated with larger firms and those in sectors most closely related to 
environmental sectors. Kent and Monem (2008) examine the factors that 
determine the implementation of triple-bottom-line (TBL) reporting in 22 
Australian companies. Their results provide evidence that adverse media 
coverage, audit committees, and the presence of sustainable development 
committees are positively related to TBL reporting.  
 
Joshi and Gao (2009) investigate the determinants of 49 multinational 
corporations’ CSRD for the year 2005. They identify a strong relationship 
between disclosures of social information and (a) firm size and (b) 
profitability of the company. Liu and Anbumozhi (2009) identify the 
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determinants of the corporate environmental disclosures of 175 Chinese 
listed companies in 2006. Their main findings show that government 
power and firm size are associated with environmental information 
disclosures. 
 
Da Silva Monteiro and Aibar-Guzman (2009) examine factors that explain 
the extent to which 109 large companies operating in Portugal during the 
period 2002─2004 disclose environmental information. They find that firm 
size and stock exchange listing are positively related to the extent of 
environmental disclosures. Reverte (2009) analyses whether company 
characteristics and media exposure are determinants of the corporate 
social responsibility disclosure practices of the 46 largest Spanish public 
companies in terms market capitalization for the period of 2005 to 
2006.The level of CSRD is measured by ratings. The results indicate that 
larger firm size, more sensitive industries, and higher media exposure lead 
to higher ratings of CSRD. Dilling (2010) investigates the impact of 
company characteristics on the CSRD practices of 124 companies from 25 
countries. His findings demonstrate that firm size and the presence of a 
governance committee are associated with corporate social responsibility 
disclosure. 
 
Based on the review of past studies provided in Table 2.1 it can be 
concluded that company characteristics such as firm size, industry type, 
leverage, profitability, age, risk, ownership, and corporate governance are 
often significant determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosure.  
 
Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995) conduct a longitudinal study of UK 
companies’ disclosures from 1979 to 1991. They draw several 
conclusions. First, corporate social responsibility does not always appear 
to be a systematic activity. Second, CSR and profitability do not occur in 
the same period. Third, CSR is related to company size. Fourth, there is 
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some evidence of industry effects. Fifth, the country in which the 
organisation is reporting and the country of ultimate ownership seem to 
have a significant effect. Finally, there would appear to be a number of 
characteristics which may be related to predisposition to communicate 
corporate social responsibility disclosure data. These include capital 
intensity, age of the corporation, strategic posture, and the existence of a 
social responsibility committee. 
 
Adams (2002, 224) classifies the determinants of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure into three categories: 
1. Corporate characteristics (including firm size, industry group, 
financial/economic performance and share trading volume, price 
and risk). 
2. General contextual factors (including country of origin, time, specific 
events, media pressure, stakeholders and social, political, cultural 
and economic context). 
3. The internal context (including identity of company chair person and 
existence of a social responsibility committee). 
 
This thesis examines determinants as described by Gray, Kouhy and 
Lavers (1995) and Adams (2002).However, it expands on general 
contextual factors by including a focus on the jurisdictional variable. 
Another important new variable considered in this thesis is the presence of 
a voluntary assurance statement in a sustainability report.  
 
In summary, firm size, industry type, the presence of a voluntary 
assurance statement, jurisdictional business systems, the presence of a 
corporate social responsibility committee, profitability, and leverage are 
tested in this thesis as possible predictors of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure. 
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2.3 Motivations for CSRD 
Adams and Zutzhi (2004) argue that there are two key drivers for 
companies to act in a socially responsible way and to be accountable for 
their activities. First, a recognition of the power that companies possess 
and an acceptance by these companies that they have broader 
responsibilities than simply earning money for their shareholders. Second, 
a recognition that it is in a business’s interest to externally report (for 
example to build trust, improve their image and/or to minimise risks). 
Companies are likely to engage in corporate social responsibility activities 
and disclosure because of these two different kinds of motivations (Branco 
and Rodrigues 2008a). Some companies expect that having good 
relations with their stakeholders will lead to increased financial returns, by 
assisting them to develop valuable intangible assets (resources and 
capabilities). These assets can be sources of competitive advantage 
because they can differentiate a company from its competitors. Other 
companies engage in CSR activities and disclosure to conform to 
stakeholder norms and expectations about their operations (Branco and 
Rodrigues 2008a). 
 
Previous studies on corporate social responsibility disclosure have 
provided different explanations of the motivations of companies that 
disclose their CSR information (Islam and Deegan 2008). For 
example,Patten (1992) uses legitimacy theory to examine the effect of the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill on the environmental disclosure in annual reports. 
He examines 23 publicly listed companies on the Fortune 500 list in 1988 
and 1989. His results show that there is an increase variation in the 
change in the amount of environmental disclosure in company’s annual 
reports. His finding supports legitimacy theory, namely that companies use 
corporate social responsibility information to legitimate their activities. 
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Deegan and Rankin (1996) investigate the environmental disclosure 
practices of 20 Australian companies which were subject to successful 
prosecution by the New South Wales and Victorian Environmental 
Protection Authorities (EPA) during the period of 1990─1993. The 
authorsuse legitimacy theory to explain whether there are variations in 
environmental disclosure around the time of the proven EPA prosecution. 
Their results show that:  
 
Organisations appear reluctant to provide any information within their 
annual reports about any negative environmental implications of their 
operation...firms which have been prosecuted believe that there is a 
need to counter negative news of their prosecution with positive news 
about their environmental initiatives. That is, it appears that they 
believe there is a need to legitimise the existence of their operation, 
the legitimation endeavour taking the form of increased disclosure of 
positive, or “good” environmental news (p.59). 
 
Brown and Deegan (1998) use legitimacy theory to examine the 
relationship between media coverage and the extent of the environmental 
disclosure of 27 Australian companies from nine industries (chemicals, 
forestry and forest products, gold, oil and gas, other metal, pastoral and 
agricultural, sand mining, solid fuels and uranium) between 1981 and  
1994. Their results indicate that there is a relationship between media 
coverage and environmental disclosure. They argue that a change in the 
level of media coverage indicate that companies have a motive to 
legitimise their activities and that this confirms legitimacy theory.   
 
Deegan, Rankin and Voght (2000) review the disclosures of Australian 
firms in their annual report, in response to five major social incidents, 
namely the Exxon Valdez disaster, the Union Carbide disaster, the Kirki oil 
spill, the Moura Mine disaster, and the Iron Baron disaster. They examine 
how these companies respond to the perceived threats to their legitimacy 
posed by these incidents. The extent of disclosure is measured in four 
themes: environmental, health and safety, community, and human 
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resource. Their findings indicate that companies do appear to change their 
disclosure policy around the time of major company and industry-related 
social events. This, in turn indicates that management considers that 
annual report corporate social responsibility disclosure is a useful device 
to reduce the effects upon a corporation of events that are perceived to be 
unfavourable to its image. 
 
O’Donovan (2002) extends the applicability and predictive power of 
legitimacy theory. He investigates the extent to which annual report 
disclosures are related to attempt to gain, maintain, and repair legitimacy. 
He analyses three large Australian public companies. By using the quasi-
experimental method and semi-structured interviews, he finds that the 
decision of companies to disclose environmental issues in their annual 
report can be explained by legitimacy theory.  
 
Deegan, Rankin and Tobin (2002) look at the corporate social 
responsibility disclosure of Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP) Limited from 
1983 to 1997. There are three issues regarding their study. As well as 
investigating the extent of social and environmental disclosure over the 
period, they consider what type of information the annual reports 
disclosed. Finally, they seek to ascertain whether social and 
environmental disclosure can be explained by the concepts of a social 
contract and legitimacy theories. The extent of disclosure is measured for 
five themes: environment, energy, human resources, community 
involvement, and other. Their results provide further evidence that 
managers communicate CSRD information in their annual report to 
legitimise their operations.  
 
Cho and Patten (2007) test whether financial environmental disclosure is 
used as a legitimising tool. Using 100 US public companies listed for the 
year 2002, they find that companies which operated in sensitive industries 
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tend to display higher non-monetary disclosure than companies operating 
in non-sensitive industries. Moreover, they also find that for firms in 
sensitive industries, the extent of monetary disclosure is higher for worse 
environmental performers than for better performers. Based on their 
findings, Cho and Patten (2007) argue that companies use financial 
environmental disclosure as a legitimising tool. 
 
By means of a longitudinal case study, Tilling and Tilt (2010) look at the 
corporate social responsibility disclosures made in tobacco company 
Rothmans’s annual reports over a forty year period (1956-1999). As in the 
studies above, their study seek to examine the appropriateness of 
legitimacy theory in explaining CSRD in annual reports. Their results 
indicate that there is a legitimacy motivation, at least in part, underlying the 
CSRDs in annual reports.  
 
Table 2.2 provides summaries past studies the motivations of companies 
that make corporate social responsibility disclosures.  
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Table 2.2 Motivations: Why Companies Provide Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) 
Study Focus of Study Findings 
Ness and Mirza (1991) Test the relationship between CSRD and industry CSRD is used to increase management welfare. 
Patten (1992) Examination of the effect of the Exxon Valdez oil spill on the 
environmental disclosure. 
Environmental disclosure is used to legitimate the firm’s activities. 
Deegan and Gordon 
(1996) 
Analyse environmental disclosure practices of Australian firms. Environmental disclosure is used to legitimize the operations of firms. 
Deegan and Rankin 
(1996) 
Investigation of the environmental disclosure practices Companies use environmental disclosure to manage their image. 
Neu, Warsame and 
Pedwell (1998) 
Investigation of the influence of external pressures on 
environmental disclosure 
Companies communicate environmental disclosure via annual 
reports to manage the publics’ impression. 
Brown and Deegan 
(1998) 
Investigation of the relationship between media’s attention to 
environmental performance and environmental disclosures. 
The environmental disclosure is associated with the extent 
(variations) of media attention. 
Tilt and Symes (1999) Investigate environmental disclosure of Australian companies. Environmental disclosure is motivated by tax legislation. 
Deegan, Rankin and 
Voght (2000) 
Examination of the reactions of Australian firms to five major 
social incidents. 
Disclosure is a means of influencing society’s perception and of 
legitimising a company’s ongoing existence.   
Wilmshurst and Frost 
(2000) 
Analyse the link between specific factors and environmental 
disclosure  
Managements disclose more environmental data in order to respond 
to stakeholders. 
Deegan, Rankin and 
Tobin (2002) 
Examination of the  CSRDs of BHP. Managements release positive CSRDs to respondto unfavourable 
media attention. 
O’Dwayer (2002) Explain managerial perceptions of CSRD CSRD may occasionally form part of a legitimacy process. 
Patten (2002) Examine whether media coverage induces increased 
environmental disclosure. 
Corporations appear to use disclosure as a legitimating tool to reduce 
public policy pressures. 
O’Donovan (2002) Examine environmental disclosure in annual reports Disclosure is used as a strategy in response to legitimacy-threatening 
environmental issues or events. 
Newson and Deegan 
(2002) 
Explore the CSRD of large Australian, Singaporean, and South 
African multinational companies. 
CSRD is made in response to the concerns of relevant public. 
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Table 2.2 (continued)   
Study Focus of Study Findings 
Campbell (2003) Investigate the intra- and inter-sectoral effects of environmental 
disclosures. 
Environmental disclosure is used to deflect suspicion with regard to 
that area of potential criticism. 
Rahaman, Lawrence and 
Roper (2004) 
Test environmental disclosure in the Ghanaian public sector. Institutional pressure is related to environmental disclosure. 
Campbell, Moore and 
Shrives (2006) 
Examination of cross-sectional effect in community disclosure 
in annual report in response to public profile. 
Patterns of community disclosure are associated with the information 
demands of a company’s specific stakeholders. 
Villiers and Van Staden 
(2006) 
Identify the trends in the environmental disclosure of South 
African companies. 
Companies will decrease specific disclosures when they perceive 
them to damagetheir legitimacy. 
Cho and Patten (2007) Investigation of the relation between environmental 
performance and environmental disclosure. 
Companies do appear to use financial report environmental 
disclosures as a legitimizing tool. 
Van Staden and Hooks 
(2007) 
Examination of the relationship between environmental 
responsiveness and the quality of environmental disclosures. 
The responsive firms may be taking a proactive approach to 
organisational legitimacy. 
Islam and Deegan (2008) Explain the social and environmental reporting of a major 
garment organisation in Bangladesh. 
Social and environmental issues are disclosed in response to 
pressures from powerful stakeholders.  
Archel et al. (2009) Test the links between the legitimizing strategies of firms and 
the characteristics of the political environment. 
Firms use social environmental disclosure to legitimize a new 
production process through the manipulation of social perceptions. 
Bebbington, Higgins and 
Frame (2009) 
Investigate the CSRD of New Zealand companies. Firms that initiate CSRD do so for legitimacy and accountability 
reasons. 
Tilling and Tilt (2010) Examine the voluntary social and environmental disclosures 
made in the annual reports of Rothmans. 
Firms engage in legitimising strategies, including increased 
disclosure, when faced with a threat. 
Villiers and Van Staden 
(2010) 
Survey individual shareholders in the US, UK, and Australia 
regarding environmental disclosure. 
Companies disclose specific environmental information in order to 
reduce asymmetry of information. 
Coetzee and Van Staden 
(2011) 
Examine the safety disclosure of South African mining 
companies. 
Firms react to perceived legitimacy threats through increased safety 
disclosure. 
Cowan and Deegan 
(2011) 
Examine the impact of a national emissions reporting schema 
on voluntary emissions disclosure.  
Environmental regulation may act as an impetus for changes in the 
environmental disclosure practices. 
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2.4 Legitimacy Theory 
As noted in previous sections, legitimacy theory is widely used to explain 
corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) in annual reports and in 
sustainability reports as a vital tool for corporation to maintain their 
legitimacy. Many researchers have discussed CSRD practices within the 
theoretical framework of legitimacy theory6. Legitimacy theory offers the 
researcher and the wider public a way to critically unpack corporate 
disclosure (Tilling and Tilt 2010). The predominance of legitimacy theory in 
CSRD research has contributed to a better understanding of the motives 
and the incentives that lead firms’ managers to engage in corporate social 
responsibility activities (Archel et al. 2009). 
 
According to Gray, Owen and Adams (1996), legitimacy theory and 
stakeholder theory are both derived from the more general theory known 
as political economy theory. Gray, Owen and Adams (1996) define 
political economy theory as the social, political and economic framework 
within which human life takes place. According to Guthrie and Parker 
(1990, 166): 
 
The political economy perspective perceives accounting reports as social, 
political, and economic documents. They serve as a tool for constructing, 
sustaining, and legitimising economic and political arrangements, 
institutions, and ideological themes which contribute to the 
corporation’sprivate interests. Disclosures have the capacity to transmit 
social, political, and economic meanings for pluralistic set of reports 
recipients. 
 
Deegan (2002) argues that legitimacy theory, like a number of other 
theories, such as political economy theory and stakeholder theory, is 
considered to be a systems-oriented theory. A systems-oriented theory 
assumes that an entity is influenced by society and, in turn, that entity also 
                                               
6
 See Table 2.2. Other relevant studies are Ahmad and Sulaiman (2004), Branco and 
Rodrigues (2006, 2008, 2008a), Kent and Monem (2008), Joshi and Gao (2009), and 
Cowan and Deegan (2011).  
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has an influence upon society. A systems-oriented view of the 
organisation and society permits us to focus on the role of information and 
disclosure in the relationship between organisations, the state, individuals, 
and groups (Gray, Owen and Adams 1996, 45). 
 
Suchman (1995) as cited in Deegan (2007, 129), states: 
Systems-oriented theories have reconceptualised organisational 
boundaries as porous and problematic, and institutional theories have 
stressed that many dynamics in the organisational environment stem 
not from technological or material imperatives, but rather, from 
cultural norms, symbols, beliefs and rituals. Corporate disclosure 
policies are considered to represent one important means by which 
management can influence external perceptions about their 
organisation. At the core of this intellectual transformation lies the 
concept of organisational legitimacy. 
 
Central to legitimacy theory is the theoretical construct known as the 
social contract. Legitimacy theory relies on the notion that the legitimacy of 
a business entity to operate in society depends on an implicit social 
contract between the business entity and society (Guthrie and Parker 
1989). An organisation’s survival will be threatened if society perceives 
that the organisation has breached its social contract (Deegan 2007).  
 
Legitimacy is a relative concept; it is relative to the social system in which 
the entity operates (Deegan 2007). Legitimacy has been defined by 
Lindblom (1994) and Suchman (1995) as: 
A condition or status which exists when an entity’s value system is 
congruent with the value system of the larger social system of which 
the entity is a part. When a disparity, actual or potential, exists 
between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity’s 
legitimacy (Lindblom 1994, 2). 
 
A generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman 1995, 
574). 
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Organisations can maintain their operations only to the extent that they 
have the support of the community (Deegan 2006). Lindblom (1994) 
points out that there are four strategies which organisations can adopt to 
obtain or maintain legitimacy:  
1) To educate and inform its “relevant publics”─about 
(actual) changes in the organisation’s performance and 
activities; 
2) To change the perceptions of the “relevant publics” - but 
not change its actual behaviour; 
3) To manipulate perception by deflecting attention from the 
issue of concern to other related issues, through an 
appeal to, for example, emotive symbols; and/or 
4) To change external expectations of its performance. 
 
Legitimacy theory asserts that organisations continually seek to ensure 
that they are perceived as operating within the bounds and norms of the 
societies in which they operate; that is, they attempt to ensure that their 
activities are perceived by outside parties as being “legitimate” (Islam and 
Deegan 2008,  853). O’Donovan (2002) argues that the greater the 
likelihood of adverse shifts in the social perceptions of how an 
organisation is acting, the greater the desirability on the part of the 
organisation to attempt to manage these shifts in social perception. In 
order to retain legitimacy, an organisation is induced into being responsive 
to changing expectations (O’Donovan 2002; Islam and Deegan 2008). 
Further, if the activities of organisations are changed, these often are 
publicised by disclosure (Cormier and Gordon 2001). 
 
There are two major branches of legitimacy theory (Suchman 1995; Joshi 
and Gao 2009; Tilling and Tilt 2010): institutional legitimacy theory and 
strategic or instrumental legitimacy theory. Institutional legitimacy theory 
addresses how organisational structures as a whole (business for 
example, or the government) have gained acceptanceby society at large, 
whereas strategic or instrumental legitimacy theory describes a process 
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by which an organisation seeks approval (or avoidance of sanction) from 
particular groups in society.  
 
According to Lindblom (1994) corporate social responsibility disclosure 
strategies can be employed that correspond to each of these theories 
(Gray, Kouhy and Lavers 1995; Deegan 2002). Gray, Kouhy and Lavers 
(1995) and Mangos and Lewis (1995) argue that corporate social 
responsibility disclosure is a form of corporate responsiveness by the 
managers of a firm to pressures which they perceive and that, as a result, 
the managers then attempt to influence the social environment. 
Legitimisation strategies, if employed, may vary between countries and 
general comments about how managers react to particular events need to 
consider the specific national, historical and cultural context in which 
managerial and organisations operate (Deegan 2002). 
 
In summary, legitimacy theory posits that companies making corporate 
social responsibility disclosures are seeking to close legitimacy gaps 
(Lindblom 1994; Gray, Kouhy and Lavers 1995). Legitimacy theory 
suggests that higher levels of corporate social responsibility disclosure 
indicate a need perceived to maintain and/or restore a perceived 
legitimacy gap. This thesis employs legitimacy theory for two reasons. 
First, the review of theoretical literature indicates that legitimacy theory has 
been utilised by numerous researchers to explain the extent and 
determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosure (see Table 2.1 
and 2.2). Second, there has been little agreement about the evidence for 
or against various empirical instruments for testing legitimacy theory as an 
explanation of the variability in corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
This thesis extends previous studies by testing legitimacy theory in an 
international setting. 
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2.5 Hypotheses  
2.5.1 Firm Size and CSRD 
In previous studies, company size has consistently been found to be 
significantly and positively associate with corporate social responsibility 
disclosure7 (Gray, Kouhy and Lavers 1995; Deegan and Gordon 1996; 
Gray et al. 2001). Evidence supports the argument that size is an 
antecedent of legitimacy8. Legitimacy theory argues that firm size will 
affect the firm’s visibility to the general public and tends to create 
increased public scrutiny (Cormier, Magnan and Van Velthoven 2005; 
Aerts and Cormier 2009). Larger firms are more politically and socially 
visible, thus they are expected to engage more heavily in legitimating 
behaviour (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975) 
 
Patten (1991) states that size is often used as a proxy of public pressure. 
Spicer (1978) finds that companies with better pollution control records 
tend be bigger than companies with poorer pollution control records. Firms 
with higher visibility will tend to disclose more in-depth CSR information in 
an attempt to respond to the demands of social activists (Belkaoui and 
Karpik 1989; Adams, Hill and Roberts 1998) and to alleviate potential 
future regulation risks in the future (Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni 2011). 
Larger firms will provide more CSRD as they are more visible and 
therefore more accountable with respect to CSR information (Cormier and 
Gordon 2001). They are also likely to have more resources for 
environmental efforts (Liu and Anbumozhi 2009); therefore, they are able 
to influence the investor’s risk perceptions. Branco and Rodrigues (2008) 
argue that larger companies are susceptible to more scrutiny from 
                                               
7
See Table 2.2. 
8
For examples, see Spicer (1978), Trotman and Bradley (1981), Cowen, Ferreri and 
Parker (1987), Belkoui and Karpik (1989), Patten (1991), Deegan and Gordon (1996), 
Hackston and Milne (1996), Adams, Hill and Roberts (1998), Neu, Warsame and Pedwell 
(1998), Williams (1999); Cormier and Magnan (2003), Nurhayati, Brown and Tower 
(2006), Ho and Taylor (2007), Ghazali (2007), Branco and Rodrigues (2008), Reverte 
(2009), Li et al. (2011). All these studies find that the size of the firm is a determinant of 
CSRD. 
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stakeholder groups, since they are highly visible to external groups and 
more vulnerable to adverse reactions among them; by communicating 
corporate social responsibility disclosure, they can improve their 
reputations. 
 
Larger firms tend to face greater pressures with respect to policy issues. 
Companies that have more comprehensive policies regarding their CSR 
activities may use corporate social responsibility disclosure to respond to 
public pressures (Deegan and Gordon 1996). Larger companies 
undertake more activities, have a greater impact on society and have 
more stakeholders who might be concerned with the CSR activities 
undertaken by them (Cowen, Ferreri and Parker 1987; Hackston and 
Milne 1996). 
 
Brammer and Pavelin (2008) argue that high quality disclosures are 
primarily associated with larger firms, as the interactions of larger firms 
with society tend to be more numerous and hold greater economic 
significance. Such larger organisations also tend to be more visible to 
relevant publics. As a result, they attract relatively greater political and 
regulatory pressures from external interests. Reverte (2009) contends that 
the public pressure perspective of legitimacy theory is concerned with 
public and, consequently, government intrusions into the activities of 
organisations that are deemed to violate their social contract.  
 
Morhardt (2010) finds a positive association between size (measured by 
total revenue) and level of sustainability index. Small companies may not 
perceive any competitive advantage in reporting corporate social 
responsibility issues, whereas large companies are more likely to 
demonstrate CSR activities, because doing so could confer many tangible 
benefits on them. On the basis of the vast majority of past studies’ 
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findings, it is expected that company size has a positive impact on 
corporate social responsibility disclosure. It is thus hypothesized that: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between firm size and the extent of 
CSRD in sustainability reports.  
 
2.5.2 Industry Type and CSRD 
Past studies of corporate social responsibility disclosure have also noted 
that the type of industry influences the extent of disclosure (see for 
example Cowen, Ferreri and Parker 1987; Zeghal and Ahmed 1990; 
Patten 1991; Ness and Mirza 1991; Roberts 1992; Hackston and Milne 
1996; Deegan and Gordon 1996; Adams, Hill and Roberts 1998; Williams 
1999; Nurhayati, Brown and Tower 2006; Reverte 2009). For example, 
Eljido-Ten’s (2007) findings show that an industry’s sensitivity, 
characterised by increases in governmental sanctions as well as 
management’s concern for the environment, are significant factors 
influencing the decision to incorporate superior environmental activities in 
corporate strategic plans. According to legitimacy theory, the type of 
industry is a proxy of public visibility and public pressures.  
 
Nurhayati, Brown and Tower (2006) argue that greater government 
scrutiny in the form of more regulations, and higher levels of public 
interest, place more pressures on companies to better fulfil societal and 
environmental expectations. The degree of influence of industry type on 
corporate social responsibility disclosure practices depends on how critical 
the effects of an organisation’s economic activities are on society (Haniffa 
and Cooke 2005).  
 
Under the tenets of legitimacy theory, the nature of industry type 
potentially affects corporate social responsibility disclosure practice. 
Social, political, and economic pressures drive companies to disclose 
more in order to minimise pressure and criticism from society (Patten 
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1991; Nurhayati, Brown and Tower 2006). Williams’s findings (1999) 
suggest that industry type can explain variations in the quantity of CSRD 
practices among companies operating in seven Asia-Pacific countries.  
 
Roberts (1992) and Hackston and Milne (1996) classify industry type as a 
dichotomous classification into high-profile and low-profile industry. 
Roberts (1992) defines high-profile industries as those with consumer 
visibility, a high level of political risk and/or concentrated and intense 
competition. For instance, companies whose economic activities modify 
the environment (i.e. resources companies) are more closely monitored for 
environmental performance than companies in other industries. Hackston 
and Milne (1996) provide evidence that companies in high-profile 
industries disclose significantly more CSR information than those in low-
profile industries.  
 
Overall, the more sensitive industries are considered to be those that have 
a greater likelihood of being criticized in corporate social responsibility 
matters, because their activities are perceived as being of higher risk 
(Reverte 2009). Based on these arguments the following hypothesis is 
posited : 
 
H2:  Firms in high-profile industries will provide a higher extent of CSRD in 
sustainability reports than firms in low-profile industries. 
 
2.5.3 The Presence of Voluntary Assurance Statements and CSRD 
As discussed in Section 2.1, the key drivers for companies to disclose 
CSR information are improving their image, building trust, and minimising 
risks (Adams and Zutshi 2004). Companies that achieve these things have 
good relations with stakeholders and conform better to stakeholder norms 
and expectations (Branco and Rodrigues 2008a). More stakeholders are 
now demanding that sustainability reports more truthfully and fairly 
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represent what companies have achieved and what they hope to achieve 
in the future (Gray 2000). To enhance the quality of sustainability reports, 
stakeholders are also demanding independent assurance (Moroney, 
Windsor and Aw 2011). Unsurprisingly, the KPMG (2008) survey shows 
that 56 percent of the G250 companies that issued a report included some 
type of assurance statement.  
 
A growing number of companies have realised the benefits of increased 
transparency concerning their sustainability performance (Park and 
Brorson 2005). Past studies find that the primary motivations of companies 
for assurance engagements are to improve credibility and make their 
corporate social responsibility information more transparent (Deegan, 
Cooper and Shelly 2006; KPMG 2008; Simnett, Vanstraelen and Chua 
2009; Perego 2009; Kolk and Perego 2010). Deegan, Cooper and Shelly 
(2006) note that the practice assurance statement in sustainability reports 
serves as a communication mechanism and may enhance the clarity and 
reliability of the statements. Companies use assurance services to 
increase stakeholder or user confidence in the quality of the sustainability 
information provided and/or to increase stakeholder trust in the level of 
organisational commitment to sustainability (Simnett, Vanstraelen and 
Chua 2009). 
 
Moroney, Windsor and Aw (2011) investigate whether assurance leads to 
enhanced quality of company environmental disclosure. Using a 
disclosure index, they find that the quality of environmental disclosures is 
higher for assured companies than for unassured companies. However, 
no difference is found in the quality of environmental disclosures for 
companies that engaged an accountant as their assurer compared to 
those that engaged a consultant as their assurer reveals a difference in 
the type of disclosure of each of companies.  
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Despite increased demand for corporate social responsibility disclosure, 
few studies have examined whether assurance influences the level of 
CSRD (Moroney, Windsor and Aw 2011). Kolk and Perego (2010) argue 
that the demand for assurance services is significantly influenced by the 
level of awareness about sustainability. They hypothesize that 
corporations domiciled in countries with higher pressure toward corporate 
social responsibility disclosure due to public policy and institutional factors 
would be more likely to have their reports externally verified by an 
assurance provider. They find that companies with greater awareness of 
CSRD engage more in assurance services in response to a higher 
demand for transparency and accountability. This stronger need for 
legitimacy leads to the third hypothesis: 
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between the presence of voluntary 
assurance statement and the extent of CSRD in sustainability reports. 
 
2.5.4 Jurisdictional Business Systems and CSRD 
A jurisdictional trait is defined as a particular characteristic of the power or 
influence that a country or group of similar countries possess to carry out 
legal decisions, enforce laws and/or affect change that influences a firm’s 
communication. Institutional factors have been used as an explanatory 
factor in CSRD studies. There are several institutional factors that impact  
disclosure at the national level, such as the type of corporate governance 
systems (Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar 2005), the type of 
business systems (Buhr and Freedman 2001; Chapple and Moon 2005), 
and the type of legal system and its level of enforcement (Williams 1999; 
Holland and Foo 2003). These studies indicate that corporate social 
responsibility information communicated by companies would be different 
in different jurisdictions as the social, environmental, and cultural factors 
influencing companies vary. As argued by Williams (1999) culture and 
political and civil systems might significantly influence CSRD practices. 
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There is also evidence that suggests that country of origin significantly 
influences corporate social responsibility disclosure (Adams, Hill and 
Roberts 1998). 
 
Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar (2005) investigate the 
differences in corporate social responsibility disclosure between countries 
with difference in shareholder- and stakeholder-orientation. They argue 
that the level of CSRD is related to the country of origin of the corporations 
and specifically to the orientation of the country. A stakeholder-oriented or 
communitarian country is characterised  as one that has widespread 
stakeholders who posses a legitimate interest in and have influence over 
firms’ activities. A shareholder-oriented is one in which companies are 
seen as instruments to create shareholder value (Simnett, Vanstraelen 
and Chua 2009). Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar (2005) 
contend that firms from countries with a stronger emphasis on social 
issues, such as those in the Scandinavian region, where more emphasis is 
placed on multiple stakeholders, will have a higher level and quality of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure than firms from countries with a 
lesser emphasis on social issues and a greater number of 
shareholders─for instance US companies.  
 
Buhr and Freedman (2001) investigate the role of cultural and institutional 
factors in motivating the voluntary environmental disclosure of Canadian 
and US companies. They find that the disclosure of Canadian companies 
increased by more than that of US company. Their result suggests that 
Canadian culture and institutional infrastructure is more conducive to 
environmental disclosure than that of the US. Baughn, Bodie and 
McIntosh (2007) investigate corporate social responsibility practices in 104 
countries. They conclude that the level of economic development, 
absence of government corruption, and economic freedom have an impact 
on the demand for CSR by key stakeholders.  
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Maignan and Ralston (2002) note that firms in different countries vary in 
the extent to which they reported CSR information, as well as in their 
managerial practices. For example, US and UK firms are found to be more 
likely to communicate corporate philanthropic issues, whereas firms from 
Holland and France emphasised their commitment to environmental 
matters. European countries in general have had a greater tradition of 
reporting CSR concerns (Fekrat, Inclan and Petroni 1996). For instance, 
Germany and Austria have often been cited for their exemplary 
environmental disclosure. Japanese companies are more likely to focus 
their corporate social responsibility disclosure on environmental and policy 
matters rather than social issues (Baughn, Bodie and McIntosh 2007).  
 
With regard to corporate social responsibility disclosure in emerging 
countries, Chapple and Moon (2005) find that there is a greater emphasis 
on community involvement in Thailand, Malaysia, and India, while 
employee relations received much less emphasis in these countries. 
Williams (1999) investigates variations in the quantity of CSRD in the 
seven Asian countries. He finds that the level of disclosure in each of the 
seven nations differ significantly across national boundaries. His results 
show that organisations in Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines have 
higher amounts of disclosure than their counterparts in Hong Kong, 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Australian-based firms appear to have levels of 
disclosure between those of these two groups. 
 
Millar et al. (2005) claim that the Anglo-American business system is 
characterised by the expectation of a high degree of information 
disclosure, while communitarian and emerging business systems are more 
likely to disclose limited amounts of information and to lack transparency. 
This is consistent with lower legitimacy expectations. Peter, Miller and 
Kusyk (2011) add that the emerging markets tend to display weaker 
measures of CSR. However, even current studies show that the extent of 
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corporate social responsibility disclosure in emerging countries is still fairly 
low9. Some studies have noted that in these countries the levels of social 
disclosures in areas such as labour issues and community involvement 
are marginally high10. However, Islam and Deegan (2010) provide 
evidence that in developing countries the CSR communication of labour 
information, has frequently been at the centre of global criticisms. Their 
study find that Bangladeshi companies seek to mitigate the media 
pressures they face by providing positive CSRD such labour information. 
Based on these arguments about jurisdictional-based diversity, it is 
hypothesized that: 
 
H4: There is a relationship between jurisdictional business systems and 
the extent of CSRD in sustainability reports. 
 
2.5.5 The Presence of a CSR Committee and CSRD 
Recently, corporate social responsibility disclosure practices have 
developed rapidly and, as a consequence, studies are paying more 
attention to companies’ internal processes of reporting (Adams 2002; Kent 
and Monem 2008; Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni 2011). Adams (2002) 
argues that a company reporting process and decision-making are 
influenced by the degree of formality versus informality, the departments 
involved and the extent of engagement of stakeholders. Specific internal 
systems are vital to enable companies to credibly monitor CSR activities 
(Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni 2011). For example, the presence of a 
CSR committee (composed of key business personnel) facilitates the 
                                               
9
For example CSRD in Malaysian companies has been found to be 17.1 percent (Haniffa 
and Cooke 2005), 25.2 percent (Ghazali 2007) and 13.9 percent (Said, Zainuddin and 
Haron 2009);  in South African companies 27.1 percent (Coetzee and Van Staden 2011); 
Chinese companies 28.8 percent (Liu and Anbumozhi 2009); Qatari companies 33.0 
percent (Naser et al. 2006);and Indonesian companies is 36.2 percent (Gunawan, 
Djajadikerta and Smith 2009). 
10
 Gunawan, Djajadikerta and Smith (2009); Pratten and Mashat (2009); and Mahadeo, 
Hanuman and Soobaroyen (2011) show that the level of labour and community 
involvement disclosure range widely between 40─95 percent.  
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embedding and integration of corporate social responsibility into business 
practices. Such a committee can hold stakeholder events to better ensure 
the CSR strategy is in line with stakeholder expectations (Spitzek 2009). A 
firm more actively engaging with stakeholders can undertake various 
actions in order to better manage corporate social responsibility issues 
(Mallin and Michelon 2011).  
 
Prior studies suggest that the presence of a CSR committee affects the 
level of corporate social responsibility disclosure. Ullman (1985) argue that 
the presence of sucha committee is an effective monitoring device for 
improving the range of disclosures provided to stakeholders. Cowen, 
Ferreri and Parker (1987) test the relationship between company 
characteristics and the types of CSRD. They argue that the existence of 
such a committee could be associated with a greater propensity to 
communicate CSR issues. Their finding provides evidence that there is a 
significant association between human resources disclosures and the 
presence of CSR committee.  
 
Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni (2011) examine the relationship between 
the presence of a CSR committee and the extent of voluntary corporate 
greenhouse gas emissions disclosure. They argue that the presence of a 
CSR committee motivates a firm to implement policies and practices to 
measure and report on greenhouse gas emissions level. Moreover, they 
hypothesize that firms that have voluntarily introduced a CSR committee 
(as a part of the board) are more likely to voluntarily disclose credible 
greenhouse gas emissions information in their reports. However, their 
study failed to statistically show the relationship between the presence of a 
CSR committee and the extent of corporate greenhouse gas emissions 
disclosure.  
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Kent and Monem (2008) study the factors that drives the adoption of triple 
bottom line (TBL) reporting. They argue that a CSR committee 
encourages companies to demonstrate greater accountability and 
transparency in corporate social responsibility disclosure, and that it 
constitutes a formal recognition that CSR impacts the activities of the 
company. Their result shows that a CSR committee is positively related to 
the adoption of TBL reporting. 
 
From the point of view of legitimacy theory, the presence of such a 
committee within the board may strengthen the public perception of 
corporate legitimacy. As argued by Mallin and Michelon (2011), when the 
board appoints a CSR committee to manage the CSR impacts on 
business activities, it is more likely that company will have greater 
legitimacy in the community in which it operates. Thus, the fifth hypothesis: 
 
H5: There is a positive relationship between the presence of a CSR 
committee and the extent of CSRD in sustainability reports. 
 
In summary, five variables are hypothesized within tenets of the legitimacy 
theory. These variables are firm size, industry type, the presence of a 
voluntary assurance statement, jurisdictional business systems, and the 
presence of a CSR committee. These variables will be examined to 
identify the determinants of the extent of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure (CSRD) in sustainability reports. Table 2.3 summaries the five 
hypotheses. 
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Table 2.3 Summary of Hypotheses 
Variable  Hypothesis Description 
Company Charateristics: 
Firm Size H1 There is a positive relationship between firm size 
and the extent of CSRD in sustainability reports. 
Industry Type H2 Firms in high-profile industries will provide a 
higher extent of CSRD in sustainability reports 
than firms in low-profile industries. 
The Presence of a 
Voluntary Assurance 
Statement 
H3 There is a positive relationship between the 
presence of a voluntary assurance statement and 
the extent of CSRD in sustainability reports. 
Institutional Factor:   
Jurisdictional Business 
Systems 
H4 There is a relationship between jurisdictional 
business systems and the extent of CSRD in 
sustainability reports. 
Internal Factor:   
The Presence of a CSR 
Committee 
H5 There is a positive relationship between the 
presence of a CSR committee and the extent of 
CSRD in sustainability reports. 
 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter provides a review of the literature that is relevant to this 
thesis. First, past studies of the explanations as to why companies engage 
in corporate social responsibility disclosure and, more particularly 
legitimacy theory are reviewed and posited as the framework for this 
thesis. Next, the chapter reviewsthe determinants of the extent of CSRD 
from various perspectives in both single country and cross-country 
settings. The theoretical frameworks used in past studies are discussed, 
and these forms the theoretical foundation for this thesis. They are the 
basis upon in which the five hypotheses are developed.  
 
Prior studies suggest that the size of firms, the type of industry, the 
presence of a voluntary assurance statement, jurisdictional business 
systems and the presence of a CSR committee are significantly and 
positively associated with corporate social responsibility disclosure. Larger 
firms and more sensitive industries are more politically visible and have 
higher public pressures, thus they are expected to communicate more 
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corporate social responsibility disclosure to legitimate their operations. The 
presence of a voluntary assurance statement and a corporate social 
responsibility committee enhance stakeholder trust into the quality of 
sustainability information. Therefore, these may strengthen the public’s 
perception of corporate legitimacy. Firms from countries with more 
emphasis on mutiple stakeholders will provide more corporate social 
responsibility disclosure to demonstrate greater accountability,  in order to 
have greater legitimacy in the community in which they operate. In 
summary, the theoretical tenets suggest that companies provide corporate 
social responsibility disclosure in response to stakeholders, in order to 
legitimate their activities. 
 
The following chapter presents the research approach adopted. It then 
explores the research paradigm and methods. The research methods 
include data collection, sample selection, measurement of variables, and 
statistical analysis in order to examine the relationship between 
dependent, independent, and control variables. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research approach adopted in this thesis. 
Section 3.1 describes the thesis’s research paradigm. Sections 3.2 and 
3.3 then review the specific research methods (data collection, sample 
selection, measurement of variables) and statistical analyses used to 
explore the relationship between corporate social responsibility disclosure 
and the predictor variables. Finally, a summary of this chapter is provided 
in Section 3.4. 
 
3.1 Research Paradigm 
The purpose of considering the research paradigm is to understand the 
paradigm that underpins the choices and decisions to be made in 
determining a research position (Carson et al. 2001). Understanding the 
research paradigm is crucial for making sense of the social world. Carson 
et al. (2001, 2) argue that a research position will have implications for 
what, how and why research is carried out. Consideration of the research 
paradigm provides a deeper and wider perspective, so that research 
projects can have a clearer purpose within a broader context. 
 
A paradigm is defined as a set of basic beliefs (or metaphysics) that 
deals with ultimates or first principles. It represents a worldview that 
defines, for its holder, the nature of the world, the individual’s place in 
it, and the range of possible relationships to the world and its part 
(Guba and Lincoln 1994, 107). 
 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) argue that there are three sets of basic beliefs, 
namely ontological, epistomological, and methodological. The ontological 
has regard to nature and reality (Guba and Lincoln 1994; Carson et al. 
2001). It determines the forms of reality perceived by the observer (Guba 
and Lincoln 1994). Positivists believe that there is a single reality, while 
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interpretivists believe that there are multiple constructed realities 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). The epistomological addresses the nature 
of the knowledge to be studied (what can be studied) and the relationship 
between the researcher and that which is to be known (Guba and Lincoln 
1994). Positivists believe that the knower and the known are independent, 
whereas interpretivists believe that the knower and the known are 
inseparable (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998).  
 
The methodological question determines the process for studying an 
areas or how the researcher goes about the research (Guba and Lincoln 
1994). Positivist researchers consult prior theories in the literature in order 
to arrive at hypotheses or research questions in the early stages of the 
research, and are unlikely to add to that prior theory during later stages 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). In contrast, theory can be used at various 
stages in the research when an interpretivist approach is taken 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). Positivist researchers believe that the 
researcher should remain distanced from the material being studied. 
Whereas, interpretivist researchers require the researcher to get involved 
with the material being researched (Carson et al. 2001). 
 
Within the ontological, corporate social responsibility disclosure is seen as 
reality, the perceptions of corporate managers are of primary importance 
as they provide evidence of the motivations behind CSRD practices. From 
an epistemological point of view, this thesis collects knowledge about 
CSRD practices from corporate reports (sustainability reports, annual 
reports, and corporate website). As discussed in Chapter 1, the objectives 
of this thesis are to provide explanations of why companies provide 
CSRD. Within the methodological, this thesis uses quantitative method 
approach. Most  CSRD studies have used a quantitative disclosure index 
as a part of their quantitative method. Finally, this thesis employs statistical 
analysis to test the hypotheses.Table 3.1 provides broad definitions of the 
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positivist and interpretivist ontology and epistemologies, and the 
characteristics of the relevant methodologies for both these differing 
paradigms. 
 
Table 3.1 Two Paradigms of Social Science Research  
 Positivism
11
 Interpretivism
12
 
Ontology 
 
Nature of the world and 
reality 
 
 
 
Have direct access to real 
world and single external 
reality 
 
 
No direct access to real 
world and no single external 
reality 
Epistemology 
 
Relationship between 
reality and research 
 
 
 
Possible to obtain hard, 
secure objective 
knowledge; research 
focuses on generalization 
and abstraction; thought 
governed by hypotheses 
and theories 
 
 
 
Understood through 
perceived knowledge; 
research focuses on the 
specific and concrete; 
seeking to understand 
specific context 
 
Methodology 
 
Focus of research 
 
 
 
Role of researcher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Techniques used by 
researcher 
 
 
 
Concentrates on description 
and explanation 
 
 
Detached, external 
observer; aims to discover 
external reality rather than 
creating the object of the 
study; strives to use a 
rational, consistent, verbal, 
logical approach; seeks to 
maintain clear distinction 
between facts and value 
judgements 
 
Statistical and mathematical 
methods predominant 
 
 
Concentrates on 
understanding and 
interpretation 
 
Researchers want to 
experience what they are 
studying; partially create 
what is studied and the 
meaning of the phenomena; 
use of pre-understanding is 
important; distinction 
between facts and 
judgements less clear 
 
Primarily non-quantitative 
 
Source: Adapted from Carson et al. (2001, 8) 
                                               
11
Positivism also is often referred to as empiricism, foundationalism, instrumentalism, 
logicism, and objectivism (Sousa 2010). 
12
Interpretivism is also frequently called as idealism, subjectivsm, relativism, and 
constructivism (Sousa 2010). 
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This thesis employs a positivist approach to understanding corporate 
social responsibility disclosure. The main reason adopting the positivist 
approach is that the constructs and factors identified in the proposed 
research model can be objectively measured. This approach is widely 
used to explain why companies engage in CSRD using corporate media 
such as annual reports, sustainability reports or websites (Roberts 1992; 
Islam and Deegan 2008).  
 
A positivist approach seeks to observe real world factors (for example 
what is being done) and correlate them (Spicer 1978). As argued by 
Sousa (2010), positivism is built on several assumptions: an equivalence 
of explanation and prediction, large-scale deployment of induction and 
deduction, the universality of closed systems and the conception of 
causality as cause–effect relations. Moreover, he notes that the main 
objective of positivist science is a prediction. Therefore, a positivist 
approach can be used to explain the incidence of and motivation for 
CSRD in companies’ annual or stand-alone reports (Ness and Mirza 
1991). 
 
The quantitative approach focuses on cause and effect relationships and 
involves examining the potential relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. This thesis takes such a quantitative approach to 
examine the relationship between CSRD and key predictors such as firm 
size, industry type, the presence of a voluntary assurance statement, 
jurisdictional business systems, and the presence of a CSR committee. 
Such an approach is used because it is focused on explaining 
associations between two or more variables and addressing specific 
questions about a clearly defined topic. By using a quantitative approach 
in such a disclosure study, the findings may be more objective and 
informative for stakeholders and other parties (Al-Tuwaijiri, Christensen 
and Hughes 2004).  
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3.2 Research Methods 
The stated purpose of this thesis is to determine the extent of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure (CRSD) across jurisdictions and to analyse 
company characteristics, the presence of voluntary assurance statements, 
institutional and internal factors influencing the extent of CSRD. 
Legitimacy theory is the theoretical framework within which these 
purposes will be pursued. The research approach adopted to test these 
purposes encompasses data collection, sample selection, measurement 
variables, and statistical analysis. 
 
3.2.1 Data Collection 
The data collection focuses on the 2009 fiscal year. The diverse data set 
collected for this thesis is sourced from 460 public companies from 44 
separate countries. 2009 is the latest reporting date at the time that data is 
being collected for this study. The types of data acquired include: (1) data 
on corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD); (2) data on the 
presence of a voluntary assurance statement; (3) data on firm 
characteristics (firm size, industry type, profitability (ROA), and leverage); 
(4) data on jurisdictional business systems; and (5) data on the presence 
of a CSR committee. 
 
In this thesis the data for CSRD and the presence of a voluntary 
assurance statement are derived from stand-alone sustainability reports. 
Most of these sustainability reports are obtained from the GRI website13 
and CorporateRegister website14. Sustainability reports not available from 
the GRI and CorporateRegister websites are obtained from the individual 
company’s websites. Data sources for the presence of a CSR committee, 
for firm characteristics: size, industry, profitability and leverage 
                                               
13
www.globalreporting.org 
14
 www.corporateregister.com 
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areobtained from sustainability reports, annual reports, and Factiva 
databases. 
 
3.2.2 Sample Selection 
The initial sample included 1421 companies from the 59 countries listed 
on the GRI website for the 2009 fiscal year. The companies chosen as the 
sample are all public companies. Companies in each country are chosen 
based on the representativeness of their characteristics of each 
region/country, and the manageability of data gathering. The sample firms 
have to meet the following criteria: 
1. They have to have 2009 fiscal year.  
2. They have to have an English versions of stand-alone sustainability 
reports. 
3. They have to be public and parent companies in their country. 
4. They have complete data sets for the dependent and independent 
variables, which are available in sustainability and annual reports, 
company’s websites or the Factiva databases. 
 
The proportional stratified random sampling method is used to select the 
thesis sample. By using this method, the relative quantity of each stratum 
is controlled, rather than having it determined by random processes. This 
approach better guarantees the proportion of different strata within a 
sample. It also produces a final sample that has a more equal 
representation of each key sub-group from the population than simple 
random methods would produce (Neuman 2006). 
 
Using the GRI’s report lists (retrieved on 24 November 2010); there are 
1418 sustainability reports for the year 2009 listed15 on the GRI website. 
                                               
15
The total population of companies can never be totally known as the GRI lists only 
reported companies which have voluntarily submitted their sustainability report to be 
reviwed by the GRI process. In essence, the population is the list as it is the subset that 
willing offered their reports for higher level scrutiny. 
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195 reports are excluded as they are annual reports and/or integrative 
reports (combined annual and sustainability reports). The English version 
of sustainability reports are solely selected, thus another 383 reports are 
excluded. 272 reports come from non public companies. The available 
population thus consists of 568 firms. These firms are subject to stratified 
proportional (by jurisdiction, industry, assurance statement, presence of a 
CSR committee) random sampling. The final sample of 460 firms 
represents 81 percent of the available population. Although biased 
towards English language, the overall sample selection is felt to be large 
and representative of GRI type global companies. Table 3.2 summarises 
the sample selection. 
 
Table 3.2 Sample Selection 
 
Total companies listed on GRI’s report lists  
(retrieved on 24 November 2010) 
1418 
1.  Less companies that do not have a stand-alone report 
(e. g. annual reports or integrative reports only) 
2.  Less companies that do not have a sustainability report in an English 
language version 
3.  Less companies that are not a public and parent company 
4.  Less incomplete data 
(195) 
 
(383) 
 
(272) 
(0) 
Available population 568 
Final Sample 460 
The sample represents 81 percent of the available population. 
 
3.2.3 Measurement of Variables 
This section explains the measurement of the dependent, independent, 
and control variables. In this thesis, the extent ofcorporate social 
responsibility disclosure (CSRD) is the dependent variable. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, this thesis uses the definition of CSRD from the 
GRI (2006). The GRI (2006, 3) defines CSRD as the practice of 
measuring, disclosing, and being accountable to internal and external 
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stakeholders for organisational performance towards the goal of 
sustainable development. 
 
3.2.3.1 Dependent Variable 
In order to provide evidence regarding the two research questions and 
their corresponding hypotheses, sustainability reports of the 460 public 
companies from 44 countries are examined to assess their corporate 
social responsibility disclosure using a disclosure index. The empirical 
literature about voluntary CSRD suggests that there are two main 
approaches utilised to measure the extent of disclosure (Williams 1997). 
These are disclosure indices (or disclosure occurrence) and content 
analysis (or disclosure abundance) (Joseph and Taplin 2011).  
 
The disclosure index has been widely used in CSRD studies (Williams 
1997, see Table 3.3); and two definitions of the disclosure index are: 
 
...a quantitative based instrument designed to measure a series of 
items which, when aggregated, gives a surrogate score indicative of 
the level of disclosure in the specific context for which the index was 
derived (Coy, Tower and Dixon 1983, 122).  
 
 
...the disclosure index counts the number of items in a checklist or 
disclosure index with at least some disclosure (Joseph and Taplin 
2011, 20). 
 
Some past studies argue that the disclosure index approach has two 
disadvantages. First, it is difficult to avoid a subjective decision concerning 
when disclosures are separate items. For example, corporate’s mission 
and objective could be a single or two items (Cooke 1991; Joseph and 
Taplin 2011). Second, particular disclosure items may be irrelevant and 
inapplicable to particular sample companies (Cooke 1991; Cahaya 2006). 
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On the other hand, content analysis is defined as a method of codifying 
text into different groups depending on selected criteria, which are known 
as the coding structure (framework) (Weber 1988 as cited in Bouten et al. 
2011). Content analysis counts the volume of disclosure such as the 
number of pages, lines, sentences, or words (Joseph and Taplin 2011). 
Several previous content analysis studies have utilised the number of 
words (Deegan and Gordon 1996), sentences (Hackston and Milne 1996), 
or pages (Patten 1992; Gray, Kouhy and Lavers 1995) as techniques of 
content analysis.  
 
However, the use of content analysis as a technique to measure level of 
disclosure has some limitations (Xiao et al. 2005). First, it is difficult to 
make comparisons between two annual or stand-alone reports if fonts, 
page margins, and other component (pictures and graphs) differ. Second, 
there is little agreement about how non-textual items such as figures and 
tables are counted (Joseph and Taplin 2011) and how disclosuresin these 
formats should be converted into a number of sentences (Unerman 2000). 
Finally, one sentence, line or page may contain more than one category of 
information and the researcher may have difficulty in deciding which 
category the sentence, line or page belongs to (Xiao et al. 2005).  
 
Consistent with past corporate social responsibility disclosure studies (see 
for example Williams 1997; Ho and Taylor 2007; Cahaya, Porter and 
Brown 2008; Christopher and Filipovic 2008; Said, Zainuddin and Haron 
2009; Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni 2011) this thesis employs a 
disclosure index to measure the extent of CSRD, as this approach enables 
the researcher to gain better insights into the level and type of CSR 
information communicated by companies (Cahaya 2006). As argued by 
Williams (1997), a disclosure index offers a valid and useful method for 
measuring the extent of CSRD. Moreover, Joseph and Taplin (2011) 
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argue that a disclosure index is a more predictable measurement of CSRD 
than content analysis. 
 
Marston and Shrives (1991), in their review of the disclosure index 
literature, report that a variety of studies have adopted a disclosure index 
as the primary mechanism for measuring the extent of disclosure. 
Disclosure indices can be broadly classified into weighted or unweighted 
indices (Cooke 1991). In a weighted disclosure index, particular disclosure 
items are given a higher score (when those items are disclosed) than the 
other disclosure items. The weighting is based on the perceived 
importance of the items (Cooke 1991). Whereas, in an unweighted index, 
each disclosure item is deemed equally important and therefore awarded 
the same score when it is disclosed (Cooke 1991; Meek, Roberts and 
Gray 1995). 
 
Most prior studies in corporate social responsibility disclosure have used 
an unweighted index to measure the level of disclosure (see Table 3.3),  
as this technique is considered far less subjective than a weighted index 
and more relevant to all companies (Cooke 1991; Meek, Roberts and Gray 
1995). The unweighted approach is adopted in this thesis: the CSRD 
index is calculated as a dichotomous equally weighted (i.e. unweighted) 
index on a 0-100 percent scale. All items are equally weighted and each of 
the 79 GRI possible indicators that are disclosed is awarded a score of 1 
(and a score of 0 if not disclosed). Items are removed from the equation 
when they are clearly not applicable. The utilization of a dichotomous 
equally weighted index is preferred because this study is concerned with 
the level of disclosure as opposed to the company‘s perceived importance 
of disclosed items. 
 
Table 3.3 gives an overview of past studies approaches to measure the 
extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
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Table 3.3Key Studies that MeasureCSRD 
Study Measurement of 
CSRD  
Content analysis Disclosure 
index 
analysis 
Number 
of 
items 
Cowen, Ferreri and 
Parker (1987) 
Content analysis Number of pages - - 
Roberts (1992) Disclosure index 
analysis 
- Rating - 
Hackston & Milne 
(1996) 
Content analysis  Number of pages 
and sentences 
- - 
Adams, Hill and 
Roberts (1998) 
Content analysis  Number of pages - - 
Al-Tuwaijiri, 
Christensen and 
Hughes (2004) 
Content analysis  Number of 
sentences, 
pages, words 
- - 
Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005) 
Disclosure index 
analysis and content 
analysis  
Number of words Equally 
weighted 
43 
Naser et al. (2006) Content analysis  Number of pages - - 
Ho and Taylor 
(2007) 
Disclosure index 
analysis 
- Equally 
weighted 
60 
Ghazali (2007) Disclosure index 
analysis 
- Equally 
weighted 
22 
Christopher and 
Filipovic (2008) 
Disclosure index 
analysis 
- Equally 
weighted 
40 
Cahaya, Porter 
and Brown (2008) 
Disclosure index 
analysis 
- Equally 
weighted 
20 
Clarkson et al. 
(2008) 
Disclosure index 
analysis 
- Different 
weights 
45 
Aerts and Cormier 
(2009) 
Disclosure index 
analysis 
- Different 
weights 
39 
Da Silva Monteiro 
and Aibar-Guzman 
(2010) 
Disclosure index 
analysis 
- Equally 
weighted 
16 
Said, Zainuddin 
and Haron (2009) 
Disclosure index 
analysis 
- Equally 
weighted 
78 
Pratten and 
Mashat (2009) 
Content analysis Number of pages - - 
Lynch (2010) Disclosure index 
analysis 
- Equally 
weighted 
85 
Coetzee and Van 
Staden (2011) 
Disclosure index 
analysis and content 
analysis  
Number of pages, 
sentences, and 
words 
Different 
weights 
18 
Rankin, Windsor 
and Wahyuni 
(2011) 
Disclosure index 
analysis 
- Equally 
weighted 
36 
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Consistent with Frost et al. (2005), Ho and Taylor (2007), Cahaya, Porter 
and Brown (2008), and Clarkson et al. (2008), the CRSD score is 
calculated by adopting the GRI guidelines, version 2006. Using a well-
established check list of items to collect data such as the 2006 GRI 
indicators, enhance the reliability16 of this disclosure index. GRI (2006) 
reporting guidelines contain 79 indicators that reflect the spirit of corporate 
social responsibility and sustainability reporting. These 79 indicators can 
be categorised into six themes: economic (9 indicators), environmental (30 
indicators), labour practices (14 indicators), human rights (9 indicators), 
society (8 indicators) and product responsibility (9 indicators). Following 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005), the formula for the CSRD index is as follows: 
      
    
  
   
  
 
where: 
CSRDj = corporate social responsibility disclosure for firm j 
nj = number of indicators expected for jth firm, nj ≤ 79 
Xij = 1 if ith item is disclosed, 0 if ith item is not disclosed 
0 ≤ Ij ≤ 1 
 
Table 3.4 lists the specific indicators based on the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) guidelines.  
 
Table 3.4 The 2006 GRI Performance Indicators 
ECONOMIC 
Category GRI code Indicator
17
 
Economic 
Performance 
EC1 Direct economic value generated and distributed, 
including revenues, operating costs, employee 
compensation, donations and other community 
investments, retained earnings, and payments to capital 
providers and governments. 
                                               
16
To better ensure the reliability of disclosure index, this thesis uses two independent and 
experienced coders. Before the coding structure was used, it was tested to better confirm 
that both coders have applied the same definition. 
17
These indicators are further categorised into core and additional components (refer to 
Appendix A). 
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EC2 Financial implications and other risks, and opportunities 
for the organisation’s activities due to climate change. 
EC3 Coverage of the organisation’s defined benefit plan 
obligations. 
EC4 Significant financial assistance received from 
government. 
Market Presence EC5 Range of ratios of standard entry level of wage compare 
to local minimum wage at significant locations of 
operation. 
EC6 Policy, practices, and proportion of spending on locally-
based suppliers at significant locations of operation. 
EC7 Procedures for local hiring and proportion of senior 
management hired from community at significant 
locations of operation. 
Indirect Economic 
Impact 
EC8 Development and impact of infrastructure investments 
and services provided primarily for public benefit through 
commercial, in-kind or pro bono engagement. 
EC9 Understanding and describing significant indirect 
economic impacts, including the extent of impacts. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
Category GRI code Indicator 
Materials EN1 Materials used by weight or volume. 
EN2 Percentage of materials used that they are recycled 
input materials. 
Energy EN3 Direct energy consumption by primary energy source. 
EN4 Indirect energy consumption by primary source. 
EN5 Energy saved due to conservation and efficiency 
improvements. 
EN6 Initiatives to provide energy-efficient or renewable 
energy-based products and services and reduction in 
energy requirements as a result of these initiatives. 
EN7 Initiatives to reduce indirect energy consumption and 
reductions achieved. 
Water EN8 Total water withdrawal by source. 
EN9 Water sources significantly affected by withdrawal of 
water. 
EN10 Percentage and total volume of water recycled and  
re-used. 
Biodiversity EN11 Location and size of land owned, leased, managed in, or 
adjacent to, protected areas and areas of high 
biodiversity value outside protected areas. 
EN12 Description of significant impacts of activities, products, 
and services on biodiversity in protected areas and 
areas of high biodiversity value outside protected areas. 
EN13 Habitats protected or restored. 
EN14 Strategies, current actions and future plans for 
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managing impacts on biodiversity. 
EN15 Number of International Union for Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) Red List species 
and national conservation list species with habitats in 
areas affected by operations, by level of extinction risk. 
Emissions, 
Effluents and 
Waste 
EN16 Total direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions by 
weight. 
EN17 Other relevant indirect greenhouse gas emissions by 
weight. 
EN18 Initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
reduction achieved. 
EN19 Emissions of ozone-depleting substances by weight. 
EN20 Nitric Oxide (NO), Sulfur Oxide (SO) and other 
significant air emission by type and weight. 
EN21 Total water discharge by quality and destination. 
EN22 Total weight of waste by type and disposal method. 
EN23 Total number and volume of significant spills. 
 EN24 Weight of transported, imported, exported or treated 
waste deemed hazardous, under the terms of the Basel 
Convention Annex I,II,III and IV, and percentage of 
transported waste shipped internationally. 
EN25 Identity, size, protected status and biodiversity value of 
water bodies and related habitats significantly affected 
by the reporting organisation’s discharge of water and 
runoff. 
Product and 
Services 
EN26 Initiatives to mitigate environmental impacts of products 
and services, and extent of impact mitigation. 
EN27 Percentage of products sold and their packaging 
materials that are reclaimed by category. 
Compliance EN28 Monetary value of significant fines and total number of 
non-monetary sanctions for non-compliance with 
environmental laws and regulations. 
Transport EN29 Significant environmental impacts of transporting 
products and other goods and materials used for the 
organisation’s operations, and transporting members of 
the workforce. 
Overall 
 
EN30 Total environmental protection expenditures and 
investments by type. 
LABOUR PRACTICES   
Category GRI code Indicator 
Employment LA1 Total workforce by employment type, employment 
contract and region. 
LA2 Total number and rate of employee turnover by age 
group, gender and region. 
LA3 Benefits provided to full-time employees that are not 
provided to temporary or part-time employees, by major 
operations. 
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Labour/ 
Management 
Relations 
LA4 Percentage of employees covered by collective 
bargaining agreements. 
LA5 Minimum notice period (s) regarding significant 
operational changes, including whether it is specified in 
collective agreements. 
Occupational 
Health and Safety 
LA6 Percentage of total workforce represented in formal joint 
management-worker health and safety committees that 
help monitor and advise on occupational health and 
safety programs. 
LA7 Rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days, and 
absenteeism, and total number of work-related fatalities 
by region. 
LA8 Education, training, counselling, prevention, and risk-
control programs in place to assist workforce members, 
their families, or community members regarding serious 
diseases. 
LA9 Health and safety topics covered in formal agreements 
with trade unions.  
Training and 
Education 
LA10 Average hours of training per year per employee by 
employee category. 
LA11 Programs for skills management and lifelong learning 
that support the continued employability of employees 
and assist them in managing career endings. 
LA12 Percentage of employees receiving regular performance 
and career development reviews. 
Diversity and 
Equal Opportunity 
LA13 Composition of governance bodies and breakdown of 
employees per category according to gender, age group, 
minority group membership, and other indicators of 
diversity. 
LA14 Ratio of basic salary of men to women by employee 
category. 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Category GRI code Indicator 
Investment and 
Procurement 
Practices 
HR1 Percentage and total number of significant investment 
agreements that include human rights clauses or that 
have undergone human rights screening. 
HR2 Percentage of significant suppliers and contractors that 
have undergone screening on human rights and actions 
taken. 
HR3 Total hours of employee training on policies and 
procedures concerning aspects of human rights that are 
relevant to operations, including the percentage of 
employees trained. 
Non-discriminant HR4 Total number of incidents of discrimination and actions 
taken. 
Freedom of 
Association and 
HR5 Operations identified in which the right to exercise 
freedom of association and collective bargaining may be 
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collective 
bargaining 
at significant risk, and actions taken to support these 
rights. 
Child Labour HR6 Operations identified as having significant risk for 
incidents of child labour, and measures taken to 
contribute to the elimination of child labour. 
Forced and 
Compulsory 
Labour 
HR7 Operations identified as having significant risk for 
incidents of forced or compulsory labour, and measures 
taken to contribute to the elimination of forced or 
compulsory labour. 
Security Practices HR8 Percentage of security personal trained in the 
organisation’s policies or procedures concerning aspects 
of human rights that are relevant to operations. 
Indigenous Rights HR9 Total number of incidents of violations involving rights of 
indigenous people and actions taken. 
SOCIETY 
Category GRI code Indicator 
Community SO1 Nature, scope, and effectiveness of any programs and 
practices that asses and manage the impact of 
operations on communicaties, including entering, 
operating, and existing. 
Corruption SO2 Percentage and total number of business units analysed 
for risks related to corruption. 
SO3 Percentage of employees trained in organisation’s anti-
corruption policies and procedures. 
SO4 Actions taken in response to incidents of corruption. 
Public Policy SO5 Public policy positions and participation in public policy 
development and lobbying. 
 SO6 Total value of financial and in-kind contributions to 
political parties, politicians, and related institutions by 
country. 
Anti-Competitive 
Behaviour 
SO7 Total number of legal actions for anti-competitive 
behaviour, anti-trust, and monopoly practices and their 
outcomes. 
Compliance SO8 Monetary value of significant fines and total number of 
non-monetary sanctions for non compliance with laws 
and regulations. 
PRODUCT RESPONSIBILITY 
Category GRI code Indicator 
Customer Health 
and Safety 
PR1 Life-cycle stages in which health and safety impacts of 
products and services are assessed for improvement, 
and percentage of significant products and services 
categories subject to such procedures 
PR2 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with 
regulations and voluntary codes concerning health and 
safety impacts of products and services, by type of 
outcome. 
Product and PR3 Type of product and service information required by 
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Service Labelling procedures and percentage of significant products and 
services subject to such information requirements. 
PR4 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with 
regulations and voluntary codes concerning product 
andservices information and labelling, by type of 
outcomes. 
PR5 Practices related to customer satisfaction, including 
results of surveys measuring customer satisfaction. 
Marketing 
Communications 
PR6 Programs for adherence to laws, standards and 
voluntary codes related to marketing communications, 
including advertising, promotion, and sponsorship. 
PR7 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with 
regulations and voluntary codes concerning marketing 
communications, including advertising, promotion, and 
sponsorship, by type of outcomes. 
Customer Privacy PR8 Total number of substantiated complaints regarding 
breaches of customer privacy and losses of customer 
data. 
Compliance PR9 Monetary value of significant fines for non-compliance 
with laws and regulations concerning the provision and 
use of products and services. 
Source: Adapted from GRI Gudielines Version 3.0 (2006) 
 
3.2.3.2 Independent Variables 
This section explains the measurement of the independent variables, 
including firm size, industry type, the presence of a voluntary assurance 
statement, jurisdictional business systems, and the presence of a CSR 
committee. 
 
Firm Size  
Firm size is commonly used as a proxy for public visibility. The more 
visible the companies the more CSR activities will be considered and 
disclosure can then be used as a way to enhance corporate reputation. 
This is consistent with the tenets of legitimacy theory. Williams (1999), Ho 
and Taylor (2007), Branco and Rodrigues (2008), and Cahaya, Porter and 
Brown (2008) conclude that firms size appears to be a significant 
determinant of corporate social responsibility disclosure (see Chapter 2 for 
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details). Previous studies measure firm size by various means (see Table 
3.5 for details).  
 
Table 3.5 Previous Studies of Firm Size Measurement 
Study Measurement 
Roberts (1992) Revenues 
Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995) Sales turnover  
Hackston and Milne (1996) Market capitalization, sales, total assets 
Adams, Hill and Roberts (1998) Sales turnover 
Williams (1999) Market capitalization 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) Total assets 
Gao, Heravi and Xiao (2005) Sales turnover 
Smith, Yahya and Amiruddin (2007) Number of employees
18
, total assets, 
market capitalization 
Branco and Rodrigues (2008) Number of employees, number of 
branches, total assets 
Reverte (2009) Market capitalization 
Said, Zainuddin and Haron (2009) Total assets 
Villiers and Van Staden (2010) Total assets 
Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni (2011) Market capitalization 
Moroney, Windsor and Aw (2011) Total assets 
Coetzee and Van Staden (2011) Total assets 
 
No overarching theoretical reason exists for a particular measure of firm 
size (Hackston and Milne 1996). Therefore consistent with the majority of 
past literature, this thesis uses the number of employees as the main 
proxy of firm size. Total assets is also examined in the additional analysis 
section. Firm size will be logged to reduce skewness and the impact of 
outliers (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007).  
 
 
                                               
18
The number of employees is used in this thesis as an alternative measure. This 
measure has been used by prior studies (e.g. Smith, Yahya and Amiruddin (2007) and 
Branco and Rodrigues (2008). 
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Industry Type  
Industry type is measured by a dummy variable in this thesis. A category 
label of 1 is given if the company is high-profile and 0 otherwise. The 
sensitivity of an industry could represent the extent of the political costs it 
incurs. High-profile industries (labelled as category 1) can be expected to 
demonstrate greater concern for CSRD than low-profile industries. Patten 
(1991); Hackston and Milne (1996); Adams, Hill and Roberts (1998); and 
Newson and Deegan (2002) note that industry type has a significant 
impact on CSRD (see Chapter 2 for details). In this thesis industries are 
classified as high-profile and low-profile. Table 3.6 lists the high-profile and 
low-profile classifications of industry type made by past studies. 
 
Table 3.6 Previous Studies of Industry Classification 
Study Industry High Profile Low Profile 
Roberts 
(1992) 
 
1.Automobile 
2.Airline 
3.Oil 
1, 2, 3 All else 
Meek, Roberts 
and Gray 
(1995) 
 
1. Metal, building materials, 
construction 
2. Engineering 
3.Consumer goods and services 
4.Oil, chemicals and mining 
4 1, 2, 3 
Hackston and 
Milne (1996) 
 
 
1. Automobile, airline, oil, agriculture, 
liquor, tobacco, media 
2. Food, health, personal products, 
hotel, appliances, household 
products 
1  2 
Adams, Hill 
and Roberts 
(1998) 
 
 
1. Oil, chemicals, metals and power. 
2. Manufacturing and automobiles. 
3. Engineering and construction 
including construction materials. 
4. Services, food and retail. 
1, 2  
 
 
 
 
3, 4  
 
 
 
 
Newson and 
Deegan 
1.Raw materials extraction 
2.Chemicals 
1, 2, 3 4, 5, 6 
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(2002) 
 
 
3.Wood, paper & forestry 
4.Services 
5.Healthcare 
6.Computers and electronics 
Haniffa 
&Cooke 
(2005) 
 
1.Consumer goods 
2.Construction/property 
3.Trading/services 
4.Plantation/mining 
5.Industrial 
1, 4, 5  2, 3  
Gao, Heravi 
and Xiao 
(2005) 
1.Property 
2.Banking and Finance 
3.Utilities 
3 
 
 
1, 2 
 
 
Reverte 
(2009) 
 
 
1.Mining, oil and gas 
2.Chemicals 
3.Paper and forestry 
4.Steel and other metals 
5.Electricity, gas distribution, water 
1 - 5 others 
Moroney, 
Windsor and 
Aw (2011) 
1. Oil and gas 
2. Chemicals 
3. Forest and paper products 
4. Utilities 
5. Metals and mining 
6. Industrials 
1 - 6 others 
 
Based on the previous studies, four industries─oil and gas, basic 
materials, utilities, and finance─are categorised in this thesis as high- 
profile. Six industries; industrials, consumer goods, health care, consumer 
services, telecommunications, and technology─are classified as low-
profile industries. Roberts (1992, 605) defines high-profile industries as 
those having significant consumer visibility, a high level of political risk or 
concentrated and intense competition.   
 
Table 3.7 supports this thesis’s industry classification. The industry groups 
it depicts are those used by the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). 
The ICB is a classification taxonomy developed by the Dow Jones, the 
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Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange (FTSE). The ICB uses a 
system of 10 industries, partitioned into 20 super sectors, which are further 
divided into 41 sectors, which then contain 114 subsectors.  
 
Table 3.7 Industry Classification of Sample Companies 
The ICB Industry Industry Classification 
Oil and Gas  High Profile 
Basic Materials  High Profile 
Utilities  High Profile 
Financials  High Profile 
Industrial  Low Profile 
Consumer Goods  Low Profile 
Healthcare Low Profile 
Consumer Services  Low Profile 
Telecommunications Low Profile 
Technology  Low Profile 
Industry classification based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). 
 
The Presence of a Voluntary Assurance Statement 
Numerous studies argue that companies’ adoption of a voluntary 
assurance statement for their sustainability reports would enhance the 
credibility of these reports (Deegan, Cooper and Shelly 2006; Simnett, 
Vanstraelen and Chua 2009; Kolk and Perego 2010). Past studies 
measure the presence of a voluntary assurance statement as a 
dichotomous variable. That is, the variable takes the value of 0 in the case 
of the sustainability report not being assured, and 1 where the report is 
assured (see for example Simnett, Vanstraelen and Chua 2009; Kolk and 
Perego 2010).  
 
Consistent with these previous studies, in this thesis, the presence of a 
voluntary assurance statement is measured by a dummy variable. The 
variable is 1 if a company has an assurance statement in their 
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sustainability reports and 0 if a company does not have an assurance 
statement in their sustainability reports. 
 
Table 3.8 highlights past studies that have measured the presence of a 
voluntary assurance statement variable. 
 
Table 3.8 Previous Studies Measures for the Presence of Voluntary 
Assurance Statements 
Study Measurement 
Simnett, Vanstraelen 
and Chua (2009) 
Dummy variable,is 0 if sustainability report is not assured, 
and 1 where the report is assured. 
Kolk and Perego (2010) Dummy variable equals 1 if an environmental, social and 
environmental or sustainability annual report is accompanied 
by an assurance statement, and 0 otherwise. 
Moroney, Windsor and 
Aw (2011) 
Dummy variable coded 1 if company has environmental 
assurance and 0 otherwise 
 
Jurisdictional Business Systems 
Prior studies have indicated that the CSRD information communicated by 
companies is different in different jurisdictions, as the social, 
environmental, and cultural factors influencing companies vary (Williams 
1999). In previous studies, jurisdiction, legal origin and/or country 
orientation have been most often measured as either developed versus 
developing country, stakeholder versus shareholder oriented, or common 
versus code law.  Many of these studies have focused on comparing 
shareholders versus stakeholder orientation. However, international 
business systems consist of more than conventional shareholder and 
stakeholder, features of emerging market systems must also be 
considered, for example, the fact that many companies are dominated by 
family owners and normally have relatively weak investor protection (Millar 
et al. 2005). Table 3.9 exhibits past studies that have classified the 
jurisdictional variable. This variable is measured by a categorical variable 
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that classifies firms in each home country into three jurisdictional groups: 
Anglo-American; communitarian; and emerging market (Eldomiaty, Choi 
and Cheng 2005). 
 
Table 3.9 Previous Studies of Jurisdictional Classification 
Study Variable Classification 
Williams (1999) Legal systems; level of 
economic development 
Code, Common law; 
developed, undeveloped 
Hope (2003) Legal origin Code, Common law 
Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari 
and Tondkar (2005) 
Country orientation Stakeholder, shareholder  
Simnett, Vanstraelen and 
Chua (2009) 
Legal origin Stakeholder , shareholder 
Kolk and Perego (2010) Legal origin Code, Common law 
Orij (2010) Country orientation Stakeholder, shareholder 
 
The Presence of a CSR Committee 
Table 3.10 displays various measurement scenarios for the presence of a 
CSR committee. This variable is measured by a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the company has a CSR committee and 0 otherwise.   
 
Table 3.10 Previous Studies Measures for the Presence of CSR 
Committee Measurement 
Study Measurement 
Cowen, Ferreri and Parker 
(1987) 
Dummy variable: 1 if the firm has a social responsibility 
committee, 0 otherwise. 
 
Al-Tuwaijiri, Christensen and 
Hughes (2004) 
Dummy variable: 1 if the firm has an environmental 
committee, 0 otherwise. 
 
Mallin and Michelon (2011) Dummy variable: 1 if the company has a committee in 
charge of CSR/ethics/sustainability matters, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Rankin, Windsor and 
Wahyuni (2011) 
Dummy variable of environmental committee: which 1 
if the firm has a specific environmental committee, 0 
otherwise. 
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Michelon and Parbonetti 
(2012) 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if company has identified a 
person in charge of social responsibility issues, 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
The empirical governance literature suggests that the presence of a CSR 
committee increases the level of corporate communication because its 
independence will foster board effectiveness (Haniffa and Cooke 2005; 
Said, Zainuddin and Haron 2009). In short, prior studies suggest that the 
presence of a CSR committee affects the level of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure.  
 
3.2.3.3 Control Variables 
Two control variables will be employed in this thesis. These are leverage 
and profitability. The selection of control variables is based on previous 
studies. Past studies have often used leverage as an indicator to measure 
the liquidity or solvency faced by companies. Leverage is measured as the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Brammer and Pavelin (2008) and 
Reverte (2009) argue that a low degree of leverage ensures that creditor 
stakeholders will seek to constrain managers’ discretion over CSR 
activities less, because such activities are only indirectly linked to the 
financial success of the firm. Prior studies on disclosure find that leverage 
is often negatively related to corporate social responsibility disclosure (see 
for example Belkaoui and Karpik 1989; Branco and Rodrigues 2008).  
 
Return on Assets (ROA) is used as the control variable proxy to measure 
profitability. Firms with high profitability are more likely to reveal their good 
news and tend to have higher levels of CSRD (Aerts and Cormier 2009). 
ROA is measured as of the ratio of total net profit divided by total assets.  
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3.3 Statistical Analysis  
This thesis employs several statistical techniques to test the five 
hypotheses. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple regressions are used 
as the main statistical technique to test these hypotheses. The regression 
model19 used is: 
CSRD = β0 + β1Firm Size+ β2Industry Type + β3Presence of Voluntary 
Assurance + β4Jurisdictional Business Systems + β5Presence of 
CSR Committee + β6Leverage+ β7Profitability + ε     
 
Independent samples t-tests will be also used to test whether there is a 
significant difference between the extent of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure in high-and low-profile industries, companies which have their 
sustainability reports assured and those that do not, and firms which have 
a CSR committee or not. The one-way ANOVA test is then employed to 
test whether there is a significant difference in the extent of CSRD among 
the three jurisdictional business systems: Anglo-American, communitarian, 
and emerging market. This thesis also utilises Pearson correlation to 
examine the associations between the dependent and predictor variables. 
 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter outlines the methodological choices and the research 
methods undertaken in this study. It details the the ontological, 
epistemological and methodological research paradigms underlying this 
thesis. In particular, this thesis adopts the positivist quantitative approach 
for this corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) study. Both the 
                                               
19
 This thesis also tests the assumptions underlying the regression model before running 
the regression estimation. These assumptions include normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity, and multicollinerity. First, the normality assumption is examined via 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. Second, the linearity assumption is examined via scatter 
plots. Third, the scatter plot and Glesjer test are employed to examine heterocedasticity 
problems. Multicollinierity is analysed using the tolerance value as well as the Variation 
Inflation Factor (VIF). Finally, the outliers are explored using Mahalanobis and Cook’s 
distance scores. 
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specific research methods and the key research questions about how best 
to predict the extent of CSRD are detailed. Consistent with many past 
studies and with the tenets of legitimacy theory, this thesis examines firm 
size, industry type, the presence of a voluntary assurance statement, 
jurisdictional business systems and the presence of a CSR committee as 
determinants of CSRD.  
 
In addition, this chapter indicates that leverage and profitability are the two 
control variables used in the regression models to control for compounding 
effect of cross sectional factors. An outline of the statistical analyses 
(ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regressions, independent samples 
t-test, one-way ANOVA, and Pearson correlations ends the chapter. 
 
Chapter four presents the descriptive statistics and univariate analysis. It 
begins with an overview of actual CSRD reporting practices across 
jurisdictions and countries. This is followed by an analysis of the global 
corporate social responsibility disclosure practices in aggregate and in 
major categories. Then, univariate analysis examines the potential 
influence of industry type, the presence of a voluntary assurance 
statement, jurisdictional business systems, and the presence of a CSR 
committee. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the descriptive statistics used and univariate tests 
carried out (independent samples t-tests, paired samples t-tests, and one-
way ANOVA). Section 4.1 presents the levels and themes of global 
corporate social responsibility disclosure. Section 4.2 contains a brief 
overview of the statistics for the levels and themes of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure per country. Sections 4.3 to 4.6 provide a detailed 
analysis of the global CSRD practices at for different groupings levels, i.e. 
core and additional indicators. Sections 4.7 to 4.10 then supply 
univariate20 analysis by looking at industry type, the presence of a 
voluntary assurance statement, jurisdictional business systems and the 
presence of a CSR committee respectively. Section 4.11 extends this 
treatment by a univariate analysis of each individual indicator of CSRD by 
industry type, presence of a voluntary assurance statement, jurisdictional 
business systems, and the presence of a CSR committee. Finally, Section 
4.12 summaries of the chapter’s findings. 
 
4.1 Levels and Themes of Global CSRD 
This section provides an overview of the corporate social responsibility 
disclosure of the 460 sample global companies from 44 countries in 2009, 
as shown in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.1 displays the mean of the CSRD index, 
i.e. the average accross the six themes of CSRD. It also shows average 
levels of disclosure for each of the six key themes of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure, namely: Economic (EC), Environmental (EN), 
                                               
20
 Univariate statistics are performed to identify any significant differences in these CSRD 
practices between high and low profile industries, assured and not assured, and across 
jurisdiction business systems. This tests are important to establish if these variables are 
key determinants. 
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Labour Practices (LA), Human Rights (HR), Society (SO), and Product 
Responsibility (PR).  
 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the overall mean of CSRD is 56.8 percent. This 
result indicates that on average these large global companies 
communicate a slight majority of the total possible CSRD indicators. This 
higher level of corporate social responsibility disclosure supports the 
decision to focus solely on sustainability reports. 
 
Figure 4.1 Levels of CSRD Themes 
 
Columns display the mean for overall CSRD (corporate social responsibility disclosures), 
and six key themes of CSRD: EC (economic), EN (environmental), LA (labour practices), 
HR (human rights), SO (society), and PR (product responsibility). 
 
The results shown in Figure 4.1 indicate that,of the six themes, labour 
practices (LA) have the highest average level of disclosure in sustainability 
reports (66.4 percent), followed by economic (EC) 60.2 percent, society 
(SO) 57.0 percent, environmental (EN) 56.7 percent, human rights (HR) 
49.0 percent, and product responsibility (PR) 46.0 percent. These results 
indicate that the companies disclosed more labour information than other 
CSR themes in their sustainability reports, suggesting these companies 
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may be concerned about labour issues. It is noteworthy that some 
companies do not disclose any economic, environmental, labour practices, 
human rights, society, and product responsibility information in their 
sustainability reports. while, in stark contrast, a few companies had 100 
percent disclosure in certain themes. The findings shown in Figure 4.1 are 
consistent with those previous studies21.  
 
Pratten and Mashat (2009) note that Libyan companies disclose at least 
one of the five categories in employee disclosures. Andrew et al. (1989) 
find that human resources is the theme most disclosed by Malaysian and 
Singaporean companies. They reason that companies in developing 
countries may be very aware of their government’ s concern to improve 
the working conditions and living standards of the workers. Islam and 
Deegan (2010) provide evidence that labour practices in developing 
countries have frequently been the object of global criticisms. Their study 
find that companies reacted to mitigate media pressures by providing 
positive labour disclosures. The findings in this thesis highlight the 
improvement in disclosures about labour practices in emerging market─ 
perhaps in response to such pressures. 
 
Table 4.1 highlights the levels and key themes of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure for overall and each jurisdiction. Interestingly, 
companies in the emerging market jurisdiction have the highest average 
level of CSRD (60.4 percent). This is followed by companies in 
communitarian (55.3 percent) and Anglo-American jurisdictions (54.7 
percent). 
                                               
21
 Teoh and Thong (1984), Newson and Deegan (2002), Gunawan, Djajadikerta and 
Smith (2009), and Azim, Ahmad and Islam (2009) find that the human resources theme is 
the most highly disclosed by companies. 
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Table 4.1 Levels and Key Themes of CSRD 
Themes Overall  Emerging  
Market  
Communitarian Anglo- 
American  
CSRD  56.8*(24.2) 60.4 55.3 54.7 
Economic 
Environmental 
Labour Practices  
Human Rights 
Society 
Product Responsibility 
60.2 (28.6) 
56.7 (25.3) 
66.4 (26.1) 
49.0 (33.9) 
57.0 (31.8) 
46.0 (33.2) 
66.7 
58.1 
72.4 
52.9 
60.0 
50.4 
60.8 
57.3 
69.7 
51.1 
58.0 
48.6 
55.4 
56.5 
58.5 
44.0 
53.9 
39.9 
 N = 460 N = 103 N = 195 N = 162 
Average of overall CSRD and six key themes of CSRD in various jurisdictions. The 
descriptive statistics are expressed in percentage. CSRD = corporate social responsibility 
disclosure. *(Standard Deviation). 
 
Regarding the key themes of corporate social responsibility disclosure, it 
can be seen that labour practices are the most disclosed theme in all 
jurisdictions. The results also show that companies in emerging market 
jurisdictions lead communicating in every major theme of CSRD.  
 
 For the economic theme, emerging market disclosure is 66.7 
percent whilst it is 60.8 percent for communitarian and 55.4 percent 
for Anglo-American. 
 The environmental disclosure levels are much close, at 58.1 
percent for emerging market, 57.3 percent for communitarian and 
56.5 percent for Anglo-American jurisdictions. 
 Levels of disclosure for labour practices and decent work show a 
similar tread, albeit with higher sets of scores, with emerging market 
72.4 percent, communitarian 69.7 percent and Anglo-American 
58.5 percent. 
 Human rights level of disclosure scores are 52.9 percent for 
emerging market, 51.1 percent for communitarian and only 44.0 
percent for Anglo-American. 
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 Scores of society-related indicators are somewhat higher, with 60.0 
percent for emerging market, 58.0 percent for communitarian and 
53.9 percent for Anglo-American. 
 Finally, disclosures for the product responsibility theme are 50.4 
percent for emerging market companies, 48.6 percent for 
communitarian and only 39.9 percent for Anglo-American. 
 
Overall, emerging market companies consistently have the highest level of 
communication across all themes and Anglo-American companies the 
lowest. These findings indicate that companies in emerging market 
countries have a surprisingly high level of commitment to and participation 
in corporate social responsibility. As reported by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) survey in 2008, 25 of 
100 large companies in emerging market countries have implemented at 
least half the indicators recommended in UNCTAD’ Guidance in Corporate 
Social Responsibility Indicators and the GRI (2006) Guidelines. This 
finding suggests that these emerging market companies are more willing 
to communicate CSR information in their sustainability reports. 
 
4.2 Overview of Levels and Themes of CSRD per Country 
Table 4.2 lists the levels and themes of CSRD per country. From emerging 
market areas, Brazil (73.3 percent), Mexico (73.0 percent), and India (70.7 
percent) have the top three scores for the CSRD index, while the three 
lowest-scoring emerging nations are Thailand (46.2 percent), China (49.7 
percent) and Turkey (49.8 percent). From the communitarian jurisdictions, 
the highest CSRD indices are those of companies from Spain (81.1 
percent), Portugal (75.5 percent), and Italy (73.8 percent), whilst 
companies from Norway (32.0 percent), Denmark (37.9 percent), and 
Japan (40.3 percent) have the lowest CSRD indices. Finally, companies 
from Australia (62.6 percent), Canada (58.0 percent), and the US (49.5 
percent) are those from the Anglo-American jurisdictions that have the 
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three highest CSRD indices, whereas companies from Singapore (40.8 
percent) and the UK (47.5 percent) are those that have the two lowest 
CSRD indices. 
 
Table 4.2 Levels and Key Themes of CSRD by Country 
Country Themes 
Emerging Market CSRD EC EN LA HR SO PR 
Colombia* 
Indonesia* 
Chile* 
Brazil 
Mexico 
India 
Malaysia 
Argentina* 
Taiwan 
South Africa 
Israel* 
Hungary* 
Croatia* 
Philippines 
UAE 
Turkey 
China 
Russia* 
Thailand 
Nigeria* 
Sri Lanka* 
89.8 
89.8 
82.2 
73.3 
73.0 
70.7 
69.6 
68.9 
63.8 
59.9 
59.4 
54.4 
52.5 
50.6 
50.6 
49.8 
49.7 
49.3 
46.2 
45.5 
19.6 
100 
100 
83.3 
73.1 
50.7 
77.7 
77.7 
88.8 
64.4 
75.4 
100 
55.5 
38.8 
50.0 
59.2 
60.0 
62.3 
50.0 
55.5 
100 
22.2 
90.0 
83.0 
76.6 
66.1 
76.6 
65.4 
68.3 
41.6 
56.0 
59.0 
67.0 
45.0 
58.3 
52.5 
44.4 
43.3 
51.6 
50.0 
55.0 
40.0 
13.3 
100 
86.0 
85.7 
82.7 
78.5 
79.2 
78.5 
92.8 
82.8 
74.4 
79.0 
78.5 
57.1 
66.0 
71.4 
65.7 
61.9 
60.7 
50.0 
57.0 
42.8 
78.0 
100 
83.3 
79.6 
76.1 
71.7 
72.2 
72.2 
64.4 
49.2 
11.0 
55.5 
61.1 
38.8 
29.6 
31.1 
27.7 
44.4 
25.0 
33.0 
11.1 
88.0 
100 
81.2 
82.2 
80.3 
71.5 
65.6 
93.7 
62.5 
60.7 
25.0 
62.5 
68.7 
43.7 
33.3 
50.0 
46.5 
31.2 
25.0 
50.0 
12.5 
78.0 
89.0 
94.4 
68.5 
65.0 
66.6 
52.7 
77.7 
60.0 
34.9 
44.0 
38.8 
16.6 
38.8 
37.0 
55.5 
36.4 
50.0 
41.6 
22.0 
16.6 
Communitarian 
Spain 
Portugal 
Italy 
South Korea 
Austria 
Germany 
Greece 
Finland 
Sweden  
Switzerland 
The Netherlands 
France 
Belgium 
Japan 
Denmark  
Norway 
81.1 
75.5 
73.8 
68.9 
66.5 
63.4 
60.7 
54.4 
49.5 
48.9 
46.2 
44.0 
41.1 
40.3 
37.9 
32.0 
85.1 
80.0 
75.8 
78.6 
76.1 
64.2 
63.6 
46.6 
47.0 
61.7 
48.8 
45.1 
38.8 
36.2 
37.7 
51.8 
78.6 
76.3 
72.5 
63.3 
51.4 
59.0 
59.3 
59.3 
51.0 
45.1 
48.2 
48.0 
41.6 
45.2 
46.0 
21.1 
91.9 
87.8 
87.3 
87.7 
72.4 
77.5 
74.6 
68.5 
58.2 
56.3 
57.6 
57.1 
52.3 
43.2 
47.1 
45.2 
79.2 
58.8 
64.0 
70.5 
55.5 
57.9 
53.5 
42.2 
49.5 
46.9 
31.8 
34.8 
31.4 
29.8 
22.2 
40.7 
77.5 
75.0 
79.4 
71.1 
75.0 
75.0 
44.3 
57.5 
50.9 
50.0 
45.8 
34.1 
43.7 
37.5 
35.0 
37.5 
73.3 
66.6 
60.1 
69.6 
66.6 
50.7 
62.6 
33.3 
32.4 
38.2 
34.0 
27.4 
31.4 
36.2 
15.5 
14.8 
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Table 4.2 continued 
Country Themes 
Anglo-American CSRD EC EN LA HR SO PR 
Ireland* 
Australia 
New Zealand* 
Canada 
US 
UK 
Singapore 
66.4 
62.6 
58.2 
58.0 
49.5 
47.5 
40.8 
55.5 
67.1 
61.1 
64.1 
51.6 
50.7 
33.3 
65.0 
63.6 
63.3 
60.0 
52.4 
50.1 
44.1 
82.1 
68.4 
71.4 
58.7 
56.6 
51.6 
64.2 
61.1 
51.3 
44.4 
53.8 
41.1 
40.3 
8.3 
56.2 
69.2 
37.5 
58.1 
49.6 
51.2 
40.6 
72.2 
50.9 
50.0 
48.2 
35.2 
33.7 
33.3 
Average overall CSRD and six key themes of CSRD in each country. The descriptive 
statistics are expressed in percentage.  * these countries are only represented by 1-2 
companies in this thesis sample, therefore, so they are excluded when results are 
interpreted in the main text. CSRD = corporate social responsibility disclosure. EC = 
economic. EN = environmental. LA = labour practices. HR = human rights. SO = society. 
PR = product responsibility. 
 
Some of the higher and lower levels of CSRD for each of the six themes 
will now be briefly discussed. For the communication of labour practices 
index, Spain has the highest levels (91.9 percent), followed by Portugal 
(87.8 percent), and South Korea (87.8 percent). Spanish firms may well 
have the highest labour disclosure because they have implemented the 
SA800022 standard. As cited by Fuentes-Garcia, Nunez-Tabales and 
Veroz-Herradon (2008), the aim of the SA8000 standard is to improve 
labour conditions. The Spanish standard requires that companies 
engaging in CSR must verify their labour information, such as having 
minimum standards for basic labour rights, health and safety, salary levels, 
etc. The second most disclosed theme by companies in each country is 
economic. Spanish firms again disclosed the most economic theme in 
their sustainability reports (85.1 percent), followed by Portuguese (80.0 
percent), and South Korean firms (78.6 percent). Conversely, Singapore 
(33.3 percent), Japan (36.2 percent), and Denmark (37.7 percent) are the 
three countries in which the communication of  economic theme is the 
                                               
22
 The SA8000 is a standard system that pertains to the human rights of workers.It is 
produced by Social Accountability International (SAI), an independent, non-governmental, 
not-for-profit organisation which provides certification services via certification bodies 
accredited by the SocialAccountability Accreditation Services Agency (Social 
Accountability 2008). 
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least. This result is consistent with the KPMG (2008) survey, which finds 
that, overall, economic is the main driver of reporting CSR activities.  
 
The third highest disclosed theme by firms is that of  society. Brazilian 
firms have the most information disclosed about their activities in Brazilian 
society (82.2 percent), followed by Mexican firms (80.3 percent), and then 
Italian (79.4 percent) firms. The three countries that have the lowest level 
of information disclosed in the theme of society are Thailand (25.0 
percent) and the United Arab Emirates (33.0 percent), and France (34.1 
percent). As for the environmental theme, Spanish firms again have the 
highest level of information most dissemination (78.6 percent), followed by 
Mexican firms (76.6 percent), and Portuguese (76.3 percent) firms. 
Conversely, companies from Norway (21.1 percent), Belgium (41.6 
percent), and Turkey (43.3 percent) provide the least information about 
their environmental activities in their sustainability reports. Brazilian firms 
disclosed the most about their human rights activities (79.6 percent), 
followed by Spanish firms (79.2 percent), and Mexican firms (76.1 
percent). In contrast, Singaporean firms (8.3 percent), Danish firms (22.2 
percent), and Thai (25.0 percent) disclose the least. Finally, product 
responsibility theme is most disclosed by companies from Spain (73.3 
percent), South Korea (69.6 percent), and Brazil (68.5 percent). Whilst 
firms from Norway (14.8 percent), Denmark (15.5 percent), and France 
(27.4 percent) disclosed the least about product responsibility (see Table 
4.2 for details). Overall, these results show that the emerging market 
companies have the highest levels of CSRD. Meanwhile, at the country 
level, Spain is the country with the highest level of CSRD. 
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4.3 Levels of CSRD-core and CSRD-additional Indicators 
The six key CSRD themes are displayed in Table 4.1. Each theme 
corresponds to a set of core and additional performance indicators23. The 
GRI (2006) states that the core indicators are intended to identify generally 
applicable indicators and are assumed to be material for most companies. 
Moreover, additional indicators are thought to represent emerging practice 
or address topics that may be material for some companies, but not for 
others (GRI 2006).  
 
Table 4.3 gives the descriptive statistics of CSRD based on the GRI 
(2006) core and additional indicators, and presents the result of paired 
sample t-tests. A clear finding is that the mean of CSRD-core indicators is 
consistently higher (64.2 percent) than that of CSRD-additional indicators 
(44.8 percent), and the difference between the two is statistically 
significant. The results may imply that some CSRD-additional indicators 
are only used by some companies to communicate broader contextual 
information that is required by stakeholders (GRI 2006). 
 
Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics for CSRD-core and CSRD-additional 
Indicators and Paired Samples t-tests 
Variables Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
CSRD-core 
CSRD-additional 
64.2 
44.8 
65.0 
43.0 
24.8 
27.9 
6.0 
0.0 
100 
100 
 Pair Differences  
 
t 
 
 
df 
 
 
Sig. 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Pair1Core - Additional  .194 .196 .009 21.1 459 .000*** 
The descriptive statistics reported are expressed in percentages. Std.Deviatation = 
standard deviation. CSRD = corporate social responsibility disclosure. The paired 
samples t-tests are performed by comparing the mean of CSRD-core and CSRD-
additional indicators. *, **, ***indicate significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 confidence 
levels respectively. 
 
                                               
23
 Refer to Appendix A for more details. 
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4.4 Levels of Core and Additional Indicatorsfor Each CSRD Theme  
Figure 4.2 reveals the mean scores for the CSRD-core and CSRD-
additional indicators for each key theme.  
 
Figure 4.2 Core and Additional Indicators for Each Theme of CSRD 
 
Each column displays the mean of the core and additional indicators for the six key 
themes of CSRD: EC = economic, EN = environmental, LA =labour practices, HR = 
human rights, SO = society, PR = product responsibility. “Core” refers to the core 
indicators and “Add” refers to the additional indicators. 
 
Consistent with the results provided in Table 4.1, the mean of labour 
practices, LA-core indicators (71.7 percent) is the highest disclosure 
indicator communicated by companies. This is followed by economic, EC-
core indicators (65.0 percent), the third highest disclosed is environmental, 
EN-core indicators (64.6 percent). This result somewhat differs from the 
finding in Table 4.1 where the theme of society have the third highest level 
of overall disclosure by companies. Figure 4.2 also shows that the mean 
for all core indicators is higher than that for additional indicators.  
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The paired samples t-tests shown in Table 4.4 confirm that there is a 
significant difference between core and additional disclosure indicators for 
all themes. Consistent with the results of the paired samples t-tests in 
Table 4.3, these results suggest that companies disclose a higher number 
of core indicators for all themes than they do for additional indicators. 
 
Table 4.4 Paired Samples t-tests for Core and Additional Indicators 
 Paired Differences  
 
t 
 
 
Df 
 
 
Sig. 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Pair1 EC-core - EC-add 
Pair2 EN-core - EN-add 
Pair3 LA-core - LA-add 
Pair4 HR-core - HR-add 
Pair5 SO-core - SO-add 
Pair6 PR-core - PR-add 
.21663 
.17966 
.18337 
.37899 
.20870 
.17250 
.34546 
.24279 
.29291 
.24901 
.35349 
.30203 
.01611 
.01132 
.01366 
.01161 
.01648 
.01408 
13.449 
15.871 
13.427 
32.642 
12.662 
12.250 
459 
459 
459 
459 
459 
459 
.000*** 
.000*** 
.000*** 
.000*** 
.000*** 
.000*** 
The paired samples t-tests are performed by comparing the means of core and additional 
indicators for the following themes economic (EC), environmental (EN), labour practices 
(LA),, human rights (HR), society (SO),and product responsibility (PR) themes. Std. Error 
Mean = standard error mean. “Core” refers to the core indicators and “Add” refers to the 
additional indicators. *, **, ***indicate significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 confidence 
levels respectively. 
 
4.5 Levels of Core and Additional Indicators for Each Category  
Figures 4.3-4.8 display the means of the core and additional disclosure 
indicators for each category24 of the GRI.Figure 4.3 shows that indirect 
                                               
24As discussed earlier, the GRI (2006) guidelines consist of six themes. Each theme is 
further broken down into several categories: 
 The cconomic theme consists of three categories; these are economic performance, 
market presence, and indirect economic impact. 
 The environmental theme consists of nine categories; these are materials, energy, 
water, biodiversity, emissions, effluents and waste, product and services, compliance, 
transport, and overall. 
 The labour practices theme consists of five categories; these are employment, 
labour/management relations, occupational health and safety, training and education, 
and diversity and equal opportunity. 
 The human rights theme consists of seven categories; these are investment and 
procurement practices, non-discriminat, freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, child labour, forced and compulsory labour, security practices, indigenous 
rights. 
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economic impact25-IEI-core is the highest indicator (73.4 percent) 
communicated by companies while the lowest is market market 
presence26, MP-additional indicator (36.9 percent).  
 
Figure 4.3 Economic Themes: Core and Additional  
 
Graph displays the means of the core and additional indicators for economic themes. 
EP
27
 = economic performance. MP = market presence, IEI = indirect economic impact. 
“Core” refers to the core indicators and “Add” refers to the additional indicators. 
                                                                                                                                
 The society theme consists of five categories; these are community, corruption, public 
policy, anti-competitive behaviour, and compliance. 
 The product responsibility theme consists of five categories; these are customer 
health and safety, product and service labelling, marketing communications, customer 
privacy, and compliance 
25
Indirect economic impact (IEI) categories consist of two indicators: 
 The IEI-core indicator (coded as EC8). This indicator measures the development 
and impact of infrastructure investments and services provided primarily for 
public benefit through commercial, in-kind or pro bono engagement. 
 The IEI-additional indicator (coded as EC9). This indicator measures the 
understanding of significant indirect economic impacts. 
26Market presence (MP) categories consist of three indicators: 
 The MP-core indicators (coded as EC6 and EC7). EC6 measures policy, 
practices, and proportion of spending on locally-based suppliers at significant 
locations of operation. EC7 measures procedures for local hiring and the 
proportion of senior management hired from the community at significant 
locations of operation. 
 The MP-additional indicator (coded as EC5). EC5 measures the range of ratios of 
standard entry level of wage compared to local minimum wage at significant 
locations of operation. 
27
 No additional indicator for Economic performance (EP) indicators (see to Appendix A 
for details). 
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Figure 4.4 reveals the means of the core and additional indicators for 
environmental categories. Energy28-core (82.2 percent) is the most 
communicated indicator by companies, whilst water29-additional (36.6 
percent) is the least disclosed indicator by companies.  
 
Figure 4.4 Environmental Themes: Core and Additional  
 
Graph displays the means of core and additional indicators for environmental themes. 
Material
30
, P and S
31
 = product and service. Emissions = emissions, effluents and waste. 
“Core” refers to the core indicators and “Add” refers to the additional indicators. 
                                               
28
Energy categories consist of five indicators: 
 The energy-core indicators (coded as EN3 and EN4). EN3 measures the direct 
energy consumption by primary energy sources, while EN4 assesses indirect 
energy consumption by primary sources. 
 The energy-additional indicators (coded as EN5 – EN7). 
29
Water categories consist of three indicators: 
 The water-core indicator (coded as EN8). 
 The water-additional indicators (coded as EN9 and EN10). EN9 quantifies the 
water sources significantly affected by withdrawal of water. EN10 measures the 
percentage and total volume of water recycled and reused. 
30
Material categories consist of two indicators: 
 The material-core indicators (coded as EN1 and EN2). 
 No additional indicator for material category. 
31
Product and services (P and S) categories consist of two indicators: EN26 and EN27. 
 No additional indicator for Pand S and compliance category. 
 No core indicator for transport and total category. 
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Figure 4.5 Labour PracticesThemes:Core and Additional  
 
Graph displays the means of core and additional indicators for L and M
32
 = 
labour/management relations. OHS = occupational health and safety. T and E = 
training and education. DEO
33
 = diversity and equal opportunity. “Core” refers to the 
core indicators and “Add” refers to the additional indicators. 
 
Figure 4.5 highlights the means of core and additional category indicators 
for labour practices. It can be seen that occupational health and safety, 
OHS-core34 (82.2 percent) represents greater number of indicators 
                                               
32
Labour/management relations (L and M) categories consist of two indicators: 
 The L and M-core indicators(coded as LA4 and LA5). LA4 measures the 
percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. LA5 
measures Minimum Notice Period (s) regarding significant operational changes, 
including whether these are specified in collective agreements. 
 No additional indicator for L and M category. 
33
Diversity and equal opportunity (DEO) categories consist of two indicators: 
 The DEO-core indicators (coded as LA13 and LA14). No additional indicator. 
34
Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) categories consist of four indicators: 
 The OHS-core indicators (coded as LA7 and LA8). LA7 determines the rates 
injury, occupational diseases, lost days, and absenteeism, and the total number 
of work-related fatalities by region. LA8 measures the education, training, 
counselling, prevention, and risk-control programs in place to assist workforce 
members, their families, or community members regarding serious diseases. 
 The OHS-additional indicators (coded as (LA6 and LA9). LA6 computes the 
percentage of total workforce represented in formal joint management-worker 
health and safety committees that help monitor and advice on OHS programs. 
LA9 evaluates the health and safety topics covered in formal agreements with 
trade unions. 
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communicated by companies, whilst OHS-additional is the lowest (43.7 
percent).  
 
Figure 4.6 Human Rights Themes: Core and Additional  
 
Graph displays the means of core and additional indicators for human rights. IPP
35
 = 
investment and procurement practices. FACB
36
 = freedom of association and collective 
bargaining. FCL
37
 = forced & compulsory labour. “Core” refers to the core indicators and 
“Add” refers to the additional indicators. 
                                               
35
Investment and Procurement Practice (IPP) categories consist of three indicators: 
 IPP-core (coded as HR1 and HR2). HR1 measures percentage and total number 
of significant investment agreements that include human rights clauses or that 
have undergone human rights screening. HR 2 measures percentage of 
significant suppliers and contractors that have undergone screening on human 
rights and actions taken. 
 The IPP-additional indicator (coded as HR3). HR3 measures total hours of 
employees training on policies and procedures concerning aspects of human 
rights that are relevant to operations, including the percentage of employees 
trained. 
36
The freedom of association and collective bargaining (FACB) category consists of a 
core indicator only (coded as HR5). 
 No additional indicator for this category. 
 No additional indicator for non-discriminant category. 
 No core indicator for security practices category. 
37
Forced and compulsory labour (FCL) category consists of a core indicator only (coded 
as HR7). 
 No additional indicator for this category. 
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Figure 4.6 presents the means of the core and additional indicators for 
human rights themes. Child labour-core38 (63.9 percent) is the indicator 
most communicated by companies, whereas, the indicator indigenous- 
rights-additional39is the least-communicated (29.3 percent).  
 
Figure 4.7 displays the means of the core and additional indicators for the 
society theme. The results show that community-core40 (71.3 percent) is 
the indicator reported most often by companies,whilst, compliance-core41 
(36.9 percent) is the least disclosed. Certain additional indicators, for 
example community, corruption, anti-competitive behaviour, and 
compliance are not disclosed by any companies. 
                                               
38
The child labour category consists of a core indicator only (coded as HR6). HR6 
assesses the operations identified as having significant risk for incidents of child labour 
and the measures taken to contribute to the elimination of child labour.  
 No additional indicator for this category. 
39
Indigenous rights category consists of an additional indicator only (coded as HR9). HR9 
quantifies the total number of incidents of violations involving the rights of indigenous 
people and actions taken. 
 No core indicator for this category. 
40
 The community category has a core indicatoronly (coded as SO1). SO1 measures the 
nature, scope, and effectiveness of any programs and practices that access and manage 
the impact of operations on communities, including entering, and operating, and existing 
in communities.  
 No additional indicator for this category. 
41
 The compliance category has a core indicator only (coded as SO8). SO8 measures the 
monetary value of significant fines and the total number of non-monetary sanctions for 
non-compliance with laws and regulations.No additional indicator for this category. 
 No core indicator for the anti-competitive behaviour (ACB) category. 
 No additional indicator for the corruption category. 
97 
 
Figure 4.7 Society Themes: Core and Additional  
 
Graphs displays the means of core and additional indicators for society themes. ACB = 
anti competitive behaviour. “Core” refers to the core indicators and “Add” refers to the 
additional indicators. 
 
Figure 4.8 shows the means of the core and additional indicators for the 
product responsibility themes. Customer health and safety-core42 (64.5 
percent) is the indicator most disclosed by companies, whereas marketing-
communication- additional43 (32.6 percent) is the least disclosed.  
                                               
42
The customer health and safety (CHS) category consists of two indicators: 
 The CHS-core indicator (coded as PR1). PR1 determines the life-cycle stages in 
which the health and safety impacts of products and services are assessed for 
improvement, and the percentage of significant products and services categories 
subject to such procedures. 
 The CHS-additional indicator (coded as PR2). PR2 measures total number of 
incidents of non-compliance with regulations and voluntary codes relating to the 
health and safety impacts of products and services. 
43
 Marketing-communications-additional (PR7) calculates the total number of incidents of 
non-compliance with regulations and voluntary codes that cover marketing 
communications, including advertising, promotion, and sponsorship, by type of outcomes. 
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Figure 4.8 Product Responsibility Themes: Core and Additional  
 
Graph displays the means of core and additional indicators for product responsibility. 
CHS = customer health and safety. PSL = product and service labelling. MC = marketing 
communications. CP
44
 = customer privacy. “Core” refers to the core indicators and “Add” 
refers to the additional indicators. 
 
 
4.6 Individual Indicators of CSRD 
The results of the descriptive statistics displayed in Figure 4.1 and Table 
4.1 are now expanded into more specific indicators. Table 4.5 presents the 
level of individual indicators of corporate social responsibility disclosure 
disclosed by companies.The shaded areas are the highest indicators 
disclosed. 
 
In terms of economic themes, it can be seen that the majority of firms 
(86.1 percent) disclose a high level of information about economic 
performance-EC1, through information such as revenues, operating costs, 
compensations, donations, investments, retained earnings, and payments, 
whereas only 37.0 percent of firms reveal information relating to market 
                                               
44
The customer privacy (CP) category has an additional indicator only (coded as PR8). 
 No core indicator for CP category. 
 No additional indicator for compliance category. 
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presence-EC5. Among these economic themes, information concerning 
therange of ratios of standard entry-level wages compared to local 
minimum wages at significant locations of operations is disclosed for less 
than any other indicator. 
 
Pertaining to environmental themes, emissions, effluents, and waste 
indicator-EN16 is the most communicated (88.7 percent) by companies. 
EN16 is the indicator used to measure the total of direct and indirect 
greenhouse gas emissions by weight. The indicator least disclosed by 
firms is additional information about biodiversity-EN15 (22.4 percent). This 
indicator relates to the number of International Union for Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) red list and national conservation 
are as affected by company operations. 
 
Table 4.5 Levels of Individual Indicators of CSRD 
GRI Indicators Number of firms 
Disclosing 
% 
EC1 – Direct economic value    396 86.1 
EC8 – Development and impact investments 338 73.5 
EC2 – Financial implication 324 70.4 
EC6 – Policy, practices, proportion of spending 284 61.7 
EC3 – Benefit plan obligations 269 58.5 
EC7 – Procedures for local hiring from community 267 58.0 
EC9 – Indirect and extent of economics impacts 228 49.8 
EC4 – Financial assistance from government 216 47.0 
EC5 – Ratios of standard entry 170 37.0 
EN16 – Direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions 408 88.7 
EN3 – Direct energy consumption 394 85.7 
EN26 – Mitigate environmental impacts 376 81.7 
EN8 – Total water withdrawal by source 372 80.9 
EN22 – Weight of waste by type and disposal method 367 79.8 
EN4 – Indirect energy consumption 363 78.9 
EN18 – Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 347 75.4 
EN5 – Energy conservation and efficiency 328 71.3 
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Table 4.5 (continued) 
GRI Indicators Number of firms 
Disclosing 
% 
EN6 – Renewable and reduction energy 322 70.0 
EN1 – Materials used by weight or volume 296 64.3 
EN7 – Reduction of indirect energy consumption 285 62.0 
EN28 – Fines and non-monetary sanctions 284 61.7 
EN17 – Other indirect greenhouse gas emissions 283 61.5 
EN20 – NO and SO and other air emissions 276 60.0 
EN23 – Total number and volume of spills 267 58.0 
EN21 – Water discharge by quality and destinations 260 56.5 
EN2 – Materials used that they recycled  260 56.5 
EN12 – Impacts of activities on biodiversity 235 51.1 
EN14 – Actions and plans for managing biodiversity 219 47.6 
EN11 – Land owned, leased & managed 219 47.6 
EN19 – Emissions of ozone-depleting 211 45.9 
EN29 – Environmental impacts of transporting 208 45.2 
EN30 – Total environmental protection expenditure 201 43.7 
EN13 – Habitats protected and restored 194 42.2 
EN10 – Volume of water recycled and reused 183 39.8 
EN27 – Products sold 181 39.3 
EN9 – Water source affected by withdrawal of water 154 33.5 
EN24 – Transported or treated waste 126 27.4 
EN25 – Biodiversity value of water bodies 110 23.9 
EN15 – List species and national conservation 103 22.4 
LA1 – Total workforce 412 89.6 
LA7 – Rates of injury, diseases, lost days 407 88.5 
LA13 – Composition of governance bodies 354 77.0 
LA8 – Education, training and counselling 350 76.1 
LA10 – Average hours of training per year 347 75.4 
LA2 – Total and rate of employee turnover 338 73.5 
LA11 – Program for skills and lifelong learning 326 70.9 
LA4 – Employees covered  324 70.4 
LA12 – Employees’ performance reviews 295 64.1 
LA3 – Benefit provided for full time employees 253 55.0 
LA5 – Minimum notice period 237 51.5 
LA14 – Ratio of basic salary of men to women 232 50.4 
LA6 – Management-worker health and safety 218 47.4 
LA9 – Health and safety topics 184 40.0 
HR6 – Child labour 294 63.9 
HR7 – Forced and compulsory labour 285 62.0 
HR5 – Freedom of association, collective bargaining 268 58.3 
HR2 – Screening on human rights and actions taken 261 56.7 
HR4 – Incidents of discrimination and actions taken 259 56.3 
HR1 – Investment agreements 202 43.9 
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Table 4.5 (continued) 
GRI Indicators Number of firms 
Disclosing 
% 
HR3 – Policy and procedures’ human rights aspects  184 40.0 
HR8 – Security practices     142 30.9 
HR9 – Indigenous rights 135 29.3 
SO1 – Community  328 71.3 
SO3  – Anti-corruption policies and procedures 320 69.6 
SO5 – Public policy development 302 65.7 
SO2 – Corruption  270 58.7 
SO4 – Actions taken in response corruption 265 57.6 
SO8 – Fines and sanctions  for non compliance 233 50.7 
SO6 – Financial contributions to political parties 211 45.9 
SO7 – Anti competitive behaviour 170 37.0 
PR1 – Health and safety products & services 297 64.6 
PR3 – Type of product and service information 271 58.9 
PR5 – Customer satisfaction survey 269 58.5 
PR6 – Marketing communication program 252 54.8 
PR9 –  Compliance 203 44.1 
PR8 – Customer privacy 158 34.3 
PR2 – Incidents of non-compliance 156 33.9 
PR7 –  Advertising, promotion and sponsorship 150 32.6 
PR4 – Product and service labelling 149 32.4 
Percentage of firms’ CSRD in each indicator from the six themes. CSRD = corporate 
social responsibility disclosure. EC = economic. EN = environmental. LA = labour 
practices. HR = human rights. SO = society. PR = product responsibility. Total sample = 
460.  
 
Regarding labour practices themes, employment-LA1 is the most popular 
indicator (89.6 percent) released by firms. LA1 relates to information about 
the total workforce by employment type, contract, and region.In contrast, 
occupational health and safety-LA9 indicators such as data about health 
and safety topics covered in formal agreements with trade unions are the 
indicator disclosed least often by firms (40.0 percent). As regards to 
human rights themes, the child labour indicator-HR6 is the most 
communicated indicator by companies in their sustainability reports (63.9 
percent), whereas the least communicated (29.3 percent) related to 
indigenous rights-HR9. As for themes relating to society, community-SO1 
is the indicator most disclosed by companies (71.3 percent), while the anti-
competitive behaviour-SO7 indicator is the least disclosed (37.0 percent). 
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As for product responsibility, customer health and safety-PR1 has the 
highest score (64.6 percent) and the lowest (32.4 percent) is for the 
product and service labelling-additional indicator-PR4. 
 
4.7 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis for Industry Type 
This section shows the results of the descriptive statistics for overall CSRD 
by industry type and of the independent samples t-tests of industry-type 
effects. Table 4.6 provides industry percentages based on the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) categories45. The high-profile industries 
(49.5 percent) in the thesis sample are financials (16.9 percent), basic 
materials (16.1 percent), utilities (8.7 percent), and oil and gas (7.8 
percent) companies. The low-profile industries (50.5 percent) are industrial 
(23.7 percent), consumer goods (11.1 percent), consumer services (5.0 
percent), telecommunications (4.5 percent), technology (4.1 percent), and 
healthcare (2.0 percent) companies. 
 
Table 4.6 Descriptive Statistics of Industry Classification 
Industry Type Industry  Frequency %* 
High Profile 1. Financials 
2. Basic Materials  
3. Utilities  
4. Oil and Gas  
78 
74 
40 
36 
16.9 
16.1 
8.7 
7.8 
Sub-Total  228 49.5 
Low Profile 5. Industrial  
6. Consumer Goods 
7. Consumer Services 
8. Telecommunications 
9. Technology 
10.Healthcare 
109 
51 
23 
21 
19 
9 
23.7 
11.1 
5.0 
4.6 
4.1 
2.0 
Sub-Total  232 50.5 
Total sample is 460 global firms across these various industries. Industry type is 
categorised into high-profile and low-profile industries.*The percentages are rounded up. 
                                               
45
 Classification schema of companies into high-profile and low-profile are based on 
previous studies (see Chapter 3, Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 for details). 
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Industry types have been examined in many previous studies as a 
possible determinant of CSRD (Cowen, Ferreri and Parker 1987; Patten 
1991; Roberts 1992; Hackston and Milne 1996; Williams 1997; Adams, Hill 
and Roberts 1998; Newson and Deegan 2002; Gao, Heravi and Xiao 
2005; Ho and Taylor 2007; Reverte 2009). These studies often argue that 
high-profile industries positively disclose more CSRD than low-profile 
industries. High-profile industries, it is argued, have higher consumer 
visibility, a high level of political risk, and more concentrated, intense 
competition (Roberts 1992). The results of the independent samples t-
tests (Table 4.7) show that the mean CSRD score for high-profile 
industries is 59.2 percent while the mean of low-profile industries is lower 
at 54.4 percent. There are statistically significant differences across high-
profile and low-profile industries (t = 2.133; p-value = 0.033) with respect 
to the CSRD index.  
 
Table 4.7 Independent Samples t-Tests of Industry-Type Effects 
 Industry N Mean Levene’s Test for 
Equality Variances 
t-test for 
Equality Means 
Mean 
Difference 
    F Sig. t Sig.   
 
 
 
High Profile  
 
Low Profile  
228 
 
232 
59.2 
 
54.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not assumed 
0.177 0.674 2.133 
3.134 
0.033** 
0.033** 
0.0480 
0.0480 
The independent samples t-tests are performed by comparing the mean CSRDs of high-
profile and low-profile industries. *, **, ***indicate significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 
confidence levels. 
 
Consistent with legitimacy theory, this finding implies that firms in high-
profile industries provide more sustainability information than firms in low-
profile industries. Patten (1991) argues that the political visibility of a 
company is influenced by industry membership. More sensitive industries 
are more susceptible to scrutiny from stakeholder groups, since they are 
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more visible to external groups. Thus, this finding is in line with legitimacy 
theory and results of previous study. 
 
4.8 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis for the Presence of 
Voluntary Assurance  
 
As outlined in Table 4.8, of the 212 companies that had their sustainability 
reports voluntarily assured, 113 (53.3 percent) have their reports assured 
by the auditing profession.  
 
Table 4.8 Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Assurance Providers46 
Assurance Providers Type  Frequency % 
Auditing Profession 
 
 
 
 
PWC 
Ernst & Young 
KPMG 
Deloitte & Touche 
Other 
46 
27 
23 
14 
3 
21.7 
12.7 
10.9 
6.6 
1.4 
Sub-Total  113 53.3 
Outside Auditing Profession 
 
 
 
 
 
Other 
DNV 
ERM 
Net Balance 
Bureau Veritas 
Corporate Citizen 
57 
14 
14 
6 
4 
4 
26.9 
6.6 
6.6 
2.8 
1.9 
1.9 
Sub-Total  99 46.7 
Table 4.8 presents assurer data for the 212 companies that have some form of voluntary 
assurance. PWC = PricewaterhouseCoopers. KPMG = Klynveld Peat Marwick 
Goerdeller. DNV = Det Norske Veritas. ERM = Environmental Resources Management. 
 
Table 4.9 presents the results of the independent samples t-tests of the 
presence of voluntary assurance statement. The presence of the extra 
voluntary assurance report variable shows that the mean of firms with 
sustainability reports assured is far higher (66.7 percent) than those not 
assured (48.4 percent). The statistical analysis indicate that there are 
statistically significant differences between assured and not assured 
                                               
46
This thesis also conduct an additional analysis to test the extent of CSRD by companies 
whose sustainability reports are assured by the auditing profession and those that are 
assured by the non-auditing profession. The result of the independent samples-test 
shows that there is no significant differences in the extent of CSRD as a result of the 
assurance provider. Refer to Appendix B. 
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sustainability reports (t = 8.729; p-value = 0.000) in regards to 
sustainability communication (see Table 4.9). This result is consistent with 
Moroney, Windsor and Aw (2011), who find the level of environmental 
disclosure for assured companies to be higher (46.8 percent) than 
unassured companies (15.4 percent). This thesis finding suggests that 
firms with extra voluntary assurance statements on their sustainability 
reports are much more likely to disclose information about CSR activities. 
 
        Table 4.9 Independent Samples t-Tests of the Presence of a Voluntary  
        Assurance Statement 
 Presence of 
Assurance 
N Mean Levene’s Test for 
Equality Variances 
t-test for 
Equality Means 
Mean 
Difference 
    F Sig. t Sig.   
 
 
 
Assured  
 
Not Assured  
212 
 
248 
66.7 
 
48.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not assumed 
1.886 0.170 8.729 
8.694 
0.000*** 
0.000*** 
0.18322 
0.18322 
The independent samples t-tests are performed by comparing the mean CSRDs of 
sustainability reports that are assured and not assured. *, **, ***indicate significant at the 
0.10,0.05, and 0.01 confidence levels. 
 
In line with legitimacy theory, this finding suggests that companies that 
undertake extra assurance practices may be doing so to enhance their 
credibility. Simnett, Vanstraelen and Chua (2009) conclude that 
companies with a higher need to increase credibility will be more likely to 
have their sustainability reports assured. This thesis univariate analysis 
finding supports such a conclusion. Sawani, Zain and Darus (2010) argue 
that a credibility motive is the main reason for such company 
communication. Other possible motives are companies’ desire to respond 
in a more visible way to stakeholders’ needs, and their seeking to improve 
internal and external reporting.  
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4.9 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis for the Presence of 
a CSR Committee 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) committees typically operate under 
one of two structures. First, CSR committees in some companies are a 
part of the board of directors. A such, they have a responsibility to report 
all CSR aspects to the board. Second some CSR committees operate 
under the executive of the company. Table 4.10 shows that in terms of a 
presence of the CSR committee, 72.7 percent of these committees are 
part of the board of directors, whilst 27.3 percent of such committees are 
responsible to the executive. 
 
Table 4.10 Descriptive Statistics of the Presence of a CSR Committee 
CSR Committee 
Structure
47
 
Name of Committee Frequency % 
Under Board of 
Directors 
1. Environmental, Health and 
Safety 
2. Sustainability 
3. Social Responsibility 
4. Other 
5. Governance and Sustainability 
6. Sustainability Development 
28 
18 
17 
10 
7 
5 
23.9 
15.4 
14.5 
8.6 
6.0 
4.3 
Sub-Total  85 72.7 
Under Executive 1. Sustainability 
2. Other 
3. Social Responsibility 
4. Environmental, Health and 
Safety 
17 
6 
5 
4 
14.5 
5.1 
4.3 
3.4 
Sub-Total  32 27.3 
  Only 117 companies in the sample that have  CSR committees provided sufficient 
information to generate these categories. 
 
Previous studies on the relationship between CSRD and independent non-
executive directors provide evidence that board independence fosters 
board effectiveness in the area of CSRD (Said, Zainuddin and Haron 
2009; Haniffa and Cooke 2005). The argument is that the existence of the 
                                               
47
This thesis also conduct an additional analysis to test the extent of CSRD of CSR 
committees formed under boards of directors and those formed under executives. The 
result of independent samples-test shows that there is no statistical difference in the 
extent of CSRD between them. Refer to Appendix C. 
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committee will encourage companies to respond to more CSR matters, as 
most of the members of the committee are likely to be independent non-
executive directors.  
 
Table 4.11 Independent Samples t-Tests of the Presence of a CSR  
Committee 
 Presence 
of CSR 
Committee 
N Mean Levene’s Test for 
Equality 
Variances 
t-test for Equality  
Means 
Mean 
Difference 
    F Sig. t Sig.   
 
 
 
Yes  
 
Not  
117 
 
343 
61.8 
 
55.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not assumed 
0.282 0.596 2.594 
2.570 
0.010*** 
0.010*** 
0.06681 
0.06681 
The independent samples t-tests are performed by comparing the mean CSRDs of firms 
that have a CSR committee and those that don’t have a CSR committee.  *, **, ***indicate 
significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 confidence levels. 
 
The results of the independent samples t-tests of the presence of a CSR 
committee (see Table 4.11) show that the mean of CSRD for companies 
which have a CSR committee is higher (61.8 percent) than for those that 
don’t have a committee (55.1 percent). There are statistically significant 
differences between the two groups (t = 2.594; p-value = 0.010). This 
result is consistent with Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) and Cowen, 
Ferreri and Parker (1987), who find a positive relationship between the 
presence of such a committee and CSRD. Spitzeck (2009) argue that in 
CSRD index communications, firms with a CSR committee in place 
outperform those without such a committee.  
 
The result indicates that the existence of such a committee operating 
under the board could be associated with a greater corporate propensity to 
make disclosures about CSR involvement (Cowen, Ferreri and Parker 
1987). As argued by Adams (2002) an internal organisational factor such 
108 
 
as the presence of a corporate responsibility committee may affect the 
internal processes of CSR reporting or the attitudes which influence 
decision-making.  As the purpose of such a committee is to represent the 
board and to assist the board in its oversight of health, safety, 
environmental, and community relate issues, their presence will likely 
encourage companies to disclose more CSR information. 
 
4.10 Univariate Analysis for Jurisdictional Business Systems 
As discussed in Section 4.1, the mean of the CSRD of companies from the 
emerging market is the highest (60.4 percent), followed by that of the 
communitarian (55.3 percent), and then Anglo-American companies (54.7 
percent). Table 4.12, Panel A shows the results of the ANOVA tests.  
 
Table 4.12 One-way ANOVA Tests of Jurisdictional Variable     
Panel A: ANOVA Tests    
 F p-value 
Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variance 
Tests of Between Subjects Effects 
0.813 
4.130 
0.444 
0.017** 
Panel B: Tukey Post Hoc Tests   
Multiple Comparisons:  
(Tukey HSD) 
Jurisdictional Business 
System  
Mean 
Differences 
p-value 
 
Anglo-American 
 
Communitarian 
 
Emerging Market 
 
Communitarian 
Emerging Market 
Anglo-American 
Emerging Market 
Anglo-American 
Communitarian 
-0.05842 
-0.07877 
0.05842 
-0.02035 
0.07877 
0.02035 
0.059* 
0.026** 
0.059* 
0.767 
0.026** 
0.767 
Panel A shows  one-way ANOVA tests performed by comparing the means of CSRDs for 
all three jurisdictions. Panel B shows the Tukey Post Hoc Tests, contrast  the means of 
CSRDs of Anglo-American, communitarian, and emerging market jurisdictions.  *, **, 
***indicate significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 confidence levels. 
 
 
It can be seen that there is a significant statistical relationship between 
jurisdictional business systems and CSRD (F= 4.130 and p-value= 0.017). 
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This result is consistent with previous studies (see, for example, Van der 
Laan Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar 2005; Orij 2010; Adams, Hill and 
Roberts 1998). For example, Adams (2002) conclude that the country in 
which a company is located affects the nature and extent of disclosure. 
Similarly, Millar et al. (2005) and Eldomiaty and Choi (2006) suggest that 
jurisdictional business systems (such as institutional and cultural factors) 
influence levels of disclosure. 
 
As shown in the Tukey HSD test (Table 4.12, Panel B), there are 
statistically significant differences in means between the level of CSRD 
communication for the Anglo-American and communitarian jurisdictions at 
the 10 percent level  (p-value = 0.059) and between the Anglo-American 
and emerging market jurisdictions at 5 percent level (p-value = 0.026). The 
results clearly indicate that the CSRD of Anglo-American firms is lower 
than that of communitarian (mean differences=-0.05842) and emerging 
market firms (mean differences=-0.07877). Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari 
and Tondkar (2005) provide historical evidence that companies from 
communitarian countries have more social disclosure than Anglo-
American companies. This thesis highlights the additional, and new finding 
that companies in emerging market countries also communicate more 
about CSR than those in Anglo-American countries. This is counter to 
earlier studies (see, for example, Orij 2010) and may reflect a growing 
desire on the part of emerging market companies to demonstrate 
legitimacy to global financial markets. 
 
4.11 Univariate Analysis for Individual Indicators of CSRD 
Table 4.13 presents the results of independent sample t-tests for individual 
indicators of CSRD. These testsare conducted to examine whether any 
statistical differences exist between the means of each individual indicator 
of CSRD across the categorical variables. Consistent with the previous 
findings discussed in Sections 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10, the results show that 
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there is a difference between high-profile and low-profile industry firms, 
those that have not and have assurance statements, and that have or do 
not have CSR committees. These findings pertain to the means of the 
individual indicators of CSRD.  
 
Regarding economic themes, the findings in Table 4.13 show that: 
 High-profile industries communicate more indicators than do low-
profile companies in the following areas: financial implications and 
other risks, and opportunities for company activities due to climate 
change-EC2; significant financial assistance received from 
governments-EC4; range of ratios of standard entry-level of wage 
compare to local minimum wage at significant locations of 
operation-EC5; policies, practices, and proportion of spending on 
locally based supplier at significant locations of operation-EC6; 
procedures for local hiring and proportion of senior management 
hired from community at significant locations of operation-EC7; and 
indicator related to understanding and describing significant indirect 
economic impacts, including the extents of impacts-EC9. The 
results of the tests are statistically significant. 
 High-profile industries also disclose more indicators than low-profile 
industries in the areas of: direct economic value generated and 
distributed, including revenues, operating costs, employee 
compensation, donations and other community investments, 
retained earnings, and payments to capital providers and 
governments-EC1; coverage of the companies defined benefit plan 
obligations-EC3; and development and impact of infrastructure 
investment and services provided primarily for public benefit 
through commercial, in-kind or pro-bono engagement-EC8. 
However, the results of the independent samples t-tests are 
statistically insignificant.  
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 Firms which have voluntary assurance statements in their 
sustainability reports disclosed more than those which have not for 
all economic indicators (EC2-EC9, except EC1). The results of the 
independent samples t-tests are  statistically significant. 
 Firms which have a CSR committee tend to release more EC5, 
EC6, EC7, and EC9 indicators in their sustainability reports than 
firms that do not have such a committee. 
 
112 
 
 
Table 4.13 Independent Samples t-Tests for Individual Indicators of CSRD 
GRI Indicator Industry Type Presence of Assurance  Presence of CSR 
Committee 
HP  LP  Sig. Have Not Sig. Have  Not Sig. 
EC1 – Direct economic value    89.0 84.0 .125 89.0 84.0 .138 88.0 85.0 .482 
EC2 – Financial implication 76.0 65.0 .011** 82.0 61.0 .000*** 71.0 70.0 .890 
EC3 – Benefit plan obligations 61.0 56.0 .214 68.0 50.0 .000*** 60.0 58.0 .732 
EC4 – Financial assistance from government 51.0 43.0 .072* 62.0 34.0 .000*** 53.0 45.0 .130 
EC5 – Ratios of standard entry 42.0 32.0 .019** 51.0 25.0 .000*** 47.0 34.0 .009*** 
EC6 – Policy, practices, proportion of spending 69.0 54.0 .001*** 73.0 52.0 .000*** 74.0 57.0 .001*** 
EC7 – Procedures for local hiring from community 65.0 51.0 .003*** 73.0 45.0 .000*** 67.0 55.0 .029** 
EC8 – Development and impact investments 75.0 72.0 .362 83.0 66.0 .000*** 79.0 72.0 .144 
EC9 – Indirect and extent of economics impacts 56.0 44.0 .009*** 56.0 44.0 .012** 56.0 48.0 .097* 
EN1 – Materials used by weight or volume 69.7 58.6 .013*** 75.9 54.4 .000*** 73.5 61.2 .017** 
EN2 – Materials used that they are recycled  61.7 51.1 .022** 64.1 50.0 .002*** 59.8 55.3 .404 
EN3 – Direct energy consumption 87.6 83.5 .210 93.4 89.6 .000*** 89.7 84.2 .144 
EN4 – Indirect energy consumption 77.4 80.4 .432 89.6 69.7 .000*** 85.4 76.6 .044** 
EN5 – Energy conservation and efficiency 70.6 72.0 .748 78.7 64.9 .001*** 70.9 71.4 .920 
EN6 – Renewable and reduction energy 68.0 72.0 .361 73.5 66.9 .121 69.2 70.2 .834 
EN7 – Reduction indirect energy consumption 60.0 64.0 .378 65.0 59.2 .201 60.6 62.3 .743 
EN8 – Total water withdrawal by source 85.5 76.0 .009*** 89.1 73.7 .000*** 89.7 77.8 .005*** 
EN9 – Water source affected by withdrawal water 40.0 26.6 .002*** 38.6 29.0 .029** 41.8 30.6 .026** 
EN10 – Volume of water recycled and reused 44.6 34.6 .028** 44.8 35.4 .042** 43.5 38.4 .331 
EN11 – Land owned, leased and managed 53.6 41.3 .008*** 60.3 36.6 .000*** 61.5 42.8 .000*** 
EN12 – Impacts of activities on biodiversity 58.7 43.1 .001*** 60.3 43.1 .000*** 66.6 45.7 .000*** 
EN13 – Habitats protected and restored 48.0 36.0 .009*** 47.6 37.5 .028** 59.8 36.1 .000*** 
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Table 4.13 (continued) 
GRI Indicator Industry Type Presence of Assurance  Presence of CSR 
Committee 
HP  LP  Sig. Have Not Sig. Have  Not Sig. 
EN14 – Action and plans for managing biodiversity 51.9 43.1 .059* 55.1 41.1 .003*** 63.2 42.2 .000*** 
EN15 – List species and national conservation 25.9 18.6 .061* 26.4 18.9 .056* 26.5 20.9 .218 
EN16 – Direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions 89.7 87.5 .451 95.2 83.0 .000*** 90.6 88.0 .453 
EN17 – Other indirect greenhouse gas emissions 60.4 62.6 .622 71.2 53.2 .000*** 69.2  8.8 .047** 
EN18 – Reduction greenhouse gas emissions 76.6 74.4 .555 79.7 71.7 .049** 80.3 73.7 .154 
EN19 – Emissions of ozone-depleting 49.7 41.7 .085* 57.5 35.8 .000*** 52.9 43.4 .074* 
EN20 – NO and SO and other air emissions 67.6 52.0 .001*** 69.3 52.0 .000*** 65.8 58.0 .138 
EN21 – Water discharge by quality and destinations 63.4 49.3 .002*** 66.0 48.3 .000*** 61.5 54.8 .206 
EN22 – Weight of waste by type and disposal method 80.0 79.5 .906 87.2 73.3 .000*** 83.7 78.4 .216 
EN23 – Total number and volume of spills 60.8 55.1 .213 67.9 49.6 .000*** 66.6 55.1 .029** 
EN24 – Transported or treated waste 33.1 21.3 .004*** 34.9 20.9 .001*** 29.9 26.5 .480 
EN25 – Biodiversity value of water bodies 28.5 19.1 .018** 33.0 16.1 .000*** 25.6 23.3 .613 
EN26 – Mitigate environmental impacts 82.9 80.4 .483 87.7 76.6 .002*** 78.6 82.8 .315 
EN27 – Products sold 37.4 41.3 .395 48.5 31.4 .000*** 47.8 36.4 .029** 
EN28 – Fines and non-monetary sanctions 61.2 62.2 .835 71.2 53.6 .000*** 71.7 58.3 .009*** 
EN29 – Environmental impacts of transporting 45.5 44.8 .890 51.8 39.5 .008*** 46.1 44.9 .814 
EN30 – Total environmental protection expenditure 49.7 37.3 .007*** 51.4 37.1 .002*** 53.8 40.2 .010** 
LA1 – Total workforce 92.3 86.6 .047** 93.8 85.8 .005*** 94.0 88.0 .068* 
LA2 – Total and rate of employee turnover 78.7 68.0 .009*** 87.2 61.6 .000*** 74.3 73.1 .803 
LA3 – Benefit provided for full employees 59.1 50.6 .068* 65.0 46.3 .000*** 59.8 53.3 .225 
LA4 – Employees covered  76.1 64.4 .006*** 82.5 60.0 .000*** 76.9 68.2 .075* 
LA5 – Minimum notice period 56.6 46.2 .026** 70.2 35.4 .000*** 50.4 51.9 .784 
LA6 – Management- worker health and safety 51.4 43.1 .072* 57.5 38.7 .000*** 52.9 45.4 .161 
LA7 – Rates of injury, diseases, lost days 88.9 88.0 .754 93.4 84.2 .002*** 89.7 88.0 .621 
LA8 – Education, training and counselling 82.1 69.7 .002*** 83.9 69.3 .000*** 72.6 77.2 .314 
LA9 – Health and safety topics 45.5 34.2 .013** 49.0 32.2 .000*** 37.6 40.8 .542 
LA10 – Average hours of training per year 78.3 72.4 .146 86.3 66.1 .000*** 76.9 74.9 .666 
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Table 4.13 (continued) 
GRI Indicator Industry Type Presence of Assurance  Presence of CSR 
Committee 
HP  LP  Sig. Have Not Sig. Have  Not Sig. 
LA11 – Program for skills and lifelong learning 73.1 68.4 .264 72.6 69.3 .440 73.5 69.9 .469 
LA12 – Employees performance reviews 62.5 65.7 .472 70.2 58.8 .011** 61.5 65.0 .499 
LA13 – Composition of governance bodies 80.0 73.7 .114 82.5 72.1 .008*** 79.4 76.0 .453 
LA14 – Ratio of basic salary of men to women 56.6 44.0 .007*** 66.0 37.1 .000*** 52.1 49.8 .671 
HR1 – Investment agreements 49.3 38.2 .016** 64.6 26.2 .000*** 51.2 41.4 .063* 
HR2 – Screening on human rights and actions taken 57.8 55.5 .617 73.5 42.3 .000*** 63.2 54.5 .100 
HR3 – Policy and procedures human rights aspects  40.4 39.5 .849 52.3 29.4 .000*** 45.3 38.1 .176 
HR4 – Incidents of discriminations and actions taken 62.5 49.7 .006*** 71.7 43.1 .000*** 64.1 53.6 .049** 
HR5 – Freedom of association,collective bargaining 61.7 54.6 .127 71.7 46.7 .000*** 65.8 55.6 .055* 
HR6 – Child labour 66.8 60.8 .187 75.0 54.4 .000*** 64.1 63.8 .961 
HR7 – Forced and compulsory labour 65.5 58.2 .107 73.5 52.0 .000*** 62.3 61.8 .911 
HR8 - Security practices 37.0 24.4 .003*** 41.0 22.1 .000*** 39.3 27.9 .022** 
HR9 – Indigenous rights 38.3 20.0 .000*** 38.6 21.3 .000*** 43.5 24.4 .000*** 
SO1 – Community  81.7 60.4 .000*** 80.1 63.7 .000*** 81.2 67.9 .006*** 
SO2 – Corruption  62.1 55.1 .127 74.0 45.5 .000*** 60.6 58.0 .614 
SO3  – Anti-corruption policies and procedures 72.3 66.6 .187 79.7 60.8 .000*** 70.9 69.1 .709 
SO4 – Actions taken in response corruption 61.7 53.3 .070* 70.7 46.3 .000*** 63.2 55.6 .154 
SO5 – Public policy development 69.7 61.3 .056* 78.3 54.8 .000*** 67.5 65.0 .623 
SO6 – Financial contributions to political parties 49.7 41.7 .085* 53.7 39.1 .002*** 56.4 42.2 .008*** 
SO7 – Anti competitive behaviour 42.5 31.1 .011** 48.5 27.0 .000*** 44.4 34.4 .052* 
SO8 – Fines and sanctions  for non compliance 56.1 44.8 .016** 65.5 37.9 .000*** 63.2 46.3 .002*** 
PR1 – Health and safety products & services 61.7 67.5 .190 71.2 58.8 .006*** 67.5 63.5 .440 
PR2 – Incidents of non-compliance 37.4 30.2 .102 42.4 26.6 .000*** 41.0 31.4 .060* 
PR3 – Type of product and service information 61.7 56.0 .215 70.7 48.7 .000*** 61.5 58.0 .505 
PR4 – Product and service labelling 38.3 26.2 .006*** 44.3 22.1 .000*** 39.3 30.0 .064* 
PR5 – Customer satisfaction survey 57.8 59.1 .788 67.4 50.8 .000*** 54.7 59.7 .338 
PR6 – Marketing communication program 50.2 59.5 .044** 69.3 42.3 .000*** 52.9 55.3 .653 
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Table 4.13 (continued) 
GRI Indicator Industry Type Presence of Assurance  Presence of CSR 
Committee 
HP  LP  Sig. Have Not Sig. Have  Not Sig. 
PR7 – Advertising, promotion and sponsorship 35.3 29.7 .206 43.4 23.3 .000*** 39.3 30.3 .073* 
PR8 – Customer privacy 39.5 28.8 .016** 47.1 23.3 .000*** 35.9 33.8 .684 
PR9 – Compliance 48.0 40.0 .081* 60.8 29.8 .000*** 51.2 41.6 .071* 
The independent samples t-tests are performed by comparing the mean CSRD of high-profile (HP) and low-profile (LP) industries, that have and 
do not have a voluntary assurance statement, companies with and without a CSR committee. CSRD = corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
EC = economic. EN = environmental. LA = labour practices and decent work. HR = human rights. SO = society. PR = product responsibility. *, **, 
*** indicate significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 confidence levels. 
116 
 
With regard to environmental themes, the results of the independent 
samples t-tests show that:   
 The majority of high-profile industries disclosed more than low-
profile industries for indicators related to materials used by weight 
or volume-EN1; percentage of materials used that are recycled 
input materials-EN2; total water withdrawal by sources-EN8; water 
sources significantly affected by withdrawal of water-EN9; 
percentage and total of water recycled and reused-EN10; location 
and size of land owned, leased, managed in, or adjacent to, 
protected areas and areas of high biodiversity value outside 
protected areas-EN11; description of significant impacts of 
activities, products and services on biodiversity in protected areas 
and areas of high biodiversity value outside protected areas-EN12; 
habitats protected and restored-EN13; strategies and current 
actions and future plans for managing impacts on biodiversity-
EN14; number of IUCN red list species and national conservation 
lists species with habitats in areas affected by operations, by level 
of extinction risk-EN15; emissions of ozone-depleting substances 
by weight-EN19; NO, SO and other significant air emissions by type 
and weight-EN20; total water discharged by quality and destination-
EN21; weight of transported, imported or treated waste deemed 
hazardous, under the terms of theBasel Convention Annex I, II, III, 
and IV, and percentage of transported waste shipped 
internationally-EN24; identify size, protected status and biodiversity 
value of water bodies and related habitats significantly affected by 
the reporting firms’s discharge of water and run-off-EN25; and total 
environmental protection expenditures and investments by type-
EN30.These results are statistically significant. 
 Firms that are sustainability assured reveal more information than 
those not assured. Results are statistically significant for all 
environmental indicators, except for information concerning initiative 
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to provide energy–efficient or renewable energy-based products 
and services and reduction in energy requirements as a results of 
these initiatives-EN6 and initiatives to reduce indirect energy 
consumption and reductions achieved-EN7. 
 The means of environmental indicators (EN1; EN4 = indirect energy 
consumption by primary energy source; EN8; EN9; EN11; EN12; 
EN13; EN14 = indirect greenhouse gas emissions; EN17 = other 
relevant indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight; EN19; EN23 
= total number and volume of significant spills; EN27 = percentage 
of product sold; EN28 = monetary value of significant and total 
number of non-monetary sanctions for non-compliance with 
environmental laws and regulations; and EN30 are higher for firms 
with have a CSR committee than those without. These results are 
statistically significant. 
 
Pertaining to the labour practices themes, the findings in Table 4.13 reveal 
that: 
 Firms in high-profile industries tend to disclose more than those in 
low-profile industries for the indicators for total workforce by 
employment type, employment contract and region-LA1; total 
number and rate of employee turnover by age, group, gender and 
region-LA2; benefits provided to full-time employees that are not 
provided to temporary or part-time employees, by major operations-
LA3; percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining 
agreement-LA4; minimum notice periods regarding significant 
operational changes, including whether it is specified in collective 
agrrements-LA5; percentage of total workforce represented in 
formal joint management-worker health and safety committees that 
help monitor and advice on occupational health and safety 
programs-LA6; education, training, counselling, prevention and risk-
control programs in place to assist workforce members, their 
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families or community members regarding serious diseases-LA8;  
health and safety topics covered in formal agreements with trade 
unions-LA9; and ratio basic salary of men to women employees 
category-LA14. These results are statistically significant. 
 Firms which have a voluntary assurance statement communicate 
more about all indicators, except for topics related to programs for 
skills and lifelong learning that support the continued employability 
of employees and assist them in managing career endings-LA11. 
This is in contrast to firms without an assurance statement. These 
results are statistically significant. 
 Surprisingly, only two indicators (LA1 and LA4) of labour practices 
and decent work show statistically significant differences (at the 10 
percent level) between firms which have a CSR committee and 
those don’t have. 
 
Relating to human rights themes, the results of independent samples t-
tests highlight that: 
 Firms in high-profile industries disclose more than those from low-
profile industries for the following indicators: percentage and total 
number of significant investment agreements that include human 
rights clauses or that have undergone human rights screening-HR1; 
the total number of incidents of discriminations and actions taken-
HR4; the percentage of security personal trained in the 
organisation’s policies or procedures concerning aspects of human 
rights that are relevant to operations-HR8; and the total number of 
incidents of violations involving rights of indigenous people and 
actions taken-HR9. The results are statistically significant.  
 The means of all human rights indicators are higher,at a statistically 
significant level for companies that have a voluntary assurance 
statement than for those don’t have.  
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 Firms which have a CSR committee disclose more and at a 
statistically significant level about the percentage of significant 
suppliers and contractors that have undergone screening on human 
rights and actions taken-HR2; HR4; HR8; and HR9 than do firms 
which do not have a CSR committee. 
 
With regard to themes that relate to society, the findings of the 
independent samples t-test provided in Table 4.13 show: 
 High-profile industry firms tend to be more likely than low-profile 
industry firms to disclose indicators relating to nature, scope, and 
effectiveness of any programs and practices that asses and 
manage the impact of operations on communities, including 
entering, operating and existing-SO1; actions taken in response 
corruption-SO4; public policy positions and participation in public 
policy development and lobbying-SO5; the total value of financial 
contributions to political parties, politicians, and related institutions 
by country-SO6; the total number of legal actions for anti-
competitive behaviour, anti-trust, and monopoly practices and their 
outcomes-SO7; and monetary value of significant fines and total 
number of non-monetary sanctions for non-compliance with laws 
and regulations-SO8. The results are statistically significant. 
 The presence of a voluntary assurance statement has a significant 
influence on the means of indicators that relate to society. 
Companies that have their sustainability reports assured have 
higher means at statistically significant level, than those do notthat 
have been assured. This is the case for all society indicators. 
 Indicator SO1, SO6, SO7, and SO8 are revealed more at 
statistically significant level by companies which have a CSR 
committee than by those that do not.  
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Concerning product responsibility indicators, the findings show that:  
 Information about indicators related to the total number of incidents 
of non-compliance with regulations and voluntary codes concerning 
products and services information and labelling, by type of 
outcomes-PR4; program for adherence to laws, standards and 
voluntary codes relating to marketing communication, including 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship by type of outcomes-PR6; 
total number of substantiated complaints regarding breaches of 
customer privacy and losses of customer data-PR8; and monetary 
value of significant fines for non-compliance with laws and 
regulations concerning the provision and use of the products and 
services-PR9 are disclosed more at statistically significant levels by 
high-profile industry firms than by those in low-profile industries..  
 The means of all product responsibility indicators for firms with 
assurance statements are higher than those of firms without 
assurance statements at statistically significant levels. 
 The total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations 
and voluntary codes concerning health and safety impacts of 
products and services by type of outcomes-PR2; PR4; PR7, and 
PR9 are disclosed more at statistically significant levels by 
companies which have a CSR committee than those don’t have 
such a committee. 
 
4.12 Summary 
This chapter reports the research findings of the descriptive statistics and 
univariate analysis. The results of the descriptive statistics show that the 
level of global corporate social responsibility disclosure is moderately high, 
averaging 56.8 percent. Labour practices (66.4 percent) is the theme most 
communicated by companies. The results of independent samples t-tests 
indicate that the levels of CSRD show statistically significant differences in 
the following case: between high-and low-profile industries, between 
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companies that do and do not have a voluntary assurance statement, and 
those that have and do not have a CSR committee. The ANOVA tests 
show that there is a significant relationship between jurisdictional business 
systems and corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD), with 
emerging market companies having significantly higher levels of 
communication than Anglo-American companies. 
 
The next chapter examines factors that potentially influence the extent of 
CSRD. It also tests the assumptions of regression analysis. Lastly, it ends 
with a sensitivity analysis for further insights. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the multivariate analysis. It begins by 
highlighting the findings of the descriptive statistics for independent and 
control variables in Section 5.1. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 then provide the 
results of outlier detection and an explanation of the assumptions of the 
statistical tests. The results of hypotheses testing via regression analysis 
and a discussion of these results are presented in sections 5.4 and 5.5. 
Section 5.6 shows the findings of the sensitivity analysis (i.e. alternative 
measures). Section 5.7 summaries the key findings of the chapter. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics for Model Variables 
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 5.1, which provides an 
overview of the continuous variables. The results show that the average 
company included in this thesis is large in size48. The mean (median) 
number of employees is 41,607 (16,197) and the total company assets are 
71,217.5 (9,758.7) million US dollars. The firm size ranged widely, from 53 
to 539,200 employees and total assets of 13.1 to 2,364,452 million USD. 
The results show that there is a large gap between the mean and median 
figures, indicating that firm size contains some extreme values and is 
heavily skewed.  
 
With regard to the control variables, Table 5.1 shows that the average 
(median) leverage ratio of the sample firms is 62.7 percent (62.1 percent). 
This value indicates that the leverage of the sample firms is relatively high. 
                                               
48
 Of 460 companies in this thesis sample, 248 or 53.9 percentage large companies listed 
on the 2009 Forbes Global 2000. Further, of these 460 firms, 113 firms or 24.5 
percentage among the world’s largest corporations, as listed on The Fortune Global 500 
in 2009. Overall, the thesis’s sample clearly included many of the world’s most prominent 
companies. 
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The high leverage ratio may indicate that creditors represent a key 
stakeholders group.  
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables49 
Variables Mean Median Std Dev  Minimum Maximum 
Firm size: 
Employees 
Log. employees 
Total assets 
Log T. assets 
Leverage  
Profitability (ROA) 
 
41,607 
4.1 
71,217.5 
4.0 
62.7 
3.5 
 
16,197 
4.2 
9,758.7 
3.9 
62.1 
2.8 
 
71,549 
0.6 
234,317.1 
0.8 
21.4 
6.4 
 
53
50
 
1.7 
13.1
51
 
1.1 
0.4
52
 
-60.8
53
 
 
539,200
54
 
5.7 
2,364,452.0
55
 
6.3 
104.0
56
 
34.2
57
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 5.1 are expressed in number (for employees), millions 
USD (for total assets), and percentage (for leverage and ROA). Log=logarithma. Log T. 
Assets=logarithma total assets. The firm size variables are measured by the number of 
employees (main proxy) and the total assets (additional proxy). Profitability is measured 
by return on asset(ROA), net profit (loss)/total assets. Leverage=total liabilities/total 
assets. 
 
The mean of ROA suggests that the financial performance of the 
companies is relatively low, with a minimum value ROA of -60.8 percent 
and overall mean (median) of 3.5 percent (2.8 percent). The relatively low 
                                               
49
Some number/ratios of these variables are unusual.Therefore, they are all double 
checked and found to be accurate. The following footnotes highlight some of the extreme 
numbers. 
50
The firm which had the lowest number of employeesis Australian Ethical Investment, 
Australia. As reported at 30 June 2009, they had 51 permanent staff and 2 temporary 
staff (Australian Ethical Investment Sustainability Reports 2009, 5). 
51
Reported on Australian Ethical Investment’s balance sheet at 30 June 2009 (Australian 
Ethical Investment Annual Report 2009, 27).   
52
At 31 December 2009 Nykredit, Denmark reported that their total assets are 889.59 and 
total liabilities 3.56 million DKK (Nykredit Annual Report 2009).  
53
At 31 December 2009 the income statement of Q Cells Germany showed that they have 
a negative net income (EUR 1,356.20 millions) (Q Cells Annual Report 2009).  
54
Petro China reported that of 539,200 employees, 61 percentare operating staff, 16 
percentare technicians, 12 percentare management staff, and the rest financial, sales, 
and other staff (Petro China Sustainability Report 2009). 
55
As reported on the balance sheet of HSBC Holdings, UK at 31December 2009 (HSBC 
Annual Report 2009, 355). 
56
Reported on the balance sheet at 31 December 2009 Ford Motor US had total assets of 
194,850 (reclassified to be 192,040) and total liabilities of 201,365 (reclassified to be 
199.860) million USD (Ford Motor Annual Report 2009). 
57
At 31 December 2009, Bristol Myers Squibb US had net income USD of 10,612 million 
(Bristol Myers Squibb Annual Report 2009, 39). 
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ROA ratio may be a reflection of global economic conditions, which 
companies around the world experienced financial hardship during the 
global financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. 
 
Figure 5.1 displays the histogram for both number of employees and total 
assets. Given the extreme skewness, the logarithmic transformation is 
employed to reduce the influence of very large companies on the 
regression results (Gray et al. 2001). The right hand histograms in Figure 
5.1 reveal a far more normal distribution of number after the log 
transformation is used. 
 
Figure 5.1 Histogram of Firm Size  
(Number of Employees and Total Assets) 
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Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the categorical variables. 
Concerning the industry type58, 228 (49.6 percent) of the total 460 sample 
companies are categorised as high-profile and 232 (50.4 percent) as low-
profile industry firms.  
 
Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics for Categorical Variables 
Variables Frequency % 
Industry Type: 
High Profile 
Low Profile 
 
 
228 
232 
 
 
49.6 
50.4 
 
Presence of Voluntary Assurance Statement: 
Assured 
Not Assured 
 
 
212 
248 
 
 
46.1 
53.9 
 
Presence of CSR Committee: 
Yes-have CSR Committee 
No-CSR Committee 
 
 
117 
343 
 
 
25.4 
74.6 
 
Jurisdictional Business Systems: 
Anglo-American 
Communitarian 
Emerging-Market 
 
 
162 
195 
103 
 
35.2 
42.4 
22.4 
N = 460   
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 5.2 are expressed as numbers and 
percentages. CSR=corporate social responsibility. The industry type, the presence of a 
voluntary assurance statement, the presence of a CSR committee, and jurisdictional 
business systems variables are measured by dummy variable. 
 
The KPMG survey (2008) note that 139 (55.6 percent) of 250 companies  
from the Fortune Global 500 that published their sustainability reports are 
from high-profile industries59. Kolk and Perego (2010) also note that, for 
the years 1999, 2002, and 2005, 298 (46.8 percent) of the 636 companies 
listed on the Fortune Global 250 that produced sustainability reports are 
                                               
58
In this thesis, oil and gas, basic materials, financials, and utilities industries are 
classified as high-profile industries. While industrials, consumer goods, consumer 
services, telecommunications, technologyand healthcare are categorised as low-profile 
industries (see, for example, Roberts 1992; Newson and Deegan 2002; Reverte 2009). 
59
 The breakdown of the 139 G250 companies is 78 companies from finance, insurance 
and securities; 25 companies from oil and gas; 18 companies from automotive; 12 
companies from utilities; 4 companies from chemicals, and 2 companies from the mining 
sector. 
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from high-profile industries60. These studies indicate that firms in high-
profile industries are more likely to produce sustainability reports than 
those in low-profile industries. 
 
In this thesis, of the 460 sustainability reports sampled, 212 (46.1 percent ) 
that have been voluntary assured by an assurance provider. KPMG (2008) 
reported that of G250 (40.0 percent), 100 companies utilised formal 
assurance in their sustainability reports. Simnett, Vanstraelen and Chua 
(2009) note in their study that of 2,113 sustainability reports, 655 (31.0 
percent) contained independent assurance reports. Kolk and Perego 
(2010) identify104 firms of the Fortune Global 250 firms that have an 
independent voluntary assurance statement in their sustainability reports. 
This may indicate trend to include a voluntary assurance statements in 
sustainability reports (KPMG 2008).  
 
The majority (74.6 percent) of sample companies do not have a CSR 
committee. Only 117 companies (25.4 percent) have a CSR committee. 
The KPMG survey in 2008 noted that only 13.0 percent of G250 
companies have CSR committees. Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) 
calculate that of 114 companies from ten countries, only 20.2 percent have 
established CSR committees. The low percentage of companies that have 
a CSR committee may indicate that the presence of such a committee as 
a governance mechanism is relatively new (Michelon and Parbonetti 
2012). 
 
With respect to the jurisdictional variable, of the 460 total sample firms 
from 44 countries, 162 firms (35.2 percent) are classified as being within 
Anglo-American61 countries, 195 firms (42.4 percent) in communitarian62 
                                               
60
 298 companies are from the oil, chemicals, utilities or bank and insurance sectors. 
61
Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK, the US, and Singapore are classified 
as Anglo-American (see, for example, Simnett, Vanstraelen and Chua 2009; Orij 2010). 
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countries, and 103 firms (22.4 percent) in emerging market63 countries. 
The results show that a greater proportion of communitarian companies 
are identified as CSR reporters in 2009 (see Table 5.2). This proportion is 
consistent with the findings of the KPMG survey in 2008 which find that 
companies from Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, France, Sweden and 
Italy have produced more than 50 percent of the stand-alone sustainability 
reports in 200864.  
 
5.2 Outlier Tests 
Multiple regression analyses are used as the primary hypotheses testing 
techniques in this thesis, a key objective being to remove any true outliers 
that would fundamentally affect the findings. This thesis uses Mahalanobis 
and Cooke’s Distance to detect multivariate outliers. Hair et al. (2009) 
define outliers as observations with a unique combination of 
characteristics identifiable as distinctly different from the other 
observations. Extreme cases, for example, have considerable impact on 
the regression solution and should be deleted or modified to reduce their 
influence (Coakes 2009).  
 
Mahalanobis’Distance is a measure of the distance in multidimensional 
space of each observation from the mean centre of the observations (Hair 
et al. 2009). Mahalanobis’Distance scores are calculated for this sample. 
With eight degrees of freedom and .001 level of confidence, the maximum 
                                                                                                                                
62
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, 
Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands are classified 
as countries having communitarian business systems. (see, for example, Simnett, 
Vanstraelen and Chua 2009; Orij 2010). 
63
The emerging market countries identified are Argentina, Brazil, China, Chile, Colombia, 
Croatia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, 
Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Arab 
Emirates(see, for example, Williams 1999; Millar et al. 2005; Simnett, Vanstraelen and 
Chua 2009;Orij 2010). 
64
KPMG (2008) notes that companies from Japan, UK, and US have the highest number 
of stand-alone sustainability reports. However, it is important to note that their sample 
consists of all company types in the N100 (e.g. public, private, and subsidiary 
companies). 
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Mahalanobis’ scores are 26.1. Three potential outliers are noted65. The 
accepted cut-off values of the Cook’s Distance score66are below 1 
(Williams 1997), and no potential outliers are detected by the Cook’s 
Distance scores (see Appendix D). 
 
Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics for Mahalanobis Scores 
 Mean Std Dev  Minimum Maximum 
Mahalanobis Scores (n = 460) 
Mahalanobis Score (n = 457) 
7.9 
7.7 
5.9 
3.1 
3.3 
3.3 
109.5 
25.3 
The table shows the descriptive statistics of the Mahalanobis’ scores before and after 
removing the outliers. Std Dev=standard deviation. 
 
Table 5.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the Mahalanobis scores for 
the full sample before (n=460) and after removing the outliers (n=457). To 
test the influence of outliers, additional multiple regressions are carried 
out. Based on the results of these tests, it is concluded that there is no 
significant statistical difference in the regression models with and without 
outliers (see Appendix E). Thus, for the main analysis, the potential 
outliers are retained and the full sample is used as the main regression 
model. 
 
5.3 Assumptions of Regression Analysis 
There are four key assumptions underlying regression analysis, namely 
normality, linearity, multicollinearity, and homoscedascity (Tabachnick and 
Fidell 2007; Coakes 2009). Hair et al. (2009, 68) argue that the statistical 
assumptions need to be tested because of the complexity of the 
relationships. Thus, testing these assumptions should occur in the initial 
phases of the regression (Hair et al. 2009). 
 
                                               
65
See Appendix D for details. Three observations exceed 26.1. These are case numbers 
17 (OZ Minerals-Australia (29), 140 (Q Cells-Germany) (109.6), and 400 Bristol-Meyer 
Squibb-USA) (26.6). 
66
 Details about Mahalanobis’ and Cook’s Distance scores are provided in Appendix D. 
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5.3.1 Normality 
One of the assumptions of multiple regressions is that the residuals 
(errors) should be normally distributed (Gujarati 2004). The assumption of 
multivariate normality is made as part of the derivation of a variety of 
significance tests (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). This assumption is 
required for assurance that the p-values for t- and F-tests are valid. Table 
5.4 shows the results of the normality tests for residuals. It can be seen 
that the value of Kolmogorov-Smirnov is .097 at the p-value .331. As the 
p-value is more than .05, it can be concluded that the residual is normally 
distributed (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). 
 
Table 5.4 Normality Test for Residuals Distribution 
N = 460 Unstandardized Residual 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 
Asymp Sig (2-tailed) 
.947 
.331 
 
5.3.2 Linearity 
The second assumption underlying regression analysis is that the 
residuals have a reasonably linear relationship with the predicted 
dependent variable and that the residuals for the predicted dependent 
variable score are the same for all the predicted scores (Tabachnick and 
Fidell 2007; Hair et al. 2009). Linearity is important because Pearson’s r 
only captures the linear relationships among variables; if there are 
substantial nonlinear relationships among variables, they are ignored 
(Tabachnick and Fidell 2007).  It can be seen from Figure 5.2 that there is 
a clear relationship between the residuals and the predicted values, 
consistent with the assumption of linearity. Thus, the model meets the 
assumption of linearity. 
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Figure 5.2 Linearity 
 
 
5.3.3 Homoscedasticity 
Homoscedasticity is an assumption related to dependency relationships 
between variables (Hair et al. 2009). Homoscedastic means that the 
variability of one continous variable is roughly the same as the values of 
other continous variables (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, p. 85). There are 
many ways to test homoscedasticity; scatter plots and Glejser Tests are 
two of these (Ghozali 2007; Coakes 2009). Figure 5.3 indicates that there 
is no specific pattern in the scatter plots. Thus, the regression model 
meets the assumption of homoscedascity. 
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Figure 5.3 Scatter Plots of the Residuals of CSRD 
 
This result is further supported by the Glesjer Test, the results of which is 
displayed in Table 5.5. The test suggests that the regression model does 
not contain heteroscedascity if there is no significant relationship between 
the absolute values of the residuals and the independent variables. It can 
be seen that the level of significance for all the independent variables 
(except jurisdiction) is higher than .05. The significance level of the 
jurisdiction variable indicates that there is a possible heteroscedascity 
problem. However, this issue is not considered to be a serious threat 
affecting the overall conclusion of this study. Moreover, Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2007) argue that heteroscedascity does not undermine the 
regression analysis, as long as the linear relationship between variables is 
captured by the analysis67. 
 
 
 
                                               
67
 This thesis has met the linearity assumption (see Section 5.3.2).  
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Table 5.5 Glesjer Tests 
Independent Variables t Significance 
Firm size  
Industry type 
Presence of assurance 
Jurisdictional business systems 
Presence of CSR committee 
Leverage 
Profitability (ROA) 
-.293 
-.706 
1.300 
-2.047 
-.527 
.984 
.345 
.769 
.480 
.194 
.041 
.598 
.326 
.730 
N=460   
The dependent variable of this regression isabsolute residuals. Firm size is measured by 
number of employees. Log=logarithma. CSR=corporate social responsibility. ROA=return 
on asset. 
 
5.3.4 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity refers to high correlations among the independent 
variables (Coakes 2009). The tolerance value and its inverse─the variance 
inflation factor (VIF)─and correlation are common measures for assessing 
multicollinearity (Hair et al. 2009). Hair et al. (2009) further argue that a 
common cut-off  threshold is a tolerance value of .10, which corresponds 
to a VIF value above 10. The results of the multicollinearity tests are 
provided in Table 5.6.  
 
Table 5.6 Multicollinearity Analysis 
Independent Variables 
 Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
Firm size 
Industry type 
Presence of assurance statement  
Jurisdictional business systems 
Presence of CSR committee 
Leverage 
Profitability (ROA) 
 .902 
.918 
.967 
.972 
.932 
.809 
.901 
1.109 
1.089 
1.034 
1.029 
1.073 
1.237 
1.110 
N=460    
The dependent variable is CSRD. CSRD=corporate social responsibility disclosure. Firm 
size= number of employees. ROA=return on assets. 
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It can be seen that the tolerance values for all variables are far above .10 
and all the VIF values are below 10. Based on these results, it can be 
concluded that there is no multicollinearity problem in the regression 
model. 
 
Table 5.7 shows the correlations between variables. The results show that 
the directional correlation amongst dependent and independent variables 
all are positive. As the correlation value is below the critical limit of 0.80 
(Hair et al. 2009) it is suggested that there is not a multicollinearity 
problem between predictor variables. 
 
Table 5.7 Pearson Correlation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. CSRD 
2. Firm size 
3. Industry type 
4. Assurance  
5. Jurisdictional  
6. CSR  
7. Leverage 
8. ROA 
1 
.021 
.150** 
.378** 
.128** 
.120** 
.094* 
.002 
 
1 
-.093* 
.001 
-.015 
.024 
.157** 
.059 
 
 
1 
.076 
.042 
.192** 
.135** 
-.071 
 
 
 
1 
.106* 
.031 
.114* 
.031 
 
 
 
 
1 
-.107* 
.035 
.038 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
-.087 
-.044 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
-268** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Pearson correlation matrix shows the correlation coefficient for all independent  and 
control variables and the dependent variable. The dependent variable is CSRD. 
CSRD=corporate social responsibility disclosure. Firm size= number of employees. 
Assurance=the presence of voluntary assurance statement. Jurisdictional=jurisdictional 
business systems. CSR=the presence of a CSR (corporate social responsibility) 
committee. ROA=return on assets. *, **, ***indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 confidence level. 
 
Based on the testings in sections 5.2 and 5.3, it is concluded that the key 
statistical assumptions for regression modelling testing are met. Therefore, 
multiple regression analyses are used as the primary statistical testsfor 
testing the hypotheses of this thesis. 
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5.4 Multiple Regressions of CSRD 
Table 5.8 details the results of the main multiple regressions performed 
using corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) as the dependent 
variable. The results of these multiple regressions shows the model fits 
and statistically significant, with F-statistic = 12.314 and p-value = 0.000. 
The regression has an adjusted R2 of 16.5 percent, which is similar to past 
disclosure studies68.  
 
Table 5.8 Multiple Regressions Results: CSRD  
Independent Variables  Predicted Sign Coefficient t-value p-value 
Constant 
Firm size  (log employees) 
Industry type 
Presence of assurance 
Communitarian 
Emerging market 
Presence of CSR 
committee 
 
H1 
H2 
H3 
H4 
H4 
H5 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
± 
± 
+ 
.358 
.007 
.046 
.170 
.042 
.068 
.060 
5.433 
.466 
2.147 
8.043 
1.708 
2.402 
2.441 
.000*** 
.641 
.032** 
.000*** 
.088* 
.017** 
.015** 
Control Variables      
Leverage 
Profitability (ROA) 
 - 
+ 
.047 
.046 
.867 
.270 
.387 
.787 
Adjusted R
2
 
F-statistic 
p-value 
N 
 .165 
12.314 
.000 
460 
   
The table shows the regression results for the entire sample (n=460). CSRD=corporate 
social responsibility is the dependent variable. Note:the Anglo-American jurisdiction is 
excluded from the model.The number of categories of jurisdictionwas3 (n = 3). The 
regression formula for dummy variable is n – 1; hence, only 2 dummy variables 
areinserted in regression model. The excluded variable is randomly chosen (statistics 
softwares will exclude one variable automatically once all dummy variables are entered 
into the regression equation).*, **, *** indicate significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level 
of confidence. 
                                               
68
Previous cross-country studies have yielded a wide range of adjusted R
2
 variations. For 
example, Orij (2010) research on the CSRD of 600 large companies from 22 countries,  
examining national culture reports an explanatory power of 7.5 percent. Using the Dow 
Jones Global Index (DJGI), Lopez, Garcia and Rodriguez (2007) examine the relationship 
between specific accounting indicators and CSR. They report an adjusted R
2
 value of 
32.8 percent.  
135 
 
First, the findings in Table 5.8 show that firm size (measured by the 
number of employees) is positively associated with corporate social 
responsibility disclosure. However, the p-value (0.641) is statistically 
insignificant.  The insignificant result with respect to the relationship 
between firm size and CSRD may seem unusual and inconsistent with 
many past studies, but this finding is consistent with Roberts (1992), 
Halme and Huse (1997),Hossain, Islam and Andrew (2006), Smith, Yahya 
and Amiruddin (2007), and Vormedal and Ruud (2009). Using a US 
sample, Robert (1992) find no statistically significant relationship between 
firm size and CSRD. Halme and Huse (1997) find there is no positive 
relationship between company size and CSRD. They argue that the extent 
of the corporate social responsibility disclosure data disseminated in larger 
company’s annual reports do not appear to be better than that in the 
annual reports of smaller firms (that is, large firms do not report more 
about CSRD policies or future actions than smaller firms). 
 
The most likely reason for this insignificant result is that the thesis’sentire 
sample consists of very large companies (see Section 5.1). Firms 
choosing to be on the GRI list are by definition very large (the means of 
employees and total assets are 41,607 and USD 71,217.5 million 
respectively); thus, in a sense all are likely to be actively pursuing 
legitimacy and have high levels of political visibility and scrutiny. These 
very large companies’ sizes differ  insufficiently different from one another 
to influence their levels of corporate social responsibility disclosure. Thus, 
hypothesis 1 (H1) is not supported.  
 
Second, Table 5.8 indicates that there is a positive and statistically 
significant association between industry type and corporate social 
responsibility disclosure (p-value = .032). Thus, H2 is accepted. This is 
consistent with the findings of Cowen, Ferreri and Parker (1987); Patten 
(1991); Roberts (1992); Hackston and Milne (1996); Adams, Hill and 
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Roberts (1998); Newson and Deegan (2002); Gao, Heravi and Xiao 
(2005); Nurhayati, Brown and Tower (2006), Garcia-Sanchez (2008); and 
Reverte (2009). These studies report that industry type affects CSRD 
levels, that specifically high-profile industries are likely to generate more 
CSRD communication. Companies operating in high-profile industries 
have consumer visibility, a high level of political risk, and concentrated and 
intense competition (Roberts 1992). As their economic activities modify or 
are likely to modify the natural environment, they are assumed to have a 
greater incentive to project a positive social image (Patten 1991). High-
profile industries also have a bigger effect on their community, and 
therefore normally have a broader group of stakeholders to satisfy 
(Hackston and Milne 1996; Adams, Hill and Roberts 1998; Haniffa and 
Cooke 2005; Reverte 2009). 
 
This finding supports the tenets of legitimacy theory, namely that a key 
reason for high-profile industries communicating more corporate social 
responsibility disclosure is to improve their accountability andvisibility, and 
to maintain their firm’s reputation on the global business stage (Amran, 
Periasamy, and Zulkafli 2011). 
 
Third, there is a positive and statistically significant association between 
the presence of voluntary assurance statements and corporate social 
responsibility disclosure (p-value = .000), suggesting that the companies 
with third party assurance statements provide higher CSRD. H3 is thus 
accepted. This finding is in line with the argument that companies 
purchase assurance service to increase stakeholder and user confidence 
in the quality, clarity, and reliability of the social information they disclose 
(Simnett, Vanstraelen and Chua 2009; Kolk and Perego 2010). Since 
corporate social responsibility information is provided and reported by the 
company itself, from the key stakeholder group points of view, the 
credibility of these reports can be questionable. This may create a 
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credibility gap since the stakeholders do not blindly trust companies and 
therefore may feel they cannot rely on the information that is reported by 
the companies themselves. Therefore, companies use an assurance 
service to verify their CSR information. 
 
As discussed in earlier sections,  larger public companies are more visible 
and have more of reputation at stake. Such companies want to improve 
their reputation amongst stakeholders, and the adoption of a voluntary 
assurance service which would likely increase the credibility of their 
reports, is one way of bolstering their reputation. From the legitimacy 
perspective, the use of assurance service may lift the reputation of 
companies and strengthen and would further legitimise their CSR 
activities. 
 
Fourth, the Table 5.8 regression (see Table 4.12 also) suggests that there 
is a positive and statistically significant association between jurisdictional 
business systems and corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
Hypothesis 4 is accepted. Matten and Moon (2008) support such a finding 
when they argue that differences in national business systems influence 
the ways in which corporations expressand pursue their social 
responsibilities in different societies. 
 
The coefficient communitarian is positive and significant at a moderate 
level (p-value = .088). This finding is consistent with Gamble et al. (1996) 
and Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar (2005). These scholars 
find that firms from countries that emphasize social issues are more 
attentive to their multiple stakeholder groups and show a higher level and 
quality of corporate social responsibility disclosure. Fekrat, Inclan and 
Petroni (1996) argue that European countries ingeneral have had a long 
tradition of reporting on social and environmental concerns. For instance, 
German and Austrian companies have in place several initiatives for 
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making environmental disclosures.Chen and Bouvin (2009) note that 
German companies communicate social issues much more than US, UK, 
and Australian companies. This may indicate that the strength of key 
stakeholder groups such as the European Multinational Entepraises 
(MNEs) have influenced the extent of CSRD (Konrad et al. 2006).  
 
The coefficient for emerging market jurisdictional countries is also positive 
and statistically significant (p-value = .017) and, further, it is higher than 
the coefficient for communitarian (p-value = .088), indicating that 
companies in emerging market countries are more likely to disclose CSR 
issues than their communitarian counterparts. This result is consistent with 
the ANOVA tests’ results provided in the previous chapter (see Table 
4.12). The finding is counter to historical trends. It is not, however, without 
any precedent.KPMG (2008), for example, reported that the disclosure of 
local companies and multinational subsidiaries in emerging market areas 
had progressed the most when compared to other region. Wanderley et al. 
(2008) argue that CSR is associated with the globalisation process, which, 
they suggest, stimulates economic and social development in emerging 
economies through industrial development, growth in job markets and 
technological transference.  
 
The positive relationship between companies in the emerging market 
jurisdiction and the extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure is 
also supported by Lines (2004) who notes that Asian companies are more 
likely to have higher levels of CSRD as they attempt to differentiate 
themselves from their competitors and lift the profiles of their global 
brands. Moreover, he argues that this movement may be influenced by 
Western multinational companies increasing their operations in many 
Asian countries. Consistent with Lines (2004), Chapple and Moon (2005) 
suggest that the increasing operation of Western organisations such as 
MNEs in Asia have affected regional firms in their CSR activities and 
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reporting. This results in Asian companies taking a proactive approach to 
CSR and sustainability issues in order to build a profile that demonstrates 
their commitment to all of their stakeholders (Lines 2004). 
 
In summary, from the perspective of legitimacy theory, by engaging in 
more corporate social responsibility activities and placing greater 
emphasis on corporate social responsibility disclosure, emerging market 
companies might better address stakeholders’ holistic expectations and 
build a more successful business image in order to attract more funds. 
 
Fifth, this thesis finds statistical evidence to suggest that the presence of a 
CSR committee affects the level of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure (p-value = .015). Hypothesis 5 is thus supported. This finding is 
consistent with the notion that the existence of such committees could be 
associated with a greater corporate propensity to communicate CSR 
issues (Cowen, Ferreri and Parker 1987). It may be that such a committee 
is an effective monitoring device for improving the range of disclosures to 
stakeholders. As argued by Kent and Monem (2008), CSR committees 
encourage companies to be more active in areas of CSR. They also act as 
a prompt for companies to be transparent in these disclosures. In short, 
CSR committees constitute a formal recognition of the CSR impacts of the 
activities of company.  
 
The role of the board, such as in the form of a CSR committee which 
oversees CSR activities can be directly linked to a corporation’s attention 
to CSR.  When a board appoints a committee to manage and work on the 
social and environmental impacts of business activities, it is more likely 
that the company will have greater legitimacy in the community in which it 
operates (Mallin and Michelon 2011). 
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Finally, this study finds that the two control variables examined, leverage 
and profitability (measured by ROA), are not statistically significant (see 
Table 5.8). The insignificant relationship between leverage and corporate 
social responsibility disclosure is consistent with prior studies. Ho and 
Taylor (2007) find no association between leverage and triple-bottom-line 
(TBL) reporting for the 50 largest US and Japanese firms. The result is 
also consistent with Haniffa and Cooke (2005), Cahaya, Porter and Brown 
(2008), Liu and Anbumozhi (2009), and Reverte (2009).This finding 
suggests that the level of CSRD may not be related to the leverage of 
companies.  
 
Furthermore, profitability is found not associated with the level of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure. As argued by Gray et al. (2001), the 
relationship between corporate social responsibility disclosure and 
profitability is still inconclusive. Previous studies  also find that there is no 
relationship between CSRD and profitability (see for example Cowen, 
Ferreri and Parker 1987; Hackston and Milne 1996; Ghazali 2007; Branco 
and Rodrigues 2008; Cahaya, Porter and Brown 2008; Clarkson et al. 
2008; Aerts and Cormier 2009; Reverte 2009; Liu and Anbumozhi 2009). 
The influence of economic performance is weak and inconsistent (Williams 
1999), as TBL reporting is primarily more likely to be driven by non-
economic events (Ho and Taylor 2007). 
 
5.5 Additional Multiple Regressions by Theme69 
This section provides the results of the extra multiple regression analyses 
for which the dependent variable (CSRD) is broken down into six key 
themes, namely economic, environmental, labour practices, human rights, 
society, and product responsibility. The findings in the previous section 
(5.4) have regard to the relationships between the predictor variables and 
                                               
69
 This analysis may help identify reasons (motivations)  to explain variation in the specific 
area of CSRD practices. 
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corporate social responsibility disclosure, the results below are based on 
the total score of CSRD for each of the six key themes. Given that these 
six themes of disclosure reflect very different aspects of businesses’ 
activities (Ho and Taylor 2007), it is important to explore whether the 
results vary across themes. This analysis will help to identify reasons for 
variations in these specific domains of CSRD practice (Williams 1997).  
 
5.5.1 Economic  
As discussed in Chapter Four,the economic themes consist of nine 
indicators (see Table 4.5).  
 
Table 5.9 Multiple Regressions: Economic Theme 
Independent Variables Predicted Sign Coefficient t-value p-value 
Constant 
Firm size  (log employees) 
Industry type 
Presence of assurance 
Communitarian 
Emerging market 
Presence of CSR committee 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
± 
± 
+ 
.313 
.005 
.060 
.175 
.039 
.099 
.075 
3.988 
.268 
2.349 
6.947 
1.341 
2.929 
2.553 
.000*** 
.789 
.019** 
.000*** 
.181 
.004*** 
.011** 
Control Variables     
Leverage 
Profitability (ROA) 
- 
+ 
.141 
.363 
2.195 
1.782 
.029** 
.075* 
Adjusted R
2
 
F-statistic 
p-value 
N 
.158 
11.755 
.000 
460 
   
The table shows the regression results for the entire sample (n=460). Economic theme is 
the dependent variable.The categories of jurisdiction are 3 (n = 3). The regression 
formula for dummy variable is n – 1.Hence, only 2 dummy variables are inserted into the 
regression model. The variable excluded from the model, Anglo-American jurisdiction, is 
randomly chosen  *, **, *** indicate significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level of 
confidence. 
 
From the six key themes of CSRD, the economic theme is the second 
most highly disclosed by firms, with an average level of disclosure of 60.2 
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percent (see Table 4.1). Table 5.9 has an adjusted R2 score of 15.8 
percent. These specific statistical findings are very similar to the overall  
presented in Table 5.8. Table 5.9 notes that firm size is not related to the 
economic themes of CSRD. Whereas, in contrast industry type, the 
presence of a voluntary assurance statement, emerging market 
jurisdiction, and the presence of a CSR committee have a positive 
statistical significance.  
 
The above findings are consistent with the main analysis in Table 5.8. The 
coefficient for communitarian is positive but not significant and two the 
control variables, leverage and profitability, are significant at the 5 percent 
and 10 percent confidence levels respectively. However, the sign on 
leverage is positive. This result is not consistent with the predicted sign, 
but is consistent with the findings of Roberts (1992), Naser et al. (2006), 
and Clarkson et al. (2008). The result suggests that companies with higher 
leverage tend to disclose more economic information. Further, the finding 
for profitability supports past studies, which suggest that profitable 
companies disclose economic information to legitimise their existence 
(Haniffa and Cooke 2005). Further still, a firm’s profitability may provide 
managers the financial resources to cover costs of making disclosures 
(Brammer and Pavelin (2008).  
 
5.5.2 Environmental  
As shown in Table 4.5,the environmental theme consists of thirty 
indicators and is the fourth highest theme communicated by firms, with an 
average of 56.7 percent (see Table 4.1). Table 5.10 shows that the 
adjusted R2 score is lower (9.6 percent) than R2 score of economic theme. 
Table 5.10 presents the statistical results for the environmental theme. 
Again, firm size do not explain the level of environmental disclosures. The 
coefficient for the industry variable is positive and statistically significant at 
the 10 percent level. Cho and Patten (2007) argue that firms from 
143 
 
environmentally sensitive industries have incentives to disclose more 
information about their environmental performance. Cowen, Ferreri and 
Parker (1987) note that companies from the paper industry sector 
disclosed more environmental information than companies from other 
industries. The clear positive statistical relationship between the presence 
of a voluntary assurance statement and environmental disclosure is 
consistent with the prior of this thesis findings. As argued by Adams 
(2002) companies may include environmental verification from auditors in 
their reports to increase their credibility.  
 
Table 5.10 Multiple Regressions: Environmental Theme 
Independent Variables Predicted Sign Coefficient t-value p-value 
Constant 
Firm size  (log employees) 
Industry type 
Presence of assurance 
Communitarian 
Emerging market 
Presence of CSR committee 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
± 
± 
+ 
.383 
.019 
.044 
.140 
.022 
.029 
.070 
5.344 
1.152 
1.865 
6.082 
.818 
.951 
2.609 
.000*** 
.250 
.063* 
.000*** 
.414 
.342 
.009*** 
Control Variables     
Leverage 
Profitability (ROA) 
- 
+ 
-.025 
.050 
-.432 
.265 
.666 
.791 
Adjusted R
2
 
F-statistic 
p-value 
N 
.096 
7.116 
.000 
460 
   
The table shows the regression results for the entire sample (n = 460). Environmental 
theme is the dependent variable. The categories of jurisdiction are 3 (n = 3). The 
regression formula for dummy variable is n – 1. Hence, only 2 dummy variables are 
inserted into the regression model. The variable excluded from the model, Anglo-
American jurisdiction, is randomly chosen  *, **, *** indicate significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 level of confidence. 
 
Moreover, as highlighted in Table 5.10, the presence of a CSR committee 
is also statistically related to environmental disclosures (t = 2.609; p-value 
= .009). This result suggests that the existence of a CSR committee 
144 
 
appears to be important and may contribute substantially to explaining the 
level of environmental disclosures. Adams (2002) notes that internal 
contextual factors such as the existence of a CSR committee are likely to 
impact the extensiveness, quality, quantity, and completeness of reporting. 
Interestingly, jurisdiction does not seem to be a predictor factor for 
environmental communication. With regard to the control variables, these 
results are consistent with Aerts, Cormier and Magnan (2006), Brammer 
and Pavelin (2008), and Michelon and Parbonetti (2012). They find that 
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5.5.3 Labour Practices 
As discussed in chapter four (see, for example,Table 4.5), the labour 
practices theme has fourteen indicators. Table 4.1 also notes that the 
labour practice theme (66.4 percent) is the highest CSRD theme disclosed 
by companies in their sustainability reports. The results in Table 5.11 
largely consistent with those in the main Table 5.8, namely an adjusted R2 
score of 15.8 percent. 
 
Other results to be noted are as follows. First, there is an insignificant 
relationship between firm size and labour practices disclosures. This 
finding is consistent with Cahaya et al. (2011), who note a similar 
insignificant association. Second, industry type, the presence of a 
voluntary assurance statement, jurisdiction (communitarian, emerging 
market), and the control variable leverage are all statistically significantly 
related to labour disclosures,whereas, by contrast, the presence of a CSR 
committee is not a statistical predictor.  
 
The findings in this thesis support previous studies that labour practices 
communication can be explained by corporate characteristics and 
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contextual variables70. For example, Cowen, Ferreri and Parker (1987) 
note a significant association between disclosures about human resources 
and the presence of a social responsibility committee. The Table 5.11 
regression results may indicate that companies disclose labour information 
to maintain their legitimacy. The results also suggest that firms with higher 
leverage tend to communicate more labour information. Dominguez (2011) 
notes that leverage has a significant impact on disclosures about human 
resources. This implies that firms may provide labour information to 
mitigate pressures from creditors.  
 
Table 5.11 Multiple Regressions: Labour Practices 
Independent Variables Predicted Sign Coefficient t-value p-value 
Constant 
Firm size  (log employees) 
Industry type 
Presence of assurance 
Communitarian 
Emerging market 
Presence of CSR committee 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
± 
± 
+ 
.455 
-.012 
.048 
.151 
.088 
.122 
.026 
6.379 
-.703 
2.067 
6.583 
3.305 
3.957 
.984 
.000*** 
.482 
.039** 
.000*** 
.001*** 
.000*** 
.325 
Control Variables     
Leverage 
Profitability (ROA) 
- 
+ 
.142 
.070 
2.428 
.376 
.016** 
.707 
Adjusted R
2
 
F-statistic 
p-value 
N 
.158 
11.752 
.000 
460 
   
The table shows the regression results for the entire sample (n = 460). Labour practices 
theme is the dependent variable.The categories of jurisdiction are 3 (n = 3). The 
regression formula for dummy variable is n – 1. Hence, only 2 dummy variables are 
inserted into the regression model. The variable excluded from the model, Anglo-
American jurisdiction, is randomly chosen  *, **, *** indicate significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 level of confidence. 
                                               
70
Williams (1999) notes a positively significant relationship between human resources 
disclosure and industry type in five ASEAN countries. Adams, Hill and Roberts (1998) 
provide evidence that industry type affect employee disclosures in eight European 
countries. Subbarao and Zeghal (1997) also note that the incidence of employee 
disclosure is affected by country domicile.  
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5.5.4 Human Rights  
The human rights theme consists of nine indicators (see Table 4.5). The 
decriptive statistics provided in Table 4.1 show that the mean of human 
rights disclosures is 49.0 percent. Table 5.12 reveals the results of the 
regression model for human rights. With regard to firm size, Eccels et al. 
(2008), as cited by Hamman et al. (2009), dispute that larger companies 
are likely to be more proactive on human rights issues. However, the result 
of this study does not support these arguments. The coefficient firm size is 
positive but not significant,a result that is consistent with Hamann et al. 
(2009) who find that company size is not significant as a predictor of 
human rights disclosure.  
 
Table 5.12 Multiple Regressions: Human Rights Theme  
Independent Variables Predicted Sign Coefficient t-value p-value 
Constant 
Firm size  (log employees) 
Industry type 
Presence of assurance 
Communitarian 
Emerging market 
Presence of CSR committee 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
± 
± 
+ 
.162 
.026 
.056 
.235 
.047 
.072 
.077 
1.732 
1.227 
1.828 
7.823 
1.349 
1.780 
2.186 
.084* 
.221 
.068* 
.000*** 
.178 
.076* 
.029** 
Control Variables     
Leverage 
Profitability (ROA) 
- 
+ 
.041 
.044 
.538 
.183 
.591 
.855 
Adjusted R
2
 
F-statistic 
p-value 
N 
.147 
10.902 
.000 
460 
   
The table shows the regression results for the entire sample (n = 460). Human rights 
theme is the dependent variable.The categories of jurisdiction are 3 (n = 3). The 
regression formula for dummy variable is n – 1. Hence, only 2 dummy variables are 
inserted into the regression model. The variable excluded from the model, Anglo-
American jurisdiction, is randomly chosen  *, **, *** indicate significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 level of confidence. 
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As displayed in the Table 5.12 findings, this thesis supports the argument 
that industry type has a relatively moderate influence on human rights 
disclosure. That is, it is statistically significant for human rights disclosures, 
but at a moderate level (10 percent) only. The GRI (2010) surveyed the 
corporate reporting of human rights practices by 100 companies. They find 
that companies in high-profile (e.g. extractive, energy utilities, and banks) 
industries report more topics relate to human rights in their sustainability 
reports than those in low-profile industries (e.g. manufacturing, service, 
and transportation).  
 
In terms of the jurisdictional business systems variable, the statistical 
testing shows only marginal support for the jurisdictional predictor. The 
variable communitarian is not found to be a statistical predictor (regardless 
of human rights disclosure) and the emerging market countries only 
marginally disclose more human rights information in their sustainability 
reports than do  communitarian countries. Interestingly, these results are 
not consistent with Wouters and Chanet (2008) who argue that European 
countries have adequately addressed the issues of human rights 
responsibilities as part of their CSR. One possible explanation for 
emerging market countries now disclosing more human rights information 
is that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) has launched clear guidelines71 for multinational enterprises 
operating in OECD countries. Lozano and Prandi (2005) suggest that 
these guidelines, which provide voluntary principles and standards, exert 
some pressure upon companies to engage in responsible business 
practices, including in the area corporate human rights. 
 
The findings inTable 5.12 show that the presence of a CSR committee has 
a positive and significant relationship to human rights disclosures. 
                                               
71
The Guidelines are first launched in 1976 and have been updated five times. The 
current version is updated in 2011. 
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Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) suggest that a CSR committee functions 
as an effective monitoring device for improving the range of disclosures. 
By disclosing human rights information in their sustainability reports, 
companies can better communicate these issues to their stakeholders. 
From the perspective of legitimacy theory,  such disclosures demonstrate 
a greater accountability to stakeholders and reduce the legitimacy gap. 
Consistent with Reverte (2009), neither leverage nor profitability appear to 
account for global CSRD human rights practices. 
 
5.5.5 Society  
As shown in Table 4.5, the theme of  society consists of eight indicators. 
Table 4.1 also notes that the average for the society theme is 57.0 
percent. Table 5.13 reports the results for the society theme of CSRD. In 
line with the other regression models, the firm size variable is not 
associated with society-related disclosures. However, the industry type, 
the presence of a voluntary assurance statement, and the presence of a 
CSR committee are found to be predictor factors for CSRD in relationship 
to society-related disclosure. The significant association between these 
disclosures and industry type is consistent with the findings of Cowen, 
Ferreri and Parker (1987) that community involvement can be explained 
by industry membership.   
 
With regard to the presence of a voluntary assurance statement, the 
coefficient is positive and of moderate statistical significance. This result is 
consistent with earlier regression models. However, both the 
communitarian and emerging market jurisdiction variables are not 
statistically significant. This finding is different from the main results 
reported in Table 5.8. The coefficient of the presence of a CSR committee 
is positive and significant at the 10 percent level. In contrast to the results 
in Tables 5.8, 5.10, and 5.12, the coefficients of leverage and profitability 
are negative. They are, however, statistically insignificant. 
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Table 5.13 Multiple Regressions: Society Theme 
Independent Variables Predicted Sign Coefficient t-value p-value 
Constant 
Firm size  (log employees) 
Industry type 
Presence of assurance 
Communitarian 
Emerging market 
Presence of CSR committee 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
± 
± 
+ 
.368 
.010 
.074 
.209 
.022 
.047 
.065 
4.156 
.495 
2.560 
7.379 
.665 
1.219 
1.960 
.000*** 
.621 
.011** 
.000*** 
.506 
.224 
.051* 
Control Variables     
Leverage 
Profitability (ROA) 
- 
+ 
-.006 
-.147 
-.087 
-.640 
.931 
.523 
Adjusted R
2
 
F-statistic 
p-value 
N 
.131 
9.680 
.000 
460 
   
The table shows the regression results for the entire sample (n = 460). Society theme is 
the dependent variable.The categories of jurisdiction are 3 (n = 3). The regression 
formula for dummy variable is n – 1. Hence, only 2 dummy variables are inserted into the 
regression model. The variable excluded from the model, Anglo-American jurisdiction, is 
randomly chosen  *, **, *** indicate significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level of 
confidence. 
 
5.5.6 Product Responsibility  
Finally, Table 5.14 provides the results of the analysis of the product 
responsibility theme. The product responsibility theme consists of nine 
indicators (see Table 4.5). The decriptive statistics provided in Table 4.1 
show that the mean of product responsibility disclosure is the lowest of all 
CSRD themes (46.0 percent). The results show that most of the 
independent variables are not statistically significant. The result of the 
regression reveals that there is no association between firm size and 
product responsibility disclosures. Cowen, Ferreri and Parker (1987) argue 
that firm size does not appear to influence product responsibility 
disclosure. In addition, consistent with Table 5.14, they also find that 
industry type is not a function of product responsibility disclosures. In this 
study, however, the presence of a voluntary assurance statement 
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continuous to exhibit a statistically significant positive association with 
CSR communication. 
 
Table 5.14 Multiple Regressions: Product Responsibility Theme  
Independent Variables Predicted Sign Coefficient t-value p-value 
Constant 
Firm size  (log employees) 
Industry type 
Presence of assurance 
Communitarian 
Emerging market 
Presence of CSR committee 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
± 
± 
+ 
.324 
-.018 
.002 
.198 
.057 
.092 
.049 
3.453 
-.841 
.068 
6.590 
1.619 
2.279 
1.406 
.001*** 
.401 
.946 
.000*** 
.106 
.023** 
.160 
Control Variables     
Leverage 
Profitability (ROA) 
- 
+ 
.101 
-.041 
1.316 
-0.167 
.189 
.868 
Adjusted R
2
 
F-statistic 
p-value 
N 
.104 
7.687 
.000 
460 
   
The table shows the regression results for the entire sample (n = 460). Product 
responsibility theme is the dependent variable.The categories of jurisdiction are 3 (n = 3). 
The regression formula for dummy variable is n – 1. Hence, only 2 dummy variables are 
inserted into the regression model. The variable excluded from the model, Anglo-
American jurisdiction, is randomly chosen  *, **, *** indicate significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 level of confidence. 
 
The jurisdictional findings in Table 5.14 are mixed. The regression results 
show a communitarian country do not have significant influence over 
product disclosure, whereas an emerging market system is found to be 
statistically and positively associated with these disclosures. Legitimacy 
tenets suggest that as companies from emerging markets seek to obtain a 
larger share of the developed market. tend to disclose more product 
information. As most of them are companies By making such product 
responsibility disclosures, they can improve their corporate image and 
legitimise their existence to multinational stakeholders. Lastly, consistent 
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with the statistical results provided above, leverage and profitability are not 
found to be determinants for product responsibility disclosures. 
 
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
This section provides additional tests to check the robustness of the main 
findings presented in Section 5.4. By using other measures of the same 
variables, the sensitivity analysis seeks to ensure that the inferences 
drawn in previous sections are as valid as possible. This section presents 
extra statistical analyses of the association between firm size, industry 
type, jurisdictional business systems and the extent of CSRD. In the main 
regression (Table 5.8), firm size is measured as the number of employees 
(see Section 3.2.3); industry type is measured by using the categories 
type into high-profile and low-profile industries (see Section 3.2.3); and 
jurisdictional business systems is classed as either Anglo-American, 
communitarian, or emerging market business systems (see Section 3.2.3). 
In this additional testing72, firm size is measured by total assets. Industry 
type is one of ten sectors: oil and gas, basic materials, utilities, financials, 
industrials, consumer goods, consumer services, telecommunication, 
technology, and healthcare industries. Jurisdictional business systems are 
reclassified as being either shareholder-or stakeholder-oriented.  
 
5.6.1 Firm Size 
The main regression results provided in Section 5.4 provide evidence that 
firm size (measured by number of employee) effects corporate social 
responsibility disclosure. Consistent with the main regression result that 
firm size is positively yet insignificantly associated with CSRD, the 
regression result in Table 5.15 indicates that the relationship between firm 
size and CSRD remains insignificant─regardless of the proxy measure. 
 
                                               
72
The additional testing is not conducted for the presence of a voluntary assurance 
statement or the presence of a CSR committee, as these variables are dichotomous 
variables, ( either i.e. presence or absence). 
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Table 5.15 Multiple Regressions Results: Alternative Measures of 
Firm Size 
Independent Variables  Predicted Sign Coefficient t-value p-value 
Constant 
Firm size  (log total assets) 
Industry type 
Presence of assurance 
Communitarian  
Emerging market 
Presence of CSR committee 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
± 
± 
+ 
.375 
.003 
.044 
.169 
.043 
.069 
.061 
6.528 
.190 
2.002 
8.001 
1.735 
2.393 
2.458 
.000*** 
.850 
.046** 
.000*** 
.083* 
.017** 
.014** 
Control variables      
Leverage 
Profitability (ROA) 
 - 
+ 
.050 
.057 
.888 
.334 
.375 
.738 
Adjusted R
2
 
F-statistic 
p-value 
N 
 .164 
12.287 
.000 
460 
   
The table shows the regression results for all sample (n=460). CSRD is the dependent 
variable. Firm size is alternatively measured by total assets.The categories of jurisdiction 
are 3 (n = 3). The regression formula for dummy variable is n – 1. Hence, only 2 dummy 
variables are inserted into the regression model. The variable excluded from the model, 
Anglo-American jurisdiction, is randomly chosen  *, **, *** indicate significant at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 level of confidence. 
 
 
5.6.2 Industry Type 
The results in Table 5.16, demonstrate that the findings forindustry type 
are mixed. The regression results show that two of the four high-profile 
industries─basic materials and utilities─are positively and significantly 
associated with CSRD. Yet, oil and gas, and financial do not show a 
significant influence on CSRD. The results also show that consumer 
goods and the telecommunications industries are positively significant 
associated with CSRD.  
 
The results provide some support for the main finding provided in Table 
5.8. Interestingly, the additional testing also shows that consumer goods 
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and telecommunications are statistically and significantly related to CSRD. 
This finding is consistent with that of Cowen, Ferreri and Parker (1987). 
They note that consumer-oriented industries can be expected to be more 
concern with demonstrating their interest about social responsibility 
issues, since a corporate image among mass-market consumers is likely 
to influence the amount of sales generated (Cowen, Ferreri and Parker 
1987, 113). 
 
Table 5.16 Multiple Regressions Results: Alternative Measures of  
Industry Type  
Independent Variables Predicted Sign Coefficient t-value p-value 
Constant 
Firm size  (log employee) 
Industries: 
Oil andgas 
Basic materials 
Utilities 
Financials 
Industrials 
Consumer goods 
Telecommunications 
Technology 
Healthcare 
Presence of assurance 
Communitarian 
Emerging market 
Presence of CSR committee 
 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
± 
± 
+ 
.354 
.004 
 
.082 
.101 
.120 
.025 
.019 
.143 
.116 
.082 
.092 
.172 
.036 
.073 
.051 
4.490 
.268 
 
1.527 
2.111 
2.212 
.527 
.424 
2.774 
1.987 
1.345 
1.134 
7.997 
1.456 
2.561 
2.037 
.000*** 
.789 
 
.127 
.035** 
.028** 
.598 
.671 
.006*** 
.047** 
.179 
.257 
.000*** 
.146 
.011** 
.042** 
Leverage 
Profitability (ROA) 
- 
+ 
.111 
-.078 
1.828 
-.439 
.068* 
.661 
Adjusted R
2
 
F-statistic 
p-value 
N 
.176 
7.127 
.000 
460 
   
The table shows the regression results for all sample (n=460). CSRD is the dependent 
variable. In the regression model presented in Table 5.16, consumer services industry is 
excluded from the model. Table 5.16 the number of industries are 10 (n = 10). The 
regression formula for dummy variable is n – 1, hence, only 9 dummy variables are 
inserted in regression model. The excluding variable is randomly chosen (statistics 
softwares will exclude one variable automatically once all dummy variables are entered 
into regression equation).*, **, *** indicate significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level of 
confidence. 
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5.6.3 Jurisdictional Business Systems 
 
As shown in Table 5.17, the result of the alternative analysis using legal 
systems (shareholder-versus stakeholder-oriented) as the measure of 
jurisdictional business system are consistent with the main finding 
reported in Table 5.8. Further, the results of the t-tests presented in Table 
5.18 support the findings of the alternative regression result. The results of 
the independent samples t-test provided in Table 5.18 are consistent with 
the main finding (see Section 4.10). This finding indicates that firms from 
countries with a stakeholder orientation have a higher level (59.9 percent) 
of CSRD than firms from countries with a shareholder orientation (54.0 
percent).  
 
Table 5.17 Multiple Regressions Results: Alternative Measures of  
Jurisdictional Business Systems  
Independent Variables  Predicted Sign Coefficient t-value p-value 
Constant 
Firm size  (log employee) 
Industry type 
Presence of assurance 
Jurisdictional  
Presence of CSR committee 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
± 
± 
.413 
.010 
.055 
.172 
-.056 
.058 
6.342 
.692 
2.547 
8.230 
-3.101 
2.391 
.000*** 
.489 
.011** 
.000*** 
.002*** 
.017** 
Leverage 
Profitability (ROA) 
 - 
+ 
.026 
.118 
.480 
.704 
.632 
.482 
Adjusted R
2
 
F-statistic 
p-value 
N 
 .173 
14.671 
.000 
438 
   
CSRD is the dependent variable. Jurisdictional business systems is alternatively 
measured by a dummy variable 1 for shareholder-oriented and 0 for stakeholder-oriented. 
N=438 (22 of 460 firms are excluded as they could not be classified as shareholder-
and/or stakeholder-oriented. They are Chinese firms and Russian firms, which fit neither 
category well).*, **, *** indicate significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level of confidence. 
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Table 5.18 Independent Samples t-Tests of Jurisdictional Effects 
 Jurisdiction N Mean Levene’s Test for 
Equality Variances 
t-test for 
Equality Means 
Mean 
Difference 
    F Sig. t Sig.   
 
 
 
Shareholder 
 
Stakeholder  
199 
 
239 
54.0 
 
59.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not assumed 
1.695 0.194 -2.557 
-2.539 
0.011 
0.011 
-0.0592 
-0.0592 
The independent sample t-tests are performed by comparing the mean CSRDs of 
shareholder-and stakeholder-oriented. *, **, ***indicate significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 
0.01 confidence levels. 
 
 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter reports the main research findings and hypotheses testing of 
the multivariate analysis. The results of the multivariate analysis suggest 
that firm size is not a determinant of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure. Hypothesis 1 (H1) is not supported. However, industry type, 
the presence of a voluntary assurance statement, jurisdictional business 
systems (communitarian and emerging market), and the existence of a 
CSR committee are found to be important determinants of CSRD. Based 
on the Table 5.8 regression analysis, it can be concluded that Hypothesis 
2, Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 4, and hypothesis 5 are supported. Two 
control variables, leverage and profitability do not appear to act as 
determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
 
Further regression analyses indicates the following. First, consistent with 
the main analysis, firm size is not a predictor of the disclosure of 
economic, environmental, labour practices, human rights, society, and 
product responsibility themes. Second, industry type is found to be a 
determinant of all corporate social responsibility disclosure themes except, 
product responsibility disclosures. Third, the result shows that the 
presence of a voluntary assurance statement is a key determinant of all 
themes of corporate social responsibility disclosure as indicated by a 
statistically high significance level.  
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Fourth, jurisdictional business systems are sometimes found to be a 
predictor of the disclosure of economic, labour practices, human rights, 
and product responsibility themes with some variations caused by 
location. Fifth, this study finds that the presence of a CSR committee is 
associated with economic, environmental, human rights, and society-
related disclosures. Sixth, the results indicate that leverage is positively 
significant as a determinant of economic and labour practices disclosures. 
Profitability, on the other hand, is found to be related to economic 
disclosures only. Finally, the sensitivity analysis shows that the robustness 
tests yield results that are generally consistent with the main regression.  
 
Chapter Six presents this thesis’s key findings about the extent of 
corporate social responsibility and the determinants that influence the level 
of corporate social responsibility disclosure. Then, various implications of 
these results are discussed.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
6.0 Introduction 
The previous chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) document the results of the 
descriptive statistics, univariate tests and multivariate analysis concerning 
the extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) practices 
and the factors that contribute to the extent of CSRD. This chapter 
highlights the key findings related to the research questions addressed in 
this thesis. The implications of these findings are then highlighted.  
 
6.1 The Extent of CSRD 
This study indicates that the overall mean of the CSRD index is 56.8 
percent. This finding shows that the extent to which companies 
communicate corporate social responsibility disclosure is at a relatively 
medium level. All of the companies communicated information about at 
least four of 79 possible indicators. The indicators about total workforce 
(LA1 = 89.6 percent), direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions (EN16 
= 88.7 percent), and rates of injury (LA7 = 88.5 percent) are the indicators 
most communicated by firms, whilst the indicators for national 
conservation (EN15 = 22.4 percent), the biodiversity value of water (EN25 
= 23.9 percent), and transported waste (EN24 = 27.4 percent) are the 
indicators least disclosed. The overaching theme most disclosed by 
companies is labour practices (66.4 percent), followed by economic (60.2 
percent), society (57.0 percent), environmental (56.7 percent), human 
rights (49.0 percent), and product responsibility themes (46.0 percent) 
(see Table 4.1). This thesis also finds the level of CSRD-core indicators to 
be 64.2 percent, while CSRD-additional indicators are found to bea level 
that is substantially lower  (44.8 percent).  
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The moderate level of corporate social responsibility disclosure warrants 
reflection. Increases with it; or if in the extent of CSRD may be influenced 
by several factors. First, they may be influenced by the time period in 
which this study is conducted. Events that are unique to a particular period 
may influence levels of disclosure when they happen. More contemporary 
events and the pressures arising from them may lead to greater levels of 
CSRD. For instance, Coetze and Van Staden (2011) find a significant 
increase in the extent of health and safety disclosure after certain major 
mining accidents. Organisations in the mining sector in which the incident 
took place disclose more information than mining organisations in sectors 
that did not experience major accidents. During the implementation period 
of the requirement for corporations to publish emission information about 
National Pollutant Inventory (NPI), Cowan and Deegan (2011) note an 
increase in the number of corporations providing voluntary environmental 
disclosures for the NPI in their reports  
 
Second, corporate social responsibility communication may be affected by 
firm characteristics. The relationship between company characteristics and 
CSR varies according to the type of CSRD being examined (Gray et al. 
2001). For example, certain industries such as the tobacco industry may 
disclose more CSR information to show that they are committed to 
contributing to the well-being of society when they are under growing 
threat as the consequences of public policy such as anti-smoking 
campaigns (Tsang 1998; Tilling and Tilt 2010). Adam and Kuasirikun 
(2000) also suggest that certain industries such as the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries face extensive pressures concerning ethical 
issues. For instance, the export of pesticides, hazardous chemicals and 
drugs; labelling and packaging of chemicals and drugs; and genetics 
research are some issues about which the public has expressed particular 
concern. Each of the above could have environmental impactsof a 
significant magnitude. In response to such pressures,companies in these 
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industries may increase their corporate social responsibility disclosure 
communication tocounter their industry’s negative image and to build 
industry credibility. 
 
There are other reasons that may explain differing levels of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure. They may be the results of economic and 
reputational considerations (KPMG 2008). Corporate social responsibility 
disclosure is driven by the desire to create good relations with 
stakeholders in order to increase financial returns (Belkaoui and Karpik 
1989; Branco and Rodrigues 2008a). Companies with a good reputation 
for social responsibility are able to improve their relations with investors, 
bankers, suppliers, and competitors, which in turn may improve financial 
outcomes (Branco and Rodrigues 2008a). Aerts, Cormier and Magnan 
(2008) argue that companies can reduce the uncertainty surrounding 
earnings forecasts by relying on CSRD. For instance, information 
contained in CSRD indicators such as economic and environmental 
performance, employee and product capital expenditures, environmental 
liabilities, and environmental and product fines and penalties may have a 
direct impact on a firm’s future earnings. Therefore, there are incentives 
for companies with good performance (i.e. high financial performance; low 
environmental and product liabilities, fines and penalities) to inform 
investors and other stakeholder groups about their CSR activities. Such  
voluntarily CSRD is likely to be perceived by market participants as good 
news.  
 
Current studies show that there is a rise in the level of awareness that 
companies have about corporate social responsibility. They are aware that 
they are becoming ever more accountable to multiple stakeholder groups 
(Adam and Frost 2007; Cooper and Owen 2007; Bebbington, Larrinaga 
and Moneva 2008; Joshi and Gao 2009; GRI 2010). This awareness may 
be manifested by their producing separate, comprehensive sustainability 
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reports as a medium to better communicate their CSR activities. Overall, 
by providing higher levels of CSRD, companies can achieve numerous 
things. They can better address the demands of stakeholders, reduce 
public pressures, minimise the risks of powerful consumer boycotts by 
external parties (Adams 2002), improve communication with the 
community and other stakeholders, and  legitimise their activities in a 
positive manner. 
 
Greater levels of communications might also be obtained by guidance 
frameworks for reporting. The GRI (2010) survey notes that there is an 
increase in the number of national and international voluntary guidelines 
and/or global frameworks for sustainability reporting. For example, at the 
international level there are numerous contemporary guidelines (see 
Appendix F) rooted in prestigious international organisations such as the 
OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises (2011), the United Nations 
Global Compact Principles (2008), and the UNPRI (2007). There are also 
more vocal stakeholder groups and private frameworks such as the GRI 
(G3) Guidelines (2006), the CERES Principles (2010), ISO 26000 (2010), 
and SA 8000 (2008). The presence of such frameworks to guide reporting 
may stimulate companies to report their CSR performance information 
more holistically and for a wider range of stakeholder. 
 
In the area of jurisdictional business systems, this thesis provides new 
insights into CSRD practices. The thesis’ results indicate that companies 
from emerging market countries have the highest CSRD communication 
level (60.4 percent) followed by companies from communitarian (55.3 
percent) and Anglo-American (54.7 percent) countries (see Table 4.1). 
Compared to prior studies, this is a surprising finding. Evidence from past 
studies ofcorporate social responsibility disclosure suggest that companies 
from communitarian countries tend to be more likely disclose social 
information (see for example Fekrat, Inclan and Petroni 1996; Adams, Hill 
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and Roberts 1998; Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar 2005), and 
the emerging market areas have traditionally lagged behind both 
communitarian and Anglo-American countries in terms of CSR reporting 
(Welford 2005). 
 
The relatively high level of corporate social responsibility disclosure in the 
emerging market countries may reflect the contemporary developments of 
standard-setting and improved regulatory environments in emerging 
market regions. Further, region-specific institutionalpressures might play a 
significant role in shaping CSR communication (Dawkins and Ngunjiri 
2008); that is, pressure to respect the preferences of region-specific 
stakeholders. Stock exchanges are one institution that may influence the 
operationsof companies active in these regions, making it more likely that 
companies will comply with CSR requirement and report their CSR 
activities (Campbell 2006; Dawkins and Ngunjiri 2008; Chen and Bouvin 
2009).  
 
The findings of this thesis are supported by the results of surveys 
conducted by the World Resources Institute (WRI) and the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) in six countries in Asia (India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam). They note that 
sustainability reporting in these countries increased over the period 2004–
2009. The survey concludes that this is mainly due to the recent increased 
efforts of governments, organisations, national securities regulators, and 
professional accounting associations. In summary, this significant increase 
in sustainability reporting has mostly been driven by three stakeholder 
groups: governments, non-government organisations (NGOs), and 
investors (World Research Institute and International Finance Corporation 
2009). 
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The results can also be partially explained by the growing presence of 
voluntary international and national standard guidelines for preparing 
sustainability reports. As cited by GRI (2010) the increased use of 
reporting guidelines is evident in important emerging countries such as 
Brazil, China, India, and South Africa. For example, Brazil has voluntary 
standards such as the Carbon Disclosure Project and the Ethos Indicators 
for corporate social responsibility. China has guidelines for environmental 
disclosures, guidelines for State-owned Enterprises fulfilling corporate 
social responsibilities, special industry guidelines about corporate social 
responsibility for banking financial institutions, guidelines for apparel and 
textile enterprises, and for industrial corporations and federations. India 
also has voluntary CSR guidelines and, finally, South Africa has the King 
III Report (2010) on corporate governance guidelines. These guidelines 
might have an impact within those countries, especially in emerging 
market which favour the use of international guidelines to demonstrate 
compliance with international norms. By complying with the guideline, for 
instance, with the GRI Guidelines, they might respond to stakeholders 
need. 
 
6.2 Insights Regarding Themes of CSRD 
Data concerning the different levels of communication of themes are 
provided in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2. The emerging market countries lead 
in the communication of all themes of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure. 
 
There are several possible reasons for these findings. First, previous 
studies show that companies, particularly in emerging market countries, 
now tend to disclose more labour information than they do many other 
themes in their annual and/or sustainability reports. Companies in the 
emerging market countries may well be aware of the concern of 
governments to improve the working conditions and the living standards of 
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the workers. Disclosures of labour information would include details of 
basic salaries, occupational health and safety, benefit, training and 
education (Andrew et al. 1989).  
 
In summary, companies in the emerging market countries are found to be 
placing greater emphasis on labour disclosure, most likely to mitigate 
pressures and criticisms from stakeholders and to better address these 
stakeholders’ holistic expectations. Achieving each of these would help 
such companies attract capital (see for example Teoh and Thong 1984; 
Newson and Deegan 2002; Kuasirikun and Sherer 2004; Gunawan, 
Djajadikerta and Smith 2009; Azim, Ahmad and Islam 2009; Pratten and 
Mashat 2009; Islam and Deegan 2010; Belal and Cooper 2011). 
 
This thesis finds that information about total workforce by employment 
type and region (LA1) and rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days, 
absenteeism, and total number of work-related fatalities by region (LA7) is 
most communicated by firms (LA1 = 412 firms or 89.6 percent; LA7 = 407 
firms or 88.5 percent) (see Table 4.5). This finding indicates that 
communicating about these indicators seems to be very important for 
companies, especially for multinational companies. A multinational bank 
company report states that: 
 
An inclusive and energised workforce is vital to the success of our 
business strategy to become a major financial services organisation 
in the region (ANZ Corporate Responsibility Review 2009, 32). 
 
Similarly, a leading Chinese bank declares that: 
 
The Bank believes that its most important asset is its employees. 
Bank of China has a competent and diverse employee team. As at 
the end of 2009, the Bank had 262,566 employees (Bank of China 
CSR Report 2009, 46). 
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Concerning rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days, absenteeism, 
and total number of work-related fatalities by region (LA7), one mining 
company, for example, claims: 
 
Of all the aspects of sustainability that we cover in this report, safety 
is the most important. We will continue with operation and issues 
specific safety campaigns. Fundamental to safety is to bring about a 
change in the sort of behaviour that places employees at risk and to 
encourage safe work practices at all times (DRDGold Sustainable 
Development Report 2009, 6).  
 
Past studies note that high-profile multinational companies face the most 
criticisms about workplace accidents (Islam and Deegan 2010) and 
number of fatalities (Coetzee and Van Staden 2011). Therefore, it could 
be that companies with higher rates of injury, workplace accidents or 
number of fatalities will be more likely to have higher levels of disclosure 
about labour-related issues. As argued by Coetzee and Van Staden 
(2011), the poorer of company’s occupational health and safety record 
(OHS) in terms of number of fatalities, the greater media scrutiny its OHS 
practices will attract. This increased media attention poses a threat to a 
company’s legitimacy. 
 
By disclosing more about labour themes, companies could preserve or 
restore their legitimacy (Aerts and Cormier 2009), satisfy the expectations 
of stakeholders (Branco and Rodgrigues 2008), make better investments 
(Subbarao and Zeghal 1997), influence public opinion (Lahteenmaki and 
Laiho 2011), reduce pressures from unionized labour force (Belal 2001) 
and international lending institutions (Rahaman, Lawrence and Roper 
2004), and legitimise their activities to highly visible employee stakeholder 
groups (Brown, Tower and Taplin 2005). Labour disclosures also may be 
made in order to secure the support of the providers of labour capital and, 
possibly, as marketing tools to demonstrate values that converge with 
those of their consumer (Holder-Webb et al. 2009). 
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The motivations of companies to communicate more corporate social 
responsibility disclosurein areas such as labour practices are also 
encouraged by governmental guidelines (Kuasirikun and Sherer 2004) and 
by coercive pressure from governments (Cahaya et al. 2011). Currently, 
there are a plethora of specific voluntary guidelines for labour disclosure. 
For instance, at the global level, there is the SA 800073 standard and at 
the regional level, in 2005 (latest revision in 2011) the OECD has 
guidelines for multinational enterprises operating in OECD countries. One 
of the aims of these guidelines is to encourage multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) to communicate information that could include data on the 
relationship between labour and other stakeholders.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, economic themes are the second most 
highly disclosed by sample companies. This finding is consistent with the 
KPMG (2008) survey, which reports that economic considerations are 
drivers for CSRD. As shown in Table 4.5, ahigh number of companies 
report information about revenues, operating costs, employee 
compensation, and donations (EC1) (396 firms or 86.1 percent).  This 
finding may imply that such information is considered the most important 
for resource management. Yet, fewer than 50 percent of the companies 
reported information about financial assistance received from government 
(EC4) and are often silent about a range of ratios of standard entry level 
wages compared to local minimum wages at significant locations of 
operation (EC5). The main reason for the lower responses may be a belief 
that these indicators are not relevant to their organisation. Some 
companies, for example, report: 
                                               
73
The SA8000 standardis a voluntary, universal and auditable standard concerning 
decent work conditions that was developed by Social Accountability International, a multi-
stakeholder NGO initiative. The SA8000 standard is based on the core conventions of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Social Accountability 2008), 
(See Appendix F). 
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We are unaware of any subsidy paid to us during 2009 (Newcrest 
Mining Sustainability Report 2009, 23). 
 
OeKB did not receive any funding or sponsorship in 2009 
(Oesterreichische Kontrollbank AG GRI Index 2009, 7). 
 
Having regard to the nature of the Group’s businesses and having 
made limited internal inquiries, we do not believe that the Group is a 
significant or material recipient of subsidies other than deductions 
allowed by tax legislation for all relevant or qualifying tax payers. 
Therefore, on the basis of materiality we have not reported this 
information (National Australia Bank GRI Index 2009, 7). 
 
There are reasons for the relatively high level of disclosures for the 
economic theme. Most companies perceive economic performance as a 
core reflect of the successful operations of the company. Past studies 
show that corporate social responsibility disclosure is often determined by 
economic performance (see for example Belkaoui and Karpik 1989; Al-
Tuwaijiri, Christensen and Hughes 2004; Clarkson et al. 2008).  
 
This thesis finds a positive relationship between profitability and economic 
disclosures (see Table 5.9). This implies that profitable companies 
disclose more economic information, most likely to legitimise their 
existence (Haniffa and Cooke 2005). As their economic performance 
increases, companies have a greater economic capacity to engage in 
CSR activities such as donations to local communities or establishment of 
employee training programs (Cahaya 2006). Therefore, communicating 
economic performance may be important for companies, particularly in 
emerging markets (see regression result in Table 5.9), to create a more 
succesful business image in order to better attract capital. This thesis’s 
finding supports legitimacy theory tenets that suggests companies 
disclose more about company performance in sustainability reports as a 
means of building their image and legitimising their existence.  
 
  
167 
 
Concerning society themes, this thesis shows that the indicators most 
disclosed by firms are community indicators (SO1) (328 firms, 71.3 
percent) (see Table 4.5). This indicates that disclosing information about 
charities, with which they are associated, public health sponsorship, 
corporate giving, educational facilities, scholarships, and blood donation 
programs and the like is of substancial importance to companies. Not 
surprisingly, this  type of information is easily and well communicated in 
sustainability reports (Gunawan, Djajadikerta and Smith 2009). It is 
reasonable to believe that community disclosures should be more reliable 
than those about other societal indicators. This is because community 
activities attract public attention and can be readily verified by outside 
parties (Tsang 1998). One company that does provide significant 
community disclosure states: 
 
As one of Australia’s largest companies, with customers, employees 
and operations across the country, Telstra is naturally a part of 
community life. It makes sense for us to be actively involved with the 
communities where Telstra people live and do business, it helps us 
know our customers better and understand their particular needs, 
whether they are in a remote or rural community, or in one of our big 
cities (Telstra Corporate Responsibility Report 2009, 46). 
 
This finding paints a useful picture of how companies engage with the 
societies in which they operate. The indicators least communicated by 
companies (170 firms, 37.0 percent) are total numbers of legal actions for 
anti-competitive behaviour, anti-trust, and monopoly practices (SO7). One 
explanation for this may be that, although these indicators may be relevant 
for companies, their non-disclosure could be due to a narrow 
understanding of the activities that relate to these indicators. 
 
As discussed in Section 5.1 (see also Table 5.1), the sample of this thesis 
is composed of large firms. Past studies argue that the larger the size of 
the firm the higher their visibility (Trotman and Bradley 1981; Cowen, 
Ferreri and Parker 1987; Aerts and Cormier 2009). Presenting a positive 
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social image with the general public is likely to be very important to 
companies with high public visibility (Branco and Rodrigues 2008). Since 
communication about societal factorsare related to how a company links 
with a society through its community involvement, companies with a high 
public profile─and, presumably, greater exposure to the communities in 
which they operate─would be expected to have greater incentives to make 
more disclosures. 
 
To further legitimise their operations, companies might use society 
disclosures about community involvement to maintain their reputation 
and/or to satisfy the expectations of stakeholders. By maintaining a good 
relationship with communities nearby a company, they seek to insure that 
their activities operate effectively and are congruent with the societal 
environment (Gunawan 2010).  
 
With regard to environmental themes, Table 4.5 shows that total direct and 
indirect greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions indicators (EN16) are the 
highest reported (408 firms, 88.7 percent) environmental theme. The issue 
of greenhouse gas emissions has become a main corporate concern. 
Current studies show that there is increased debate, discussion and 
interest in climate change, pollution and emissions. For example, the 
disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions has attracted increased public 
attention since the United Nations’ Kyoto Protocol is issued in an attempt 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni 
2011). As an aviation company states: 
 
Air France-KLM set up a ‘Climate Action Plan’ to combat climate 
change. As part of this, the Group: supports the Kyoto Protocol; 
continues to modernize its fleet, contributes to aviation research, and 
encourages the entire supply chain to cut CO2 emissions; asks all its 
staff to work towards ambitious environmental action plans, from fuel 
saving in the sky to cutting emissions on the ground; provides its 
customers with transparent and reliable information on their travel-
related CO2 emissions, via a calculator based on real operating data, 
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and opportunities to compensate them (Air France-KLM Corporate 
Social Responsibility Report 2009, 20). 
 
Another example is that in Australia, attempts to reduce carbon pollution 
emissions can be seen in the introduction of the Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme (CPRS) (Cowan and Deegan 2011). The CEO and 
Managing Director of a cement company reports: 
 
Boral’s businesses will offset the increased costs associated with the 
CPRS with price increases and cost reduction initiatives. However, 
the estimated incremental costs as a result of the CPRS for Boral’s 
cement business will increase by a factor of around six times from 
2012 to 2017 (and will continue to grow) as a result of a decline in 
EITE assistance of 1.3 percent per annum, the removal of the 5 
percent “recession buffer” and the increase in the price of carbon. To 
preserve Australia’s competitiveness, in the absence of a global 
carbon price, sectoral review mechanisms must be a feature of the 
CPRS legislation. We are continuing to reinforce these issues with 
the Australian Government (Boral Limited Sustainability Report 2009, 
2). 
 
This finding is consistent with KPMG (2008) and GRI (2010) surveys, the 
results of which conclude that a number of the disclosing firms 
acknowledge the importance of climate change. Perhaps the relatively 
high level of communication about GHG emissions may be influenced by 
the implementation guidelines such as those mentioned above.  
 
Past studies provide evidence that companies use environmental 
disclosure as a strategic mechanism (Deegan and Rankin 1996; Deegan, 
Rankin and Voght 2000). As mentioned, the percentage of companies that 
disclosed theirgreenhouse gas emissions is 88.7 percent (see Table 4.5). 
This finding may indicate that most companies (408 firms) have increased 
their disclosure levels due to increasing pressure about climate change 
issues. Disclosure focussing on GHG emissions seems to reduce public 
pressures upon companies, which in turn, is a response to a legitimacy 
threat (Patten 1991; Deegan and Gordon 1996).  
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Previous studies argue that companies with poor environmental 
performance are likely to disclose more about environmental issues (Al-
Tuwaijiri, Christensen and Hughes 2004). In other words, companies that 
emit more greenhouse gas are more likely to disclose this in sustainability 
reports. However, Cowan and Deegan (2011) posit that companies 
communicating such emissions disclosures do so purely as a legitimising 
exercise.  
 
Concerning human rights themes, the child labour indicator (294 firms, 
63.9 percent) (see Table 4.5) is most disclosed by companies. The 
indicator child labour (HR6), is particularly interesting. This indicator 
encompasses corporate policies to eliminate the incidence of child labour, 
an area of particular relevance to companies in emerging market 
countries. Perhaps surprisingly, this thesis finds that the companies in 
these countries are leading  the world in human rights communication. 
Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia, and India have very high human rights 
disclosures indices (see Table 4.2). As argued by Islam and Deegan 
(2010) many high-profile multinational companies, especially in developing 
countries, have been the object of global criticisms about controversial 
policies such as using child and forced labour. Therefore, disclosing a 
company’s policy about child and forced labour, indicating such things as 
the significant risk of incidents of child labour and their committed to the 
elimination of child labour, are very important for companies. These could 
be viewed as strategic ways of meeting stakeholder expectations and 
thereby legitimising a company’s activities. Some mining companies, for 
example, report: 
 
In the value chain, we seek to improve awareness of human rights, 
with a special focus on the eradication of forced labour and child 
labour and on the promotion of the rights of children and adolescents 
(Vale Sustainability Report 2009, 114). 
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We are committed to ensuring that our employees and contractors 
uphold the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour 
and we support the effective abolition of child labour (Barrick Gold 
Corporation Responsibility Report 2009, 25). 
 
AngloGold Ashanti is committed to upholding the basic labour rights 
enshrined in the Fundamental Rights Conventions of the ILO as 
expressed in the legislation, regulations and practices of the countries 
where we operate. The company’s employment policies and practices 
prevent it from hiring minors (AngloGold Ashanti Sustainability 
Review 2009, 63). 
 
With regard to product responsibility disclosures, this thesis finds that 
health and safety product and services (PR1) are the indicators most 
communicated by companies (297 firms, 64.6 percent) (see Table 4.5). 
This thesis also notes that information about the health and safety of 
products and services (PR1) is more likely disclosed by companies in low-
profile industries (see Table 4.13). One possible reason for this is that the 
nature of low-profile industries, such as consumer goods, technology and 
healthcare industries,neccessitates a focus on product safety. These 
industries are expected to exercise due care in the design of their products 
and services, to ensure they are fit for their intended use and do not pose 
unintended hazards to health and safety. One company that does provide 
a disclosure about the health and safety of their products and services 
states: 
 
In accordance with international law and customer requirements, 
Qisda formulated a ‘Hazardous Material Management Checklist’ for 
use of chemical substances in products or in the production process 
and for the strict control of the influence of chemical substances on 
environmental health and safety. Qisda observes all specially 
designated chemical substance standards and strenuously requires 
all suppliers to restrict or prohibit the use of hazardous chemical 
substances (Qisda Corporate Sustainability Report 2009, 69).  
 
The emphasis on product responsibility disclosures, especially the health 
and safety of products and services is consistent with legitimacy theory 
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tenets, which posit that disclosures are used in the pursuit of building or 
maintaining legitimacy within a social environment (Islam and Deegan 
2008).  Interestingly, the indicator in this area shows information about the 
total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and voluntary 
codes concerning product and services (PR7) is the least indicator 
communicated by companies (149 firms, 32.4 percent). One likely 
explanation is that most companies might perceive that such information is 
sensitive and they may not wish to highlight those areas that they may not 
be fully addressing. Thus, by partially or non total-disclosure, companies 
seek to lesser the possibility of a bad image among their customers. 
 
Arguably, product responsibility disclosures are primarily aimed at 
customers to maintain consumer loyalty and market share. For instance, 
the communication of more information about the health and safety of 
products could be used as a marketing tool to demonstrate that the values 
of companies are convergent with these of customers. Moreover, such 
disclosures may also be seen as a means to increase sales and influence 
customers’ purchasing behaviours. 
 
In summary, most of the sample companies (66.4 percent) disclose about 
labour practices indicators. The emerging markets companies lead in 
communicating in all indicators of corporate social responsibility disclosure 
(CSRD). These findings imply that firms in emerging market countries in 
particular are placing greater emphasis on CSRD communication: (1) to 
better address stakeholder holistic expectations, in order (2) to attract 
capital and (3) build a more successful business image. 
 
6.3 Determinants of CSRD 
To answer the second research question, regression analysis is 
conducted to test the relationship between predictor variables and the 
extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure by using a disclosure 
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index based on legitimacy tenets. Table 6.1 summaries the results of the 
hypotheses testing (based on the Table 5.8 regression model). As shown 
in Table 6.1, Hypotheses 2 to 5 are accepted, whilst Hypothesis 1 is 
rejected.  
 
Table 6.1 Summary: Hypotheses Testing 
Variables Hypotheses Results 
Firm Size H1: There is a positive relationship between firm 
size and the extent of CSRD in sustainability 
reports. 
Rejected 
Industry Type H2:  Firms in high profile industry will provide a 
higher extent of CSRD in sustainability reports 
than firms in low profile industry. 
Accepted 
The Presence of 
Voluntary 
Assurance 
H3:  There is a positive relationship between the 
presence of voluntary assurance statement 
and the extent of CSRD in sustainability 
reports. 
Accepted 
Jurisdictional 
Business Systems 
H4: There is a relationship between jurisdictional 
business systems and the extent of CSRD in 
sustainability reports. 
Accepted 
The Presence of 
CSR Committee 
H5:  There is a positive relationship between the 
presence of a CSR committee and the extent 
of CSRD in sustainability reports. 
Accepted 
The table shows a summary of the hyptheses testing results based on the Table 5.8 
multiple regression results 
 
This means that four independent variables, namely industry type, the 
presence of a voluntary assurance statements, jurisdictional business 
systems, and the presence of a CSR committee are found to be predictors 
of the extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure, whereas firm 
size is found to be not statistically significant as a determinant of CSRD. 
The discussion of these results is in the following sub-sections. 
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6.3.1 Firm Size 
Hypothesis 1, which states there is a positive relationship between firm 
size and the extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure in 
sustainability reports, is rejected (see Table 5.8). This somewhat 
surprising result indicates that the influence of firm size on the overall 
CSRD index is statistically insignificant. This finding is not in line with the 
vast majority of the literature on legitimacy theory, but it is consistent with 
Roberts (1992), Moneva and Llena (2000), and Van Staden and Hooks 
(2007).  
 
Some possible explanations for the finding of non-significance follow. First, 
it could be a function of the sample set composition. The vast majority of 
this thesis sample is very large companies (see Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1). 
Past studies argue that larger companies have higher political visibility, 
and that such companies are much more likely to provide corporate social 
responsibility disclosure (see for example Hackston and Milne 1996; Aerts 
and Cormier 2009). Yet, virtually all of the sample companies arguably 
already have high political visibility (as most of them are considered very 
large within their respective countries (see Table 5.1) and thus virtually all 
are likely to be concerned about legitimacy issues. They are more likely to 
disclose more CSRD.  
 
Second, size may not be a continuous function for corporate social 
responsibility disclosure because smaller firms may have alternative 
channels of communication (Gray, Kouhy and Lavers 1995). For instance, 
smaller firms may use news papers or brochures for their CSRD─perhaps 
due to the lower cost of producing and distributing such media (Zeghal 
and Ahmed 1990). Thus, number of employees and financial size (total 
assets) may be less relevant than political presence and public visibility. 
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Another possible explanation is that smaller firms may be equally 
motivated to communicate their CSR, because the marginal utility of 
enhanced legitimacy or an improved reputation is possibly greater for 
smaller firms than for larger firms (Udayasankar 2008). Given that CSRD 
is a way to legitimate their activities and legitimacy substantially enhances 
firm performance, it is likely that smaller firms will also attempt to gain 
legitimacy. For instance, disclosing their corporate social responsibility 
activities may help these firms gain access to and secure various 
resources. Firms with constrained or inadequate resource access may use 
CSR as astrategic means to acquire such resources, sometimes to the 
exclusion of competitors (Udayasankar 2008, 170).  
 
6.3.2 Industry Type 
Industry type is a significant explanatory variable that influences the extent 
of corporate social responsibility disclosure (see Table 5.8). The reason 
for thus is that high profile industries are more likely to be scrutinized by 
the general public and socially sensitive stakeholder groups. High-profile 
companies are those operating in starky visible industries, such as basic 
materials (mining, chemicals, forestry and paper), utilities, and oil and gas. 
These industries are more exposed to and influenced by the political, 
social and environmental factors (Newson and Deegan 2002). For 
instance, the basic materials and utilities industries are more likely to 
generate greater public concern and regulatory scrutiny as their operations 
emit greater levels of harmful GHGs (Kolk, Levy and Pinkse 2008). Also, 
compared to other sectors the mining industries face some of the steepest 
challenges, as their activities generate significant social concerns in terms 
of their environmental impact and the health and safety of their 
employees. (Coetzee and Van Staden 2011). Such pressures as these 
drive high profile companies to communicate more about their CSR 
activities. 
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This finding is consistent with past studies (Cowen, Ferreri and Parker 
1987; Patten 1991; Roberts 1992; Lynn 1992; Hackston and Milne 1996; 
Adams, Hill and Roberts 1998; Newson and Deegan 2002; Gao, Heravi 
and Xiao 2005; Nurhayati, Brown and Tower 2006; Reverte 2009; Aerts 
and Cormier 2009; Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni 2011). These studies 
argue that type of industry is related to CSR activities. The results of this 
thesis show that the extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure for 
high-profile industries (59.2 percent) is statistically higher than for low-
profile industries (54.4 percent). This is consistent with legitimacy theory 
tenets. By way of explanation, high-profile industries may be more active 
in communicating CSRD than low-profile industries because they face 
greater pressures to meet stakeholders’ expectations.  
 
Firms from high-profile industries also tend to disclose more corporate 
social responsibility information than firms from low-profile industries as 
they are subject to a wide range of regulations, for instance environmental 
regulations (Da Silva Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán (2009). As a result, if a 
firm does not disclose CSR information, this could be interpreted by the 
firm’s stakeholders as a signal of poor CSR performance. Poor perception 
of a firm by shareholders and stakeholders is very costly to that firm 
(Amran, Periasamy and Zulkafli 2011). Avoiding such costs is strong 
incentives for firms to engage in CSRD.  
 
6.3.3 The Presence of a Voluntary Assurance Statement 
This study concludes that the presence of a voluntary assurance 
statement affects the extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure 
(see Table 5.8). This finding is consistent with the findings of Moroney, 
Windsor and Aw (2011) that assurance enhances the quality of CSRD. 
The extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure for assured 
companies (66.7 percent) is far higher than for those companies not 
assured (48.4 percent). A possible explanation of this is that assurance 
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improves the credibility and transparency of sustainability reports 
(Deegan, Cooper and Shelly 2006; Simnett, Vanstraelen and Chua 2009; 
Kolk and Perego 2010). The presence of independent professional 
assurance acts to positively influence the perception of the quality and 
reliability of a company’s reporting process. The presence of an assurance 
statement can be seen to assure:  the accuracy and completeness of CSR 
information reported; that the report has been prepared in accordance with 
a particular set of reporting guidelines and has consulted with its key 
stakeholders; and that internal policies and related management systems 
have been implemented (GRI 2006; Deegan, Cooper and Shelly 2006). 
For example, companies may have an incentive to provide incomplete of 
information about their environmental performance (i.e. level of reduction 
carbon emissions, greenhouse gas emissions, non-compliance monetary 
fines). In this case, the company will have the incentive to enhance the 
credibility of their report by adoptingvoluntary assurance in order to secure 
their organisational legitimacy. 
 
The findings of this thesis are consistent with legitimacy theory tenets. 
Commentary and/or approved in the form of an assurance statement, 
given by third parties such as auditors or experts in other field of social 
responsibility may enhance a company’s reputation. In addition,a voluntary 
assurance statement might be used by a company to further legitimise 
their actions.  
 
6.3.4 Jurisdictional Business Systems 
Hypothesis 4 states that there is a relationship between jurisdictional 
business systems and the extent of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure in sustainability reports. This findings support this hypothesis 
and provide clear evidence that jurisdictional business systems affect the 
extent of CSRD. Specifically, the findings indicate (see Table 4.1) that 
companies from the emerging market (60.4 percent) countries disclosed 
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higher CSRD than communitarian (55.3 percent) and Anglo-American 
(54.7 percent) countries respectively. This finding differssignificantly from 
past findings (see for example Adams, Hill and Roberts 1998; Williams 
1999; Newson and Deegan 2002; Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari and 
Tondkar 2005; Orij 2010), where companies from emerging market 
countries have been found to have had lower communication levels.  
 
From a legitimacy lens, it can be seen that by engaging in more CSR 
activities and communicating higher levels of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure, these companies from emerging market countries 
might better address stakeholders’ expectations and build a more 
successful global business image in order to gain a competitive edge, and 
attract and retain more financial capital. In other words, they may need to 
work harder and communicate better to attract new investors. Cheung et 
al. (2010) find a positive and significant association between CSR 
performance andmarket valuation in Asian Emerging Markets (AEMs). 
They argue that high-value stocks in emerging markets attract 
international investors, and that greater international investor participation 
leads to better performance in CSR. 
 
The results also suggest that companies from communitarian countries are 
more likely to disclose more CSR information than those from Anglo-
American countries. This finding is consistent with Tschopp (2005). He 
finds that corporate social responsibility disclosure in European Union 
countries is greater than in US. This may be because the geopolitical 
atmosphere in communitarian countriesis more conducive to focusing on 
CSR concerns (Tschopp 2005) and place more emphasis and focus on 
multiple stakeholders (Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar 2005). 
  
179 
 
6.3.5 The Presence of a CSR Committee  
The evidence of this thesis shows that the presence of a CSR committee 
is also a significant predictor of the extent of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure (see Table 5.8). Past studies note that internal organisational 
factors such the presence of a CSR committee influence the nature and 
extent of reporting (Adams 2002). This thesis’s finding is consistent with 
Cowen, Ferreri and Parker (1987), Kent and Monem (2008), and Mallin 
and Michelon (2011). This thesis supports the arguments that the 
presence of a CSR committee encourages a company to demonstrate 
greater accountability and transparency (Kent and Monem 2008) and 
motivates a firm to implement corporate social responsibility policies 
(Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni 2011). This thesis highlights that the 
extent of CSRD is higher for companies which do have a CSR committee 
(61.8 percent) than for those do not (55.1 percent) (see Table 4.13).  
 
From a point of view of legitimacy theory, the findings of this thesis 
suggest that the presence of a CSR committee could strengthen the public 
perception of corporate legitimacy and could enhance corporate image. 
The public may value an entity and consider it more transparent and 
accountable if it has a CSR committee. Such a committee could serve as a 
mediator among different stakeholder groups and it could also act as an 
assisting, monitoring and supervising mechanism to better ensure that 
companies have well addressed CSR issues─including external 
communication. Moreover, a CSR committee is typically has responsibility 
forseveral functions: defining and implementing the environmental 
management system; coordinating the dissemination and implementation 
of environmental and sustainability policies; ensuring ongoing dialogue 
and involvement with stakeholders; and responding to stakeholder 
information requests regarding company sustainability policies and 
initiatives. 
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6.4 Implications 
The findings of this thesis offer insights into corporate social responsibility 
disclosure global practices in the international arena. This section 
highlights the key implications of this thesis in the light of the choice of 
theoretical framework. It also compares these results to results obtained in 
past studies.  
 
This thesis suggests that legitimacy theory is helpful in explaining the 
motivations of companies providing corporate social responsibility 
disclosure (CSRD). Legitimacy theory is based on the notion that 
organisations seek to ensure that they are operating within the bounds 
and norms of their respective societies (Deegan 2002; Islam and Deegan 
2008). This provides important insights about how legitimacy theory can 
be applied to explain variations of CSRD across jurisdictions. It does this 
by showing that type of industry, the presence of a voluntary assurance 
statement, jurisdictional business systems, and the presence of a CSR 
committee explain the variation of CSRD across companies.  
 
This study indicates that firm size is not a significant predictor of the extent 
of corporate social responsibility disclosure. Legitimacy theory predicts 
that firm size will affect the firm’s visibility to the general public and will 
tend to create increased public scrutiny (Cormier, Magnan and Van 
Velthoven 2005; Aerts and Cormier 2009). The result is consistent with 
Van Staden and Hooks (2007), who suggests that firm size might not 
impact CSRD practices. The implication of this finding is that future studies 
might consider redefining firm size by revising the measurement of political 
visibility, for example, the firm size variable might be remeasured by a 
relative size proxy (e.g. a company’s market capitalization divided by the 
market capitalization of its entire stock exchange). Such a measure might 
better reflect the national impact and influence of any one company. 
 
  
181 
 
The positive significant relationship between industry type and the extent 
of corporate social responsibility disclosure implies that high-profile 
industries have a stronger commitment to externally communicate their 
CSR activities than do low-profile industries. More sensitive companies 
have more potential pressure from stakeholder groups. From a legitimacy 
perspective, the main reason high-profile industries choose to disclose 
more of their CSR activities is to improve their accountability and visibility 
and to enhance their corporate image.  
 
The results of this thesis imply that regulatory bodies should try to get low-
profile industries to provide more CSR information. Regulatory measures 
may be necessary to ensure all companies agree to implement GRI-style 
guidelines and to ensure that implementation is uniform for all industries. 
Given there are no mandatory requirements for any industry to disclose all 
six themes of CSR information, regulators and the accounting profession 
should at the very least strongly encourage further voluntary CSRD to 
enhance transparency and accountability. Professional education may be 
a vehicle for such persuasive pursuits. 
 
This thesis also shows that the presence of a voluntary assurance 
statement is helpful in explaining the extent of CSRD. This finding is 
consistent with Moroney, Windsor and Aw (2011). Legitimacy theory 
tenets suggest that the presence of a voluntary assurance statement can 
enhance a company’s image by providing highly credible sustainability 
reports. This thesis confirms this to be the case. 
 
To enhance credibility reports, this thesis offers a suggestion for regulatory 
bodies and the accounting and auditing professions. These groups can 
play a more active role in helping to increase public confidence in their 
competency and legitimacy as high-quality assurance providers for such 
non-traditional communication (Deegan, Cooper and Shelly 2006; Simnett, 
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Vanstraelen and Chua 2009). For example, bodies such as the 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), GRI, and 
the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) could evolve 
developing specific global standards for assurance in sustainability 
reports. Such standards would lead to higher levels of reliability, 
comparability, and homogeneity of current assurance practices. As 
sustainability report assurance activities are an important aspect in 
enhancing transparency and accountability of companies, there is a need 
for further research in this area. 
 
This thesis notes that emerging market countries are now leading the 
reporting of CSR issues. Past studies show that communitarian countries 
(such as many of the continental European countries) are more likely to 
disclose CSR information than are Anglo-American (see Section 2.5.4). 
Taking account of jurisdictional business systems is particularly important 
for understanding global CSRD. This thesis gives new insights, by 
employing legitimacy theory to better explain the differences in levels of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure across jurisdictions. Consistent 
with legitimacy theory, the findings of this thesis suggest that emerging 
market countries use CSRD as a way to create a positive image which 
may help them obtain funds from foreign direct investment or overseas 
private and institutional finance. 
 
The implication of this thesis is that there is a need for further research to 
explain the importance of jurisdictional business systems in differing 
disclosure practices across jurisdictions. The findings of this thesis could 
be complemented by qualitative research into why emerging market 
companies are currently leading in communicating of CSR themes. For 
instance, the role of initiative bodies, the influence of governments, other 
stakeholders, and culture could be explored in the different locations. A 
practical implication of this thesis is that organisations such as the 
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International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) should consider 
developing legislations and guidelines in order to harmonize corporate 
social responsibility disclosure practices across countries. 
 
This thesis notes that the presence of a CSR committee is related to the 
extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure. From a theoretical 
viewpoint, this result provides support for the argument developed by 
Adams (2002) related to the role of internal contextual factors influencing 
the extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure. CSR committees 
are established to manage issues related to CSR activities. They also 
have responsibility for controlling how CSR activities impact other 
business’ activities (Mallin and Michelon 2011). By placing a CSR 
committee at the board or executive level, companies might better address 
the strategic CSR issues such as environmental management, reporting, 
community involvement and other issues. A CSR committee can also be 
seen as a means of dealing with stakeholders and addressing the 
legitimacy gap (Michelon and Parbonetti 2010). It can also acts as a 
vehicle for communication between companies and their stakeholder 
groups. 
 
From the perspectives of legitimacy theory, the presence of a CSR 
committee could be viewed as a positive signal to stakeholders about the 
company’s concern and commitment of companies involving in CSR 
activities. Such concern and commitment enhances a company’s 
reputation. Stakeholders might feel the presence of a CSR committee 
demonstrates greater accountability and sound and transparent good 
corporate governance practices. 
 
The implications of this thesis point to promising avenues of research. 
Academic researchers should further explore the role of a CSR committee 
in influencing the process of corporate social responsibility reporting. The 
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degree to which the presence of a CSR committee affects corporate social 
responsibility disclosure needs to be analysed in more detail, beyond the 
distinction of CSR committee structure (see Table 4.12). The level of 
independence in making CSR decisions may differ between CSR 
commitees formed under the control of board of directors and those that 
are under the executive committee. From a practical point of view, these 
findings offer insights to governance standard setters or regulators 
concerning the role of a CSR committee in enhancing the credibility of 
sustainability reports. 
 
This thesis shows that the control variables, namely leverage and 
profitability, do not significantly influence the extent of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure, but do partially affects specific themes of CSRD. 
The evidence shows that leverage is not as a determinant of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure, a result that is consistent with several prior 
CSRD studies (see for example Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Cahaya, Porter 
and Brown 2008; Reverte 2009). The insignificant relationship between 
leverage and CSRD indicates leverage (as proxy of creditors pressure) is 
not sufficient to compel companies to disclose more CSR data.  
 
This thesis notes that profitability does not significantly influence corporate 
social responsibility disclosure,a finding that supports a number of past 
studies (see for example Cowen, Ferreri and Parker 1987; Hackston and 
Milne 1996; Branco and Rodrigues 2008; Cahaya, Porter and Brown 2008; 
Aerts and Cormier 2009; Reverte 2009). Arguably, the results of this thesis 
imply that economic performance is not a key factor that determines 
corporate social responsibility activities. Therefore, the argument that 
corporate social responsibility disclosure is not mainly driven by economic 
factors is supported (Ho and Taylor 2007). This result is also consistent 
with William’s finding (1999) that CSRD may be more closely associated 
with public pressure rather than economic pressure. One implication of 
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this finding is need for future research to consider a longitudinal study 
approach. As argued by McGuire et al. (1988) and Purushothaman et al. 
(2000) as cited by Cahaya, Porter and Brown (2008), the association 
between economic performance and CSRD may exist over a longer time 
period.  
 
Overall, this thesis highlights that the extent of corporate social 
responsibility (CSRD) is linked to industry type, the presence of voluntary 
assurance statement, jurisdictional business systems, and the presence of 
CSR committee. The findings of this thesis have implications for and offer 
insights to both academic researchers and regulatory bodies.  
 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter highlights the results of this thesis in relation to the extent of 
CSRD. The thesis finds that on average the extent of global corporate 
social responsibility disclosure is at a relatively medium level (56.8 
percent). The variation of the extent of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure can be explained by industry type, the presence of a voluntary 
assurance statement, jurisdictional business systems, and the presence of 
a CSR committee. Size is not found to influence the extent of CSRD. In 
aggregate, these results suggest that legitimacy theory can help predict 
the extent of CSRD practices in the international arena.  
 
The final chapter provides a summary of this thesis and makes further 
recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY OF CSR COMMUNICATION 
 
7.0 Overview of the Study 
The primary objective of this study is to provide comparative evidence 
about the corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) practices of 
companies around the world. This thesis empirically investigates company 
characteristics, the presence of a voluntary assurance statement, 
institutional factors and internal context variables that determine the extent 
of corporate social responsibility disclosure. The specific factors that have 
been examined are firm size, industry type, the presence of a voluntary 
assurance statement, jurisdictional business systems, and the presence of 
a CSR committee. Legitimacy theory is employed, because it offers a 
useful framework for explaining what motivates companies that provide 
CSRD.   
 
The sample set of this thesis is 460 sustainability reports for 2009, taken 
from from 44 diverse countries. These reports are obtained from the 
Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) website. Sustainability reports are 
chosen as the focus because they provide more comprehensive about 
information sustainability than annual reports do. Thus, this thesis 
captures and analyzes the extent of companies’ communication of 
sustainability information in their reports from a thoroughly global 
perspective. 
 
The dependent variable of this thesis is the extent of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure, measured by a dichotomous equally weighted 
index based upon 79 key GRI checklist items. Descriptive analysis, 
univariate analysis and multivariate regression tests are employed to 
examine the relationship between dependent, independent, and control 
variables. 
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7.1 The Main Findings 
Table 7.1 presents the key research questions and important findings 
about the extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) 
practices, based on the results of the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Table 7.1 Summary: Thesis Findings 
Research Questions Thesis Findings Relevant 
Thesis 
Section 
What is the extent of 
CSRD across the 
sample? 
Overall the extent of CSRD is  56.8%. The 
highest disclosed theme by companies is labour 
practices and decent works (66.4%), followed by 
economic (60.2%), society (57.1%), 
environmental (56.8%), human rights (49.0%), 
and product responsibility (46.0%) themes. 
4.2 
What company 
characteristic, the 
presence of a voluntary 
assurance statement, 
institutional, and internal 
factors explain CSRD 
communication? 
Four statistically significant predictor variables 
explain the extent of CSRD: industry type, the 
presence of a voluntary assurance statement, 
jurisdictional business systems, and the 
presence of a CSR committee.. 
5.4 
 
The results of this study indicate that the level of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure (CSRD) is moderate (56.8 percent). In order of 
most- to least-reported the six CSRD themes are as follows: labour 
practices (66.4 percent), followed by economic (60.2 percent), society 
(57.1 percent), environmental (56.8 percent), human rights (49.0 percent), 
and product responsibility themes (46.0 percent) respectively (see Table 
4.2 and Figure 4.1).  
 
This thesis does not find any statistical relationship between firm size and 
the extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure (see Table 5.8). 
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This finding differs from most prior studies. The reason for this statistically 
insignificant result may be that the sample of this thesis is dominated by 
very large global companies. The result suggests that the size of these 
very large companies is insufficiently different from each other to affect 
their level of corporate social responsibility disclosure. Hence, hypothesis 
1 is rejected.  
 
The industry type and the presence of a voluntary assurance statement 
are found to be key predictors in explaining the extent of CSRD (see Table 
5.8). High-profile industries are more likely to produce CSRD 
communication. Legitimacy theory posits that this is in order to improve 
their accountability and visibility. The companies that have a voluntary 
assurance statement in their sustainability reports also provide higher 
corporate social responsibility disclosure. Legitimacy theory tenets explain 
that this is to increase stakeholder and user confidence in the quality, 
clarity, and reliability of the corporate social responsibility information. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are therefore accepted. 
 
The extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure communication is 
also influenced by the jurisdictional business systems and the presence of 
a CSR committee (see Table 5.8). More specifically, companies from the 
emerging market jurisdiction have the highest CSRD followed by 
communitarian and Anglo-American countries. This may reflect a changing 
world order. Companies in emerging market countries may now be placing 
greater emphasis on CSRD to better address stakeholder groups’ 
expectations, in order to attract more global capital and build successful 
business images. This thesis also finds that the presence of a CSR 
committee affects the extent of CSRD. The impact of such a committee 
suggests that it is seen as an effective monitoring device that prompts 
companies to demonstrate greater accountability, commitment and 
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transparency in corporate social responsibility disclosure. Consequently, 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 are accepted. 
 
7.2 Contributions of Thesis 
There are several key contributions of this thesis. First, the findings of the 
thesis support the use of legitimacy theory to interpret and explain 
companies’ motivations for providing corporate social responsibility 
disclosure (CSRD). Using legitimacy theory, this thesis provides insights 
into why companies which may significantly effect their communities and 
multiple stakeholders demonstrate greater accountability and transparency 
by increasing CSRD to better meet stakeholders’ expectations.  
 
Second, this thesis provides insights into the corporate social 
responsibility disclosure practices of 460 companies around the world. By 
using such a rich data set 44 diverse countries with different jurisdictional 
business systems, this thesis captures current global corporate social 
responsibility disclosure practices, rather than merely looking at the CSRD 
of companies in a single jurisdiction. 
 
Third, this thesis explores the role of additional voluntary assurance 
reports and their influence on the perceived credibility of sustainability 
reports. It also examines the presence of a CSR committee, a variable that 
has rarely been investigated in previous studies. The result of the thesis 
shows that the presence of a voluntary assurance statement in 
sustainability reports affects the extent of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure. Companies seem to adopt assurance services to enhance the 
quality of disclosure in sustainability reports. The thesis’s findings also 
suggest that the presence of a CSR committee is an effective monitoring 
device for controlling the extent to which companies disclose CSRD for 
stakeholder groups. 
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A further contribution of this thesis is the identification of sustainability 
reports as a valuable source for capturing and analysing the corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) information. The thesis also contributes to a 
fuller comprehension of the details companies provide in sustainability 
reports. The results of this thesis indicate that the extent of CSRD in 
sustainability reports is moderate with just over half of the GRI 
recommended items communicated on average.  
 
Finally, this thesis focuses on important themes of CSR, whereas, most of 
the previous studies ofcorporate social responsibility disclosure measure 
only specific themes. Six dimensions of CSR are measured in this thesis, 
namely economic, environmental, labour practices and decent work, 
human rights, society, and product responsibility. A focus on only one or 
some themes of corporate social responsibility disclosure is not sufficient 
as stakeholder groups require comprehensive information about 
company’s interactions with communities, employees, customers, 
government, and the public. By exploring the whole set of CSRD issues, 
this study provides better insights into the key CSR dimensions that are 
communicated by large companies. 
 
7.3 Future Research Suggestions 
Several limitations to this thesis need to be noted. This thesis has taken a 
cross-sectional approach in measuring the extent of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure practices. Below are some suggestions for future 
research. First, further understanding of CSRD could be obtained by using 
a longitudinal data set. A longitudinal study could capture the changes of 
companies’ economic performance in different economic conditions over 
time and the impact these changes have on corporate social responsibility 
disclosure practices.  
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Second, other more qualitatively-oriented research techniques could be 
employed to obtain interview and focus group style data from key senior 
corporate managers. Such techniques could obtain valuable evidence 
about the constraints and incentives of these managers to communicate 
social information. Such qualitative techniques could gain an in-depth 
understanding of the motivations underlying company managers’ 
decisions about whether or not to communicate corporate social 
responsibility disclosure. 
 
Third, further investigation is recommended to consider other mediums of 
reporting, such as companies’ websites. Due to the rapid change in 
internet reporting around the world, it is suggested that future studies 
examine corporate social responsibility disclosure via website analysis.  
 
Fourth, this study could be expanded by exploring corporate social 
responsibility disclosure in other settings, such as private companies, 
public sector bodies, not-for-profits, or non-government organisations 
(NGOs). Cormier and Gordon (2001) argue that ownership type is a key 
variable affecting the prevalence of CSRD. Publicly owned firms may or 
may not face greater pressures to disclose CSR than privately owned 
firms or NGOs, due to higher visibility and accountability expectations from 
large stakeholders. Examining the extent of CSRD of public and other 
entities, would offer a broader basis for testing legitimacy theory in 
differently structured entities.  
 
Fifth, the findings in this thesis indicate that firm size, which was measured 
by number of employees and total assets is not a predictor of the extent of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure. Future studies need to consider 
different or better measures of firm visibility when using a global data 
base. An example would be relative size (i.e. market capitalization divided 
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by total market capitalization of country stock exchange), which may be a 
better measure for firm visibility for international studies. 
 
Finally, this thesis could be extended by further analysing the influence of 
other predictor variables, such as media pressure, on corporate social 
responsibility disclosure practices. Islam and Deegan (2010) note that the 
media influences community concerns and CSRD practice.  
 
7.4 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis explores corporate social responsibility issues by generating 
important large-scale evidence about contemporary corporate social 
responsibility disclosure practices. It also examines factors that influence 
disclosures in 460 globally prominent companies across 44 diverse 
countries. Unlike the majority of past studies, which have focused solely 
on annual reports, this thesis uses the more contemporary stand-alone 
sustainability reports as the media to provide a better understanding of 
sustainability information.  
 
The findings of this thesis have made a significant contribution to the 
literature in several ways. First, the results of the thesis supports the 
application of legitimacy theory to interpret the motivations of large global 
companies for providingcorporate social responsibility disclosure. Second, 
type of industry, the presence of a voluntary assurance statement, 
jurisdictional business systems, and the presence of a CSR committee are 
given as important explanatory factors that influence the extent of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure.  
 
The above variables are powerful predictors of the motivations of global 
companies to provide corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD). 
For instance, this thesis more closely investigates the importance of 
jurisdictional business systems as a determinant of the extent of CSRD 
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practices.The findings are mostly consistent with previous studies. 
However, important new insights regarding the prominence of emerging 
market companies are uncovered. Also highlighted are the notable 
influence on CSRD of voluntary assurance and the presence of a CSR 
committee. 
 
Overall, the empirical findings of this thesis contribute valuable further 
development of insights into corporate social responsibility disclosure 
practices. They make possible for the community and the business and 
accounting professions a better understanding of CSR communication. 
The findings of this thesis can also be used to inform policies that motivate 
companies to disclose more corporate social responsibility information 
worldwide. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Core and Additional Performance Indicators 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 the GRI (2006) performance 
indicators consists of 79 indicators. These 79 indicators are further 
categorized into core and additional performance indicators. According to 
the GRI (2006), core performance indicators are assumed to be material 
for most organisations. An organisation should report core indicators 
unless they are deemed not material on the basis of the GRI Reporting 
Principles. Whereas, additional indicators represent emerging practice that 
may be material for some organisation, but are not necessarily material for 
others. Said differently core indicators are deemed to be essential items. 
Whereas, additional items may be less crucial. Table A.1 lists all the GRI 
core and additional indicators. 
 
 
Table A.1 Core and Additional Performance Indicators* 
ECONOMIC 
Category GRI code Indicator 
Economic 
Performance 
EC1-CORE Direct economic value generated and 
distributed, including revenues, 
operating costs, employee 
compensation, donations and other 
community investments, retained 
earnings, and payments to capital 
providers and governments.  
 EC2-CORE Financial implications and other risks, 
and opportunities for the organization’s 
activities due to climate change. 
 EC3-CORE Coverage of the organization’s defined 
benefit plan obligations. 
 EC4-CORE Significant financial assistance received 
from government. 
Market 
Presence 
EC5-ADD Range of ratios of standard entry level 
of wage compare to local minimum 
wage at significant locations of 
operation. 
 EC6-CORE Policy, practices, and proportion of 
spending on locally-based suppliers at 
significant locations of operation. 
 EC7-CORE Procedures for local hiring and 
proportion of senior management hired 
from community at significant locations 
of operation. 
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Indirect 
Economic 
Impact 
EC8-CORE Development and impact of 
infrastructure investments and services 
provided primarily for public benefit 
through commercial, in-kind or pro bono 
engagement. 
 EC9-ADD Understanding and describing 
significant indirect economic impacts, 
including the extent of impacts. 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
Category GRI code Indicator 
Materials EN1-CORE Materials used by weight or volume. 
 EN2-CORE Percentage of materials used that they 
are recycled input materials. 
Energy EN3-CORE Direct energy consumption by primary 
energy source. 
 EN4-CORE Indirect energy consumption by primary 
source. 
 EN5-ADD Energy saved due to conservation and 
efficiency improvements. 
 EN6-ADD Initiatives to provide energy-efficient or 
renewable energy-based products and 
services and reduction in energy 
requirements as a result of these 
initiatives. 
 EN7-ADD Initiatives to reduce indirect energy 
consumption and reductions achieved. 
Water EN8-CORE Total water withdrawal by source. 
 EN9-ADD Water sources significantly affected by 
withdrawal of water. 
 EN10-ADD Percentage and total volume of water 
recycled and reused. 
Biodiversity EN11-
CORE 
Location and size of land owned, 
leased, managed in, or adjacent to, 
protected areas and areas of high 
biodiversity value outside protected 
areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
EN12-
CORE 
Description of significant impacts of 
activities, products, and services on 
biodiversity in protected areas and 
areas of high biodiversity value outside 
protected areas. 
 EN13-ADD Habitats protected or restored. 
 
 
 
EN14-ADD Strategies, current actions and future 
plans for managing impacts on 
biodiversity. 
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Category GRI code Indicator 
 EN15-ADD Number of IUCN Red List species and 
national conservation list species with 
habitats in areas affected by operations, 
by level of extinction risk. 
Emissions, 
Effluents and 
Waste 
 
 
 
EN16-
CORE 
Total direct and indirect greenhouse 
gas emissions by weight. 
EN17-
CORE 
Other relevant indirect greenhouse gas 
emissions by weight. 
EN18-ADD Initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and reduction achieved. 
Category GRI code Indicator 
 EN19-
CORE 
Emissions of ozone-depleting 
substances by weight. 
 EN20-
CORE 
NO, SO and other significant air 
emission by type and weight. 
 EN21-
CORE 
Total water discharge by quality and 
destination. 
 EN22-
CORE 
Total weight of waste by type and 
disposal method. 
 EN23-
CORE 
Total number and volume of significant 
spills. 
 EN24-ADD Weight of transported, imported, 
exported or treated waste deemed 
hazardous, under the terms of the 
Basel Convention Annex I,II,III and IV, 
and percentage of transported waste 
shipped internationally. 
 EN25-ADD Identity, size, protected status and 
biodiversity value of water bodies and 
related habitats significantly affected by 
the reporting organization’s discharge 
of water and runoff. 
Product and 
Services 
EN26-
CORE 
Initiatives to mitigate environmental 
impacts of products and services, and 
extent of impact mitigation. 
 
 
EN27-
CORE 
Percentage of products sold and their 
packaging materials that are reclaimed 
by category. 
Compliance EN28-
CORE 
Monetary value of significant fines and 
total number of non-monetary sanctions 
for non compliance with environmental 
laws and regulations. 
Transport EN29-ADD Significant environmental impacts of 
transporting products and other goods 
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and materials used for the organization’s 
operations, and transporting members of 
the workforce. 
Overall EN30-ADD Total environmental protection 
expenditures and investments by type. 
LABOUR PRACTICES & DECENT WORK 
Category GRI code Indicator 
Employment LA1-CORE Total workforce by employment type, 
employment contract and region. 
 LA2-CORE Total number and rate of employee 
turnover by age group, gender and 
region. 
 LA3-ADD Benefits provided to full-time employees 
that are not provided to temporary or 
part-time employees, by major 
operations. 
Labour/ 
Management 
Relations 
LA4-CORE Percentage of employees covered by 
collective bargaining agreements. 
LA5-CORE Minimum notice period (s) regarding 
significant operational changes, 
including whether it is specified in 
collective agreements. 
Occupational 
Health and 
Safety 
LA6-ADD Percentage of total workforce 
represented in formal joint management-
worker health and safety committees 
that help monitor and advice on 
occupational health and safety 
programs. 
 LA7-CORE Rates of injury, occupational diseases, 
lost days, and absteineism, and total 
number of work-related fatalities by 
region. 
 LA8-CORE Education, training, counselling, 
prevention, and risk-control programs in 
place to assists workforce members, 
their families, or community members 
regarding serious diseases. 
 LA9-ADD Health and safety topics covered in 
formal agreements with trade unions.  
Training and 
Education 
LA10-
CORE 
Average hours of training per year per 
employee by employee category. 
 
 
 
 
 
LA11-ADD Program for skills management and 
lifelong learning that support the 
continued employability of employees 
and assists them in managing career 
endings. 
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 LA12-ADD Percentage of employees receiving 
regular performance and career 
development reviews. 
Diversity and 
Equal 
Opportunity 
LA13-
CORE 
Composition of governance bodies and 
breakdown of employees per category 
according to gender, age, group, 
minority group membership, and other 
indicators of diversity. 
 LA14-
CORE 
Ratio of basic salary of men to women 
by employee category. 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Category GRI code Indicator 
Investment and 
Procurement 
Practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HR1-CORE Percentage and total number of 
significant investment agreements that 
include human rights clauses or that 
have undergone human rights 
screening. 
HR2-CORE Percentage of significant suppliers and 
contractors that have undergone 
screening on human rights and actions 
taken. 
HR3-ADD 
 
 
Total hours of employee’s trainings on 
policies and procedures concerning 
aspects of human rights that are relevant 
to operations, including the percentage 
of employees trained. 
Non-
discriminant 
HR4-CORE Total number of incidents of 
discriminations and actions taken. 
Freedom of 
Association and 
collective 
bargaining 
HR5-CORE Operations identified in which the right to 
exercise freedom of association and 
collective bargaining may be at 
significant risk, and actions taken to 
support these rights. 
Child Labour HR6-CORE Operations identified as having 
significant risk for incidents of child 
labour, and measures taken to 
contribute to the elimination of child 
labour. 
Forced and 
Compulsory 
Labour 
HR7-CORE Operations identified as having 
significant risk for incidents of force or 
compulsory labour, and measures taken 
to contribute to the elimination of forced 
or compulsory labour. 
Security 
Practices 
HR8-ADD Percentage of security personal trained 
in the organization’s policies or 
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procedures concerning aspects of 
human rights that are relevant to 
operations. 
Indigenous 
Rights 
HR9-ADD Total number of incidents of violations 
involving rights of indigenous people and 
actions taken. 
SOCIETY 
Category GRI code Indicator 
Community SO1-CORE Nature, scope, and effectiveness of any 
programs, and practices that asses and 
manager the impact of operations on 
communicates, including entering, 
operating, and existing. 
Corruption SO2-CORE Percentage and total number of 
business units analysed for risks related 
to corruption. 
 
 
 
SO3-
CORE 
Percentage of employees trained in 
organization’s anti-corruption policies and 
procedures. 
 SO4-
CORE 
Actions taken in response to incidents of 
corruption. 
Public Policy SO5-
CORE 
Public policy positions and participation 
in public policy development and 
lobbying. 
 SO6-ADD Total value of financial and in-kind 
contributions to political parties, 
politicians, and related institutions by 
country. 
Anti-Competitive 
Behaviour 
SO7-ADD Total number of legal actions for anti 
competitive behaviour, antitrust, and 
monopoly practices and their outcomes. 
Compliance SO8-
CORE 
Monetary value of significant fines and 
total number of non monetary sanctions 
for non compliance with laws and 
regulations. 
PRODUCT RESPONSIBILITY 
Category GRI code Indicator 
Customer Health 
and Safety 
PR1-CORE Life cycle stages in which health and 
safety impacts of products and services 
are assessed for improvement, and 
percentage of significant products and 
services categories subject to such 
procedures 
PR2-ADD Total number of incidents of non-
compliance with regulations and 
voluntary codes concerning health and 
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safety impacts of products and 
services, by type of outcomes. 
Product and 
Service 
Labelling 
PR3-CORE Type of product and service information 
required by procedures and percentage 
of significant products and services 
subject to such information 
requirements. 
PR4-ADD Total number of incidents of non-
compliance with regulations and 
voluntary codes concerning product 
and services information and labelling, 
by type of outcomes. 
PR5-ADD Practices related to customer 
satisfaction, including results of surveys 
measuring customer satisfaction. 
Marketing 
Communications 
PR6-CORE Program for adherence to laws, 
standards and voluntary codes related 
to marketing communications, including 
advertising, promotion, and 
sponsorship. 
PR7-ADD Total number of incident of non-
compliance with regulations and 
voluntary codes concerning marketing 
communications, including advertising, 
promotion, and sponsorship, by type of 
outcomes. 
Customer 
Privacy 
PR8-ADD Total number of substantiated 
complaints regarding breaches of 
customer privacy and losses of 
customer data. 
Compliance PR9-CORE Monetary value of significant fines for 
non-compliance with laws and 
regulations concerning the provision 
and use of products and services. 
Source: GRI (2006) 
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Appendix B: Independent Sample T-test for Assurance Provider 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.8 the sustainability reports’ 
assurance provider can be categorised into two types. Some sustainability 
reports are assured by the auditing entities. Yet, others are assured by  
non-auditing profession. Table B-1 presents the result of the independent 
sample t-test for the 212 firms in the sample that had voluntary assurance. 
Whilst, audit firm assurance providers are linked to a slightly higher CSRD 
mean (68.3% as compared to 64.8%), there is no statistically significant 
difference regarding the extent of CSRD between both types of assurance 
provider (p-value=.269). 
 
Table B-1 Independent Sample T-test for Assurance Provider 
 
CSRD Assuranc
e Provider 
N Mea
n 
Levene’s Test 
for Equality 
Variances 
t-test for Equality 
Means 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
    F Sig. T     Sig.   
 
 
 
Audit Firm 
 
Non Audit 
Firm 
113 
 
99 
68.3 
 
64.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not assumed 
5.735 0.018 
 
1.109 
1.098 
0.269 
0.274 
0.03506 
0.03193 
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Appendix C: Independent Sample T-test for the CSR  
Committee Structure 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4 Table 4.13). The structure of CSR committee 
can be further categorised into two categories. First, a CSR committee can 
be formed under the board of directors’ control. The committee in this 
scenario has the responsibility to report all CSR affairs to the board. In the 
second scenario, a CSR committee is a part of the executive. The 
committee has responsibility to assist executive concerning CSR issues.  
 
Table C-1 shows the result of independent sample t-tests. The test 
examines the difference of the extent CSRD in sustainability reports 
between companies which have the CSR committee structured under the 
board (average CSRD score of 69.2%) and executive (average score of 
66.6%). The result indicates that there is no statistically significant 
difference in the level of CSRD between both of them (p-value=.577). 
 
Table C.1 Independent Sample T-test for CSR Committee Structure 
 
CSRD CSR 
Committee 
N Mean Levene’s Test for 
Equality Variances 
t-test for Equality Means Mean 
Difference 
    F Sig. T Sig.   
 
 
 
Board 
 
Executive 
85 
 
32 
69.2 
 
66.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equal variances assumed 
Equal variances not assumed 
0.075 0.784 .560 
.577 
0.577 
0.566 
0.025795 
0.025795 
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Appendix D: Outliers 
 
Table D.1 provides the results of outlier tests by using Mahalanobis and 
Cook’s Distance scores. As mentioned in Chapter 5 Section 5.2 that with 
eight degrees of freedom and .001 level of confidence, the maximum 
Mahalanobis scores are 26.12 for the detection of possible outliers. Based 
on the Mahalanobis scores, Table D.1 shows three possible cases there 
are three observation exceed 26.12, these are observation number 17, 
140, and 400 (see shaded areas in Table D.1). Thus, additional regression 
analysis is conducted (with and without outliers). Concerning the Cook’s 
Distance score, the result show that all observations have Cook’s Distance 
less than 1. Thus, there is no outlier observations using this techniques. 
The extra regression in Appendix E reveals no fundamental difference in 
the statistical results (with or without outliers). Therefore, the full sample is 
used for the prime thesis analysis. 
 
 
Table D.1 Mahalanobis and Cook’s Distance Scores 
Obs Mahalanobis  Cook’s  Obs Mahalanobis  Cook’s  Obs Mahalanobis  Cook’s  
1 8.33052 0.00037 156 4.07401 0.00022 311 6.48042 0.00234 
2 7.72468 0.00006 157 4.24602 0.00271 312 9.62483 0.00005 
3 12.56084 0.00061 158 8.60977 0.00442 313 6.68537 0.00056 
4 5.42199 0.00237 159 6.54150 0.00040 314 6.41885 0.00598 
5 7.44142 0.00441 160 20.44737 0.00070 315 11.09768 0.00052 
6 18.42898 0.00694 161 12.64011 0.00335 316 6.24239 0.00501 
7 7.35314 0.00182 162 13.87501 0.00182 317 5.35596 0.00295 
8 5.74621 0.00326 163 6.49790 0.00003 318 3.82327 0.00107 
9 5.23854 0.00067 164 7.33096 0.00100 319 6.81264 0.00090 
10 13.02241 0.00206 165 10.13806 0.00711 320 3.85068 0.00025 
11 3.98481 0.00079 166 11.59160 0.00132 321 5.41800 0.00555 
12 17.89081 0.00009 167 9.13217 0.00082 322 24.12239 0.00013 
13 7.49963 0.00344 168 9.22941 0.00168 323 5.41026 0.00006 
14 10.11118 0.00538 169 11.66099 0.00803 324 4.56399 0.00178 
15 5.32444 0.00063 170 7.01764 0.00598 325 4.85948 0.00414 
16 25.15208 0.00013 171 8.56016 0.00432 326 5.64202 0.00029 
17 28.97576 0.00115 172 10.79631 0.00010 327 5.70102 0.00038 
18 7.49054 0.00012 173 6.18603 0.00014 328 4.23048 0.00226 
19 11.35860 0.00272 174 6.33261 0.00241 329 3.77227 0.00034 
20 17.69874 0.00108 175 4.58306 0.00051 330 6.28684 0.00869 
21 5.25797 0.00291 176 6.08566 0.00027 331 3.54408 0.00015 
22 7.87617 0.00547 177 4.86653 0.00132 332 5.93643 0.00195 
23 12.55859 0.00490 178 5.69023 0.00021 333 7.20232 0.00000 
24 8.57728 0.00412 179 6.70282 0.00164 334 4.54135 0.00182 
25 7.42802 0.00223 180 4.26807 0.00094 335 7.56378 0.00419 
26 8.03313 0.00028 181 3.91325 0.00003 336 7.07471 0.00402 
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27 4.26926 0.00220 182 7.45212 0.00083 337 4.67212 0.00061 
28 12.48657 0.00225 183 3.77219 0.00090 338 5.14706 0.00190 
29 4.56322 0.00040 184 5.50371 0.00070 339 8.17605 0.00037 
30 12.28639 0.00002 185 3.30893 0.00193 340 13.87875 0.00189 
31 3.93239 0.00000 186 3.67258 0.00074 341 8.72223 0.00000 
32 5.43267 0.00018 187 4.15141 0.00073 342 11.58674 0.00001 
33 7.71233 0.00135 188 5.82894 0.00035 343 6.10059 0.00026 
34 4.90873 0.00090 189 7.20643 0.00202 344 6.74745 0.00004 
35 5.28861 0.00241 190 6.64774 0.00019 345 7.90647 0.00097 
36 5.86860 0.00025 191 7.38080 0.00089 346 16.04999 0.00588 
37 8.03658 0.00001 192 9.42797 0.00004 347 6.70566 0.00036 
38 6.81777 0.00265 193 9.02216 0.00037 348 6.82049 0.00076 
39 4.49918 0.00008 194 5.61298 0.00245 349 10.15841 0.00002 
40 10.99444 0.00729 195 8.55951 0.00292 350 5.99498 0.00138 
41 14.96842 0.00138 196 6.66605 0.00050 351 5.98566 0.00033 
42 12.04352 0.00118 197 9.91918 0.00065 352 7.07445 0.00089 
43 7.94979 0.00147 198 9.75430 0.00333 353 23.75771 0.00397 
44 11.92581 0.00050 199 4.02265 0.00044 354 8.49095 0.00131 
45 16.55500 0.00096 200 8.14174 0.00051 355 8.73466 0.00084 
46 10.13598 0.00004 201 8.63876 0.00040 356 12.15580 0.01344 
47 6.78857 0.00565 202 4.77165 0.00000 357 8.35184 0.00134 
48 8.21077 0.00409 203 8.72745 0.00179 358 4.18652 0.00213 
49 19.25874 0.00272 204 9.62391 0.00004 359 9.13922 0.00593 
50 7.51678 0.00002 205 5.57686 0.00000 360 8.69875 0.00002 
51 10.08766 0.00185 206 7.20798 0.00077 361 6.42786 0.00913 
52 6.90563 0.00290 207 9.57078 0.00270 362 6.90702 0.00018 
53 4.67563 0.00073 208 6.11927 0.00000 363 9.87559 0.00057 
54 19.26589 0.00933 209 7.90403 0.00009 364 8.10965 0.00823 
55 4.28636 0.00021 210 10.94707 0.00405 365 6.07076 0.00042 
56 9.16162 0.00066 211 10.45382 0.00192 366 6.61723 0.00224 
57 11.37795 0.00096 212 6.97129 0.00218 367 11.51487 0.00000 
58 6.94858 0.00247 213 11.02502 0.00323 368 11.10241 0.00199 
59 8.98762 0.01383 214 8.32862 0.00002 369 5.35774 0.00890 
60 9.94695 0.01434 215 7.59915 0.00560 370 6.82315 0.00550 
61 9.13214 0.00670 216 6.76065 0.00077 371 4.68788 0.00155 
62 11.46519 0.01002 217 5.96369 0.00183 372 4.18741 0.00037 
63 10.08510 0.00247 218 6.87067 0.00016 373 4.94449 0.01038 
64 9.14912 0.00646 219 11.41618 0.00702 374 11.16748 0.00488 
65 6.77168 0.00138 220 4.64964 0.00084 375 8.46499 0.00194 
66 9.78923 0.00073 221 5.14925 0.00191 376 6.95999 0.00017 
67 7.22210 0.00000 222 5.72850 0.00077 377 8.98495 0.00056 
68 9.97514 0.00006 223 3.81980 0.00181 378 13.42668 0.01074 
69 6.42260 0.00678 224 5.21479 0.00359 379 15.93120 0.00075 
70 15.19506 0.00811 225 7.47632 0.00195 380 6.17669 0.00154 
71 6.48531 0.00262 226 5.45073 0.00287 381 8.47172 0.00143 
72 7.76991 0.00062 227 3.97360 0.00009 382 7.43832 0.00615 
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73 6.27537 0.00031 228 5.46576 0.00043 383 4.99981 0.00001 
74 5.42242 0.00520 229 4.96238 0.00042 384 8.62611 0.00507 
75 7.40230 0.00310 230 8.84931 0.00034 385 14.46128 0.00152 
76 5.40244 0.00000 231 4.57844 0.00639 386 7.40466 0.00068 
77 7.53049 0.00123 232 5.33836 0.00213 387 7.02881 0.00428 
78 6.71557 0.00689 233 3.79698 0.00075 388 5.43081 0.00090 
79 9.20899 0.00002 234 3.80584 0.00008 389 4.71879 0.00035 
80 6.60706 0.00074 235 8.26696 0.00070 390 6.31000 0.00253 
81 11.25627 0.00297 236 9.50347 0.00203 391 4.49916 0.00969 
82 9.17638 0.00187 237 7.58584 0.00257 392 6.13808 0.00005 
83 6.43038 0.00001 238 4.68732 0.00130 393 8.80852 0.00059 
84 10.89109 0.00722 239 4.75851 0.00298 394 6.92153 0.00101 
85 11.24259 0.00036 240 4.03468 0.00003 395 5.74364 0.00484 
86 9.48367 0.00343 241 7.49017 0.00598 396 5.65911 0.00007 
87 7.90379 0.00405 242 7.17684 0.00025 397 5.88699 0.00127 
88 12.27499 0.00000 243 7.18047 0.00933 398 6.32133 0.00168 
89 7.27633 0.00889 244 7.58871 0.00250 399 5.76041 0.00094 
90 8.67102 0.00558 245 7.43527 0.00269 400 26.58879 0.00814 
91 12.00835 0.00600 246 4.71851 0.00231 401 6.01889 0.00013 
92 7.85553 0.00577 247 6.33966 0.00048 402 7.01324 0.00000 
93 10.88334 0.01031 248 10.16741 0.00046 403 9.30030 0.00183 
94 14.46973 0.00000 249 3.70709 0.00019 404 6.44219 0.00027 
95 6.10926 0.00026 250 5.11102 0.00050 405 7.68706 0.00006 
96 9.63172 0.00042 251 5.91843 0.00013 406 4.03394 0.00239 
97 10.46725 0.00645 252 5.07134 0.00021 407 8.78272 0.00531 
98 7.02513 0.00583 253 7.50546 0.00464 408 7.04222 0.00236 
99 7.11641 0.00070 254 4.09719 0.00082 409 4.72802 0.00020 
100 6.56916 0.00031 255 14.91900 0.00586 410 6.44704 0.00005 
101 6.09221 0.00195 256 9.87976 0.00000 411 8.12758 0.00676 
102 5.29583 0.00107 257 3.97211 0.00017 412 4.99167 0.00021 
103 5.79007 0.00001 258 10.98125 0.00233 413 6.73516 0.00050 
104 6.59414 0.00790 259 6.35481 0.00104 414 4.30495 0.00054 
105 12.76205 0.00415 260 6.90827 0.00056 415 11.77279 0.00326 
106 17.16384 0.00056 261 5.99681 0.00287 416 6.49619 0.00123 
107 6.78069 0.00000 262 9.94579 0.00000 417 11.35787 0.00039 
108 4.92806 0.00046 263 11.12383 0.00000 418 11.54986 0.00226 
109 4.38655 0.00031 264 6.39802 0.00105 419 5.77040 0.00466 
110 10.29391 0.00171 265 8.50584 0.00183 420 4.35134 0.00072 
111 3.35335 0.00007 266 12.88843 0.00001 421 7.04225 0.00070 
112 4.66985 0.00184 267 6.47787 0.00055 422 9.69338 0.01736 
113 7.60241 0.00313 268 9.00920 0.00069 423 8.68410 0.01476 
114 6.57811 0.00000 269 10.37781 0.00014 424 8.17309 0.00292 
115 8.58679 0.00007 270 13.75474 0.00560 425 6.99451 0.00036 
116 3.36004 0.00170 271 15.74297 0.00055 426 8.79523 0.00236 
117 6.17581 0.00225 272 11.12884 0.00318 427 7.66883 0.00049 
118 4.16463 0.00326 273 9.60657 0.00319 728 6.92431 0.00309 
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119 6.30710 0.00090 274 8.45522 0.00438 429 4.00640 0.00067 
120 7.54557 0.00043 275 12.83048 0.00012 430 6.98777 0.00160 
121 9.20517 0.00799 276 5.79126 0.00014 431 5.91901 0.00207 
122 9.44020 0.01417 277 5.22700 0.00211 432 6.75299 0.00096 
123 3.58471 0.00150 278 6.25592 0.00114 433 5.20699 0.00209 
124 8.49238 0.00077 279 6.53102 0.00051 434 6.85719 0.00393 
125 13.31431 0.00790 280 5.73081 0.00066 435 7.79710 0.00000 
126 4.57684 0.00279 281 4.24104 0.00119 436 7.56386 0.00009 
127 6.59111 0.00096 282 5.94318 0.00406 437 6.34222 0.00332 
128 7.25066 0.00021 283 4.11850 0.00218 438 5.54453 0.00029 
129 4.28537 0.00258 284 4.96058 0.00016 439 6.90303 0.00000 
130 6.64015 0.00013 285 4.03097 0.00019 440 4.06986 0.00010 
131 6.83789 0.00071 286 9.29988 0.00195 441 8.97849 0.00422 
132 5.75937 0.00001 287 6.61216 0.00001 442 6.26717 0.00075 
133 6.08089 0.00002 288 4.55947 0.00118 443 8.43782 0.00005 
134 6.40786 0.00072 289 7.77158 0.00053 444 4.94822 0.00437 
135 4.72355 0.00207 290 13.08689 0.00325 445 5.29767 0.00064 
136 5.18666 0.00047 291 9.05068 0.00191 446 8.17719 0.00098 
137 4.04996 0.00146 292 6.91780 0.00012 447 8.17256 0.00028 
138 5.34285 0.00016 293 3.77277 0.00015 448 6.19468 0.00415 
139 4.35122 0.00075 294 13.06899 0.00907 449 8.41332 0.00667 
140 109.51911 0.01927 295 6.43924 0.00008 450 8.35301 0.00277 
141 4.87116 0.00002 296 5.06555 0.00031 451 4.89016 0.00490 
142 6.91035 0.00069 297 16.54443 0.00048 452 7.26245 0.00002 
143 7.07235 0.00005 298 4.03188 0.00077 453 6.93886 0.00004 
144 4.94617 0.00008 299 8.77003 0.00038 454 10.31743 0.01518 
145 5.34666 0.00292 300 5.14262 0.00005 455 7.68214 0.00024 
146 6.55560 0.00050 301 9.03078 0.00012 456 7.36138 0.00050 
147 8.20224 0.00000 302 10.24587 0.00230 457 9.26162 0.00003 
148 9.35730 0.00008 303 4.64187 0.00258 458 4.90633 0.00135 
149 4.57924 0.00005 304 4.85361 0.00015 459 5.08863 0.00006 
150 8.55821 0.00001 305 5.07356 0.00044 460 4.61095 0.00002 
151 10.39252 0.00361 306 5.75690 0.00171 - - - 
152 5.41249 0.00128 307 5.72148 0.00055 - - - 
153 9.08844 0.00005 308 5.06369 0.00445 - - - 
154 5.71173 0.00001 309 3.82692 0.00334 - - - 
155 8.35159 0.00319 310 3.73632 0.00225 - - - 
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Appendix E: Regression Analysis with and without the outliers 
 
As stated in Chapter 5, Section 5.2) and Appendix D, extreme cases 
(outliers) may have considerable impact on the regression results and 
should be deleted or modified to reduce their influence (Coakes 2009). 
This appendix presents the results of multiple regression analysis with and 
without outliers (see Appendix D for more details). The tests are 
conducted to better assess the possible impact of outliers on regression 
results.  Appendix D highlights three possible outliers. Therefore, Table 
E.1 and E.2 regression models are run to assess possible differences with 
(Table E.1) and without (Table E.2) outliers. 
 
Table E.1: Multiple regression full sample (N = 460) 
Independent Variables  Coefficient t-value p-
value 
Constant 
Firm Size  (log employee) 
Industry Type 
Presence of Assurance 
Communitarian 
Emerging Market 
Presence of CSR 
Committee 
 
 
.358 
.007 
.046 
.170 
.042 
.068 
.060 
5.433 
.466 
2.147 
8.043 
1.708 
2.402 
2.441 
.000*** 
.641 
.032** 
.000*** 
.088* 
.017** 
.015** 
Leverage 
Profitability (ROA) 
 .047 
.046 
.867 
.270 
.387 
.787 
Adjusted R2 
F-statistic 
p-value 
N 
.165 
12.314 
.000 
460 
   
Legend: CSRD is the dependent variable. *, **, *** significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
level.  
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Table E.2: Multiple regression without outliers (N = 457) 
Independent Variables  Coefficient t-value p-
value 
Constant 
Firm Size  (log employee) 
Industry Type 
Presence of Assurance 
Communitarian 
Emerging Market 
Presence of CSR 
Committee 
 
 
.335 
.011 
.048 
.172 
.042 
.065 
.060 
4.082 
.673 
2.189 
8.129 
1.694 
2.275 
2.438 
.000*** 
.501 
.029** 
.000*** 
.091* 
.023** 
.015** 
Leverage 
Profitability (ROA) 
 .051 
.187 
.910 
.042 
.364 
.367 
Adjusted R2 
F-statistic 
p-value 
N 
.167 
12.463 
.000 
457 
   
Legend: CSRD is the dependent variable. *, **, *** significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
level.  
 
Based on the results from Tables E.1 and E.2, it can be seen that there is 
no fundamental statistical difference between the regression with (n=460) 
and without (n=457) outliers. First, all the coefficient for the predictor 
variables are similar (positive). Second, all the levels of statistical 
significances (p-value) of predictor variables do not differ before and after 
the outliers removed.  The results are virtually identical. Thus, this thesis 
uses the full sample (N = 460) in the main regression analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 F-1 
 
Appendix F: Noteable International Guidance for 
Sustainability Reporting 
 
As discussed in Chapter Six, there are some other noteable international 
guidelines concerning sustainability reporting. These are: 
F.1 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011). 
 
This guidelines include Section III on “Disclosure”, which encourages 
timely, regular, reliable and relevant disclosure on financial and non-
financial performance, including environmental and social issues 
(OECD 2011).  
 
F.2  The United Nations (UN) Global Compact  (2007). 
The UN Global Compact is the world’s largest voluntary corporate 
citizenship initiative and provides a framework for organisations that 
are committed to align their operations and strategies with 10 
principles in the areas of human rights (2 principles), labour (4 
principles), environment (3 principles), and anti-corruption (1 
principle).   
 
F.3  UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) (2007). 
UNPRI is an investor initiative in partnership with the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) Finance Initiative and the UN 
Global Compact. It consists of a set of voluntary best practice 
principles to assist investors in integrating environmental, social and 
corporate governance (ESG) issues into investment processes and 
ownership practices. The UNPRI (2007) principles are developed by 
an international institutional investor group. There are six principles 
reflecting environmental, social, and corporate governance issues. 
 
F.4  The Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) 
Principles (2010). 
The CERES (2010) principles are a model corporate code of 
environmental conduct created by the Coalition for Environmentally 
Responsible Economies (CERES), a coalition of investors, public 
pension trustees, foundations, labour unions, and environmental 
religious, and public interest groups. The CERES principles have ten-
point code of conduct and specific environmental reporting 
guidelines. These are: 
 Protection of the biosphere. 
 Sustainable of use natural resources. 
 Reduction and disposal of wastes. 
 Energy conservation. 
 Risk reduction. 
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 Safe product and services. 
 Environmental restoration. 
 Informing public. 
 Management commitment. 
 Audit reports. 
 
F.5  The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) (2010). 
The ISO 26000 is the latest standard concerning international 
guidance on Social Responsibility. The standard states that to be 
accountable an organisation should at appropriate intervals report 
significant impacts related to social responsibility to concerned 
stakeholders. 
 
F.6  The Social Accountability (SA) 8000 (2008). 
The SA 8000 standard is a voluntary, universal and auditable 
standard for decent work conditions that was developed by Social 
Accountability International, a multi-stakeholder Non-Government 
Organisations (NGOs) initiative. The SA8000 standard is based on 
the core conventions of the International Labour Organisation, the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The SA8000 standards are 
including child labour, forced and compulsory labour, health and 
safety, freedom of association and right to collective bargaining, 
discrimination, disciplinary practices, working hours, remuneration, 
and management systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
